Nolasco v COMELEC
FACTS
A disqualification case was filed against Meycauayan, Bulacan Mayor-elect Florentino Blanco for alleged performing acts which are grounds for disqualification under the Omnibus Election Code – giving money to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing election functions: for committing acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy, and for spending an amount for his campaign in excess of what is allowed by the law.
The COMELEC First Division required both parties to submit their position papers. The case was decided against Blanco.
A reconsideration was moved by Blanco in the COMELEC En Banc. Nolasco, the vice-mayor-elect took part as intervenor, urging that should Blanco be finally disqualified, the mayoralty position be turned over to him. The parties were allowed to file their memoranda. En Banc denied Blanco and Nolasco’s motions thus this petition for certiorari.
Issues:
1. WON Blanco was denied due process and equal protection of laws
2. WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in proclaiming Alarilla as the duly elected mayor
Held:
1. Blanco was not denied due process and equal protection of the laws. He was given all the opportunity to prove that the evidence on his disqualification was not strong. Blanco’s contention that the minimum quantum of evidence was not met is untenable. What RA 6646 and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure require is a mere evidence of guilt that should be strong to justify the COMELEC in suspending a winning candidate’s proclamation.
2. Nolasco, not Alarilla, is adjudged as the Mayor of Meycauayan. It is already a settled principle in the case of Reyes v COMELEC that the candidate with the second highest number of votes cannot be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate be disqualified. There cannot be an assumption that the second placer would have received the other votes otherwise it is a judgment substituting the mind of a voter. It cannot be assumed that the second placer would have won the elections because in the situation where the disqualified candidate is excluded, the condition would have substantially changed.
fr. atty nas^^
Sunday, February 28, 2010
marquez vs. comelec
Marquez v COMELEC
Facts:
Marquez, a candidate for an elective position in Quezon Province during the 1998 elections, filed a petition praying for the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of Rodriguez on the ground of disqualification under section 40 of the Local Government Code (Section 40. Disqualification. The following persons are disqualified from running for any local elective position... (e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad.)
Rodriguez is allegedly criminally charged with insurance fraud in the United States and that his arrest is yet to be served because of his flight from the country.
The COMELEC dismissed Marquez’s Petition.
Rodriguez was proclaimed the Governor-elect of Quezon.
Issues:
WON Rodriguez, at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy, is said to be a fugitive from justice as provided for in section 40 of the Local Government Code.
Held:
“Fugitive from justice” does not mean a person convicted by final judgment. It includes those who after being charged flee to avoid prosecution. The COMELEC is directed to proceed and settle the case in conformity of the given clarification with the term “fugitive from justice”.
fr. atty nas^^
Facts:
Marquez, a candidate for an elective position in Quezon Province during the 1998 elections, filed a petition praying for the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of Rodriguez on the ground of disqualification under section 40 of the Local Government Code (Section 40. Disqualification. The following persons are disqualified from running for any local elective position... (e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad.)
Rodriguez is allegedly criminally charged with insurance fraud in the United States and that his arrest is yet to be served because of his flight from the country.
The COMELEC dismissed Marquez’s Petition.
Rodriguez was proclaimed the Governor-elect of Quezon.
Issues:
WON Rodriguez, at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy, is said to be a fugitive from justice as provided for in section 40 of the Local Government Code.
Held:
“Fugitive from justice” does not mean a person convicted by final judgment. It includes those who after being charged flee to avoid prosecution. The COMELEC is directed to proceed and settle the case in conformity of the given clarification with the term “fugitive from justice”.
fr. atty nas^^
adiong vs. comelec
ADIONG vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 103956
March 31, 1992
FACTS:
On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its powers granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws.
Section 15(a) of the resolution provides:
Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. — The following are lawful election propaganda:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals… Provided, That decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof.
Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:
Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda. —
It is unlawful:…
(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place, whether public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or billboards…
Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections assails the COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes.
HELD:
the petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of Section 15 (a) of Resolution No. 2347 of the COMELEC providing that "decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof" is DECLARED NULL and VOID.
The COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds.
The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him.
Also, the questioned prohibition premised on the statute (RA 6646) and as couched in the resolution is void for overbreadth. The restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle (The provisions allowing regulation are so loosely worded that they include the posting of decals or stickers in the privacy of one's living room or bedroom.) In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. (The right to property may be subject to a greater degree of regulation but when this right is joined by a "liberty" interest, the burden of justification on the part of the Government must be exceptionally convincing and irrefutable. The burden is not met in this case.)
Additionally, the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII, section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles. It is to be reiterated that the posting of decals and stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen becomes crucial in this kind of election propaganda not the financial resources of the candidate.
In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution:
NOTES:
-A statute is considered void for overbreadth when "it offends the constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms
- Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns, it includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose of it; and the Constitution
- The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles does not endanger any substantial government interest. There is no clear public interest threatened by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen's right of free speech and expression. Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled.
Complete provisions (for review)
Resolution No. 2347:
Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. — The following are lawful election propaganda:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers, handwritten or printed letters, or other written or printed materials not more than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches in width and fourteen (14) inches in length. Provided, That decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof.
Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:
Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda. —
It is unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place, whether public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or billboards, at the campaign headquarters of the candidate or political party, organization or coalition, or at the candidate's own residential house or one of his residential houses, if he has more than one: Provided, that such posters or election propaganda shall not exceed two (2) feet by three (3) feet in size. (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code -on lawful election propaganda
Lawful election propaganda. — Lawful election propaganda shall include:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers or other written or printed materials of a size not more than eight and one-half inches in width and fourteen inches in length;
(b) Handwritten or printed letters urging voters to vote for or against any particular candidate;
(c) Cloth, paper or cardboard posters, whether framed or posted, with an area not exceeding two feet by three feet, except that, at the site and on the occasion of a public meeting or rally, or in announcing the holding of said meeting or rally, streamers not exceeding three feet by eight feet in size, shall be allowed: Provided, That said streamers may not be displayed except one week before the date of the meeting or rally and that it shall be removed within seventy-two hours after said meeting or rally; or
(d) All other forms of election propaganda not prohibited by this Code as the Commission may authorize after due notice to all interested parties and hearing where all the interested parties were given an equal opportunity to be heard: Provided, That the Commission's authorization shall be published in two newspapers of general circulation throughout the nation for at least twice within one week after the authorization has been granted. (Section 37, 1978 EC)
Republic Act No. 6646-
Section 11(a): Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. — In addition to the forms of election propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful: (a) to draw, paint, inscribe, write, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place, whether private, or public, except in the common poster areas and/or billboards provided in the immediately preceding section, at the candidate's own residence, or at the campaign headquarters of the candidate or political party: Provided, That such posters or election propaganda shall in no case exceed two (2) feet by three (3) feet in area: Provided, Further, That at the site of and on the occasion of a public meeting or rally, streamers, not more than two (2) and not exceeding three (3) feet by eight (8) feet each may be displayed five (5) days before the date of the meeting or rally, and shall be removed within twenty-four (24) hours after said meeting or rally; . . . (Emphasis supplied)
G.R. No. 103956
March 31, 1992
FACTS:
On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its powers granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws.
Section 15(a) of the resolution provides:
Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. — The following are lawful election propaganda:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals… Provided, That decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof.
Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:
Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda. —
It is unlawful:…
(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place, whether public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or billboards…
Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections assails the COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes.
HELD:
the petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of Section 15 (a) of Resolution No. 2347 of the COMELEC providing that "decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof" is DECLARED NULL and VOID.
The COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds.
The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him.
Also, the questioned prohibition premised on the statute (RA 6646) and as couched in the resolution is void for overbreadth. The restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle (The provisions allowing regulation are so loosely worded that they include the posting of decals or stickers in the privacy of one's living room or bedroom.) In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. (The right to property may be subject to a greater degree of regulation but when this right is joined by a "liberty" interest, the burden of justification on the part of the Government must be exceptionally convincing and irrefutable. The burden is not met in this case.)
Additionally, the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII, section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles. It is to be reiterated that the posting of decals and stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen becomes crucial in this kind of election propaganda not the financial resources of the candidate.
In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution:
NOTES:
-A statute is considered void for overbreadth when "it offends the constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms
- Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns, it includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose of it; and the Constitution
- The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles does not endanger any substantial government interest. There is no clear public interest threatened by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen's right of free speech and expression. Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled.
Complete provisions (for review)
Resolution No. 2347:
Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. — The following are lawful election propaganda:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers, handwritten or printed letters, or other written or printed materials not more than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches in width and fourteen (14) inches in length. Provided, That decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof.
Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:
Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda. —
It is unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place, whether public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or billboards, at the campaign headquarters of the candidate or political party, organization or coalition, or at the candidate's own residential house or one of his residential houses, if he has more than one: Provided, that such posters or election propaganda shall not exceed two (2) feet by three (3) feet in size. (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code -on lawful election propaganda
Lawful election propaganda. — Lawful election propaganda shall include:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers or other written or printed materials of a size not more than eight and one-half inches in width and fourteen inches in length;
(b) Handwritten or printed letters urging voters to vote for or against any particular candidate;
(c) Cloth, paper or cardboard posters, whether framed or posted, with an area not exceeding two feet by three feet, except that, at the site and on the occasion of a public meeting or rally, or in announcing the holding of said meeting or rally, streamers not exceeding three feet by eight feet in size, shall be allowed: Provided, That said streamers may not be displayed except one week before the date of the meeting or rally and that it shall be removed within seventy-two hours after said meeting or rally; or
(d) All other forms of election propaganda not prohibited by this Code as the Commission may authorize after due notice to all interested parties and hearing where all the interested parties were given an equal opportunity to be heard: Provided, That the Commission's authorization shall be published in two newspapers of general circulation throughout the nation for at least twice within one week after the authorization has been granted. (Section 37, 1978 EC)
Republic Act No. 6646-
Section 11(a): Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. — In addition to the forms of election propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful: (a) to draw, paint, inscribe, write, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place, whether private, or public, except in the common poster areas and/or billboards provided in the immediately preceding section, at the candidate's own residence, or at the campaign headquarters of the candidate or political party: Provided, That such posters or election propaganda shall in no case exceed two (2) feet by three (3) feet in area: Provided, Further, That at the site of and on the occasion of a public meeting or rally, streamers, not more than two (2) and not exceeding three (3) feet by eight (8) feet each may be displayed five (5) days before the date of the meeting or rally, and shall be removed within twenty-four (24) hours after said meeting or rally; . . . (Emphasis supplied)
pilar vs. comelec
JUANITO C. PILAR vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 115245/ 245 SCRA 759
July 11, 1995
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolution of the COMELEC in UND No. 94-040.
Petitioner Pilar filed his COC for the position of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. 3 days after, petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy.
The COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of P10,000.00 for failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2348, in turn implementing R.A. No. 7166 which provides that:
Statement of Contributions and Expenditures: Effect of Failure to File Statement. Every candidate and treasurer of the political party shall, within thirty (30) days after the day of the election, file in duplicate with the offices of the Commission the full, true and itemized statement of all contributions and expenditures in connection with the election.
Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and expenditures because he was a "non-candidate," having withdrawn his certificates of candidacy three days after its filing. Petitioner posits that "it is . . . clear from the law that candidate must have entered the political contest, and should have either won or lost"
COMELEC denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner and deemed final its first decision. Petitioner went to the COMELEC En Banc (UND No. 94-040), which denied the petition. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Did Petitioner's withdrawal of his candidacy extinguish his liability for the administrative fine.
HELD:
The petition is DISMISSED.
Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that "every candidate" has the obligation to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term "every candidate" must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy. Furthermore, Section 14 of the law uses the word "shall." As a general rule, the use of the word "shall" in a statute implies that the statute is mandatory, and imposes a duty which may be enforced , particularly if public policy is in favor of this meaning or where public interest is involved. We apply the general rule.
Also, Section 13 of Resolution No. 2348 categorically refers to "all candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy.” It is not improbable that a candidate who withdrew his candidacy has accepted contributions and incurred expenditures, even in the short span of his campaign. The evil sought to be prevented by the law is not all too remote.
Lastly, we note that under the fourth paragraph of Section 73 of the B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, it is provided that "[t]he filing or withdrawal of certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred."
NOTES:
- Admittedly, contributions and expenditures are made for the purpose of influencing the results of the elections. The state has an interest in seeing that the electoral process is clean, and ultimately expressive of the true will of the electorate. One way of attaining such objective is to pass legislation regulating contributions and expenditures of candidates, and compelling the publication of the same.
- It is noteworthy that Resolution No. 2348 even contemplates the situation where a candidate may not have received any contribution or made any expenditure. Such a candidate is not excused from filing a statement, and is in fact required to file a statement to that effect. Under Section 15 of Resolution No. 2348, it is provided that "[i]f a candidate or treasurer of the party has received no contribution, made no expenditure, or has no pending obligation, the statement shall reflect such fact."
Complete provisions (for review)
R.A. No. 7166 entitled "An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes" provides as follows:
Section 14- Statement of Contributions and Expenditures: Effect of Failure to File Statement. Every candidate and treasurer of the political party shall, within thirty (30) days after the day of the election, file in duplicate with the offices of the Commission the full, true and itemized statement of all contributions and expenditures in connection with the election.
No person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has filed the statement of contributions and expenditures herein required.
The same prohibition shall apply if the political party which nominated the winning candidate fails to file the statement required herein within the period prescribed by this Act.
Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file the statements or reports in connection with electoral contributions and expenditures as required herein shall constitute an administrative offense for which the offenders shall be liable to pay an administrative fine ranging from One Thousand Pesos ( P1,000.00) to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00), in the discretion of the Commission.
The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of such failure; otherwise, it shall be enforceable by a writ of execution issued by the Commission against the properties of the offender.
It shall be the duty of every city or municipal election registrar to advise in writing, by personal delivery or registered mail, within five (5) days from the date of election all candidates residing in his jurisdiction to comply with their obligation to file their statements of contributions and expenditures.
For the commission of a second or subsequent offense under this Section, the administrative fine shall be from Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) to Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00), in the discretion of the Commission. In addition, the offender shall be subject to perpetual disqualification to hold public office (Emphasis supplied).
COMELEC Resolution No. 2348 (Re: Rules and Regulations Governing Electoral Contributions and Expenditures in Connection with the National and Local Elections on May 11, 1992)
Sec. 13. Statement of contributions and expenditures: Reminders to candidates to file statements. Within five (5) days from the day of the election, the Law Department of the Commission, the regional election director of the National Capital Region, the provincial election supervisors and the election registrars shall advise in writing by personal delivery or registered mail all candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy with them to comply with their obligation to file their statements of contributions and expenditures in connection with the elections. Every election registrar shall also advise all candidates residing in his jurisdiction to comply with said obligation (Emphasis supplied).
Sec. 17. Effect of failure to file statement. (a) No person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has filed the statement of contributions and expenditures herein required.
The same prohibition shall apply if the political party which nominated the winning candidates fails to file the statement required within the period prescribed by law.
(b) Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file statements or reports in connection with the electoral contributions and expenditures as required herein shall constitute an administrative offense for which the offenders shall be liable to pay an administrative fine ranging from One Thousand Pesos (P1,000) to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000), in the discretion of the Commission.
The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of such failure; otherwise, it shall be enforceable by a writ of execution issued by the Commission against the properties of the offender.
For the commission of a second or subsequent offense under this section, the administrative fine shall be from Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000) to Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000), in the discretion of the Commission. In addition, the offender shall be subject to perpetual disqualification to hold public office.
G.R. No. 115245/ 245 SCRA 759
July 11, 1995
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolution of the COMELEC in UND No. 94-040.
Petitioner Pilar filed his COC for the position of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. 3 days after, petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy.
The COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of P10,000.00 for failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2348, in turn implementing R.A. No. 7166 which provides that:
Statement of Contributions and Expenditures: Effect of Failure to File Statement. Every candidate and treasurer of the political party shall, within thirty (30) days after the day of the election, file in duplicate with the offices of the Commission the full, true and itemized statement of all contributions and expenditures in connection with the election.
Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and expenditures because he was a "non-candidate," having withdrawn his certificates of candidacy three days after its filing. Petitioner posits that "it is . . . clear from the law that candidate must have entered the political contest, and should have either won or lost"
COMELEC denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner and deemed final its first decision. Petitioner went to the COMELEC En Banc (UND No. 94-040), which denied the petition. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Did Petitioner's withdrawal of his candidacy extinguish his liability for the administrative fine.
HELD:
The petition is DISMISSED.
Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that "every candidate" has the obligation to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term "every candidate" must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy. Furthermore, Section 14 of the law uses the word "shall." As a general rule, the use of the word "shall" in a statute implies that the statute is mandatory, and imposes a duty which may be enforced , particularly if public policy is in favor of this meaning or where public interest is involved. We apply the general rule.
Also, Section 13 of Resolution No. 2348 categorically refers to "all candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy.” It is not improbable that a candidate who withdrew his candidacy has accepted contributions and incurred expenditures, even in the short span of his campaign. The evil sought to be prevented by the law is not all too remote.
Lastly, we note that under the fourth paragraph of Section 73 of the B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, it is provided that "[t]he filing or withdrawal of certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred."
NOTES:
- Admittedly, contributions and expenditures are made for the purpose of influencing the results of the elections. The state has an interest in seeing that the electoral process is clean, and ultimately expressive of the true will of the electorate. One way of attaining such objective is to pass legislation regulating contributions and expenditures of candidates, and compelling the publication of the same.
- It is noteworthy that Resolution No. 2348 even contemplates the situation where a candidate may not have received any contribution or made any expenditure. Such a candidate is not excused from filing a statement, and is in fact required to file a statement to that effect. Under Section 15 of Resolution No. 2348, it is provided that "[i]f a candidate or treasurer of the party has received no contribution, made no expenditure, or has no pending obligation, the statement shall reflect such fact."
Complete provisions (for review)
R.A. No. 7166 entitled "An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes" provides as follows:
Section 14- Statement of Contributions and Expenditures: Effect of Failure to File Statement. Every candidate and treasurer of the political party shall, within thirty (30) days after the day of the election, file in duplicate with the offices of the Commission the full, true and itemized statement of all contributions and expenditures in connection with the election.
No person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has filed the statement of contributions and expenditures herein required.
The same prohibition shall apply if the political party which nominated the winning candidate fails to file the statement required herein within the period prescribed by this Act.
Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file the statements or reports in connection with electoral contributions and expenditures as required herein shall constitute an administrative offense for which the offenders shall be liable to pay an administrative fine ranging from One Thousand Pesos ( P1,000.00) to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00), in the discretion of the Commission.
The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of such failure; otherwise, it shall be enforceable by a writ of execution issued by the Commission against the properties of the offender.
It shall be the duty of every city or municipal election registrar to advise in writing, by personal delivery or registered mail, within five (5) days from the date of election all candidates residing in his jurisdiction to comply with their obligation to file their statements of contributions and expenditures.
For the commission of a second or subsequent offense under this Section, the administrative fine shall be from Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) to Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00), in the discretion of the Commission. In addition, the offender shall be subject to perpetual disqualification to hold public office (Emphasis supplied).
COMELEC Resolution No. 2348 (Re: Rules and Regulations Governing Electoral Contributions and Expenditures in Connection with the National and Local Elections on May 11, 1992)
Sec. 13. Statement of contributions and expenditures: Reminders to candidates to file statements. Within five (5) days from the day of the election, the Law Department of the Commission, the regional election director of the National Capital Region, the provincial election supervisors and the election registrars shall advise in writing by personal delivery or registered mail all candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy with them to comply with their obligation to file their statements of contributions and expenditures in connection with the elections. Every election registrar shall also advise all candidates residing in his jurisdiction to comply with said obligation (Emphasis supplied).
Sec. 17. Effect of failure to file statement. (a) No person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has filed the statement of contributions and expenditures herein required.
The same prohibition shall apply if the political party which nominated the winning candidates fails to file the statement required within the period prescribed by law.
(b) Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file statements or reports in connection with the electoral contributions and expenditures as required herein shall constitute an administrative offense for which the offenders shall be liable to pay an administrative fine ranging from One Thousand Pesos (P1,000) to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000), in the discretion of the Commission.
The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of such failure; otherwise, it shall be enforceable by a writ of execution issued by the Commission against the properties of the offender.
For the commission of a second or subsequent offense under this section, the administrative fine shall be from Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000) to Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000), in the discretion of the Commission. In addition, the offender shall be subject to perpetual disqualification to hold public office.
Philippine Press Institute vs. comelec
Phil. Press Institute, Inc. vs. Comelec
244 scra 272
Facts:
In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, PPI, a non-stock, non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers, asks us to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. Petitioner also contends that the 22 March 1995 letter directives of Comelec requiring publishers to give free "Comelec Space" and at the same time process raw data to make it camera-ready, constitute impositions of involuntary servitude, contrary to the provisions of Section 18 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Finally, PPI argues that Section 8 of Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press and of expression.
On the other hand, The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment on behalf of respondent Comelec alleging that Comelec Resolution No. 2772 does not impose upon the publishers any obligation to provide free print space in the newspapers as it does not provide any criminal or administrative sanction for non-compliance with that Resolution. According to the Solicitor General, the questioned Resolution merely established guidelines to be followed in connection with the procurement of "Comelec space," the procedure for and mode of allocation of such space to candidates and the conditions or requirements for the candidate's utilization of the "Comelec space" procured. At the same time, however, the Solicitor General argues that even if the questioned Resolution and its implementing letter directives are viewed as mandatory, the same would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police power of the State. The Solicitor General also maintains that Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the Comelec over the communication and information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.
Issue:
Whether or not Resolution No. 2772 issued by respondent Commission on Elections is valid.
Held:
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED in part and Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 in its present form and the related letter-directives dated 22 March 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE as null and void, and the Temporary Restraining Order is hereby MADE PERMANENT. The Petition is DISMISSED in part, to the extent it relates to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772. No pronouncement as to costs.
Ratio Decidendi:
1. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, in its present form and as interpreted by Comelec in its 22 March 1995 letter directives, purports to require print media enterprises to "donate" free print space to Comelec. As such, Section 2 suffers from a fatal constitutional vice and must be set aside and nullified.
2. To the extent it pertains to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition must be dismissed for lack of an actual, justiciable case or controversy.
fr. atty valles^^
244 scra 272
Facts:
In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, PPI, a non-stock, non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers, asks us to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. Petitioner also contends that the 22 March 1995 letter directives of Comelec requiring publishers to give free "Comelec Space" and at the same time process raw data to make it camera-ready, constitute impositions of involuntary servitude, contrary to the provisions of Section 18 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Finally, PPI argues that Section 8 of Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press and of expression.
On the other hand, The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment on behalf of respondent Comelec alleging that Comelec Resolution No. 2772 does not impose upon the publishers any obligation to provide free print space in the newspapers as it does not provide any criminal or administrative sanction for non-compliance with that Resolution. According to the Solicitor General, the questioned Resolution merely established guidelines to be followed in connection with the procurement of "Comelec space," the procedure for and mode of allocation of such space to candidates and the conditions or requirements for the candidate's utilization of the "Comelec space" procured. At the same time, however, the Solicitor General argues that even if the questioned Resolution and its implementing letter directives are viewed as mandatory, the same would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police power of the State. The Solicitor General also maintains that Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the Comelec over the communication and information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.
Issue:
Whether or not Resolution No. 2772 issued by respondent Commission on Elections is valid.
Held:
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED in part and Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 in its present form and the related letter-directives dated 22 March 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE as null and void, and the Temporary Restraining Order is hereby MADE PERMANENT. The Petition is DISMISSED in part, to the extent it relates to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772. No pronouncement as to costs.
Ratio Decidendi:
1. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, in its present form and as interpreted by Comelec in its 22 March 1995 letter directives, purports to require print media enterprises to "donate" free print space to Comelec. As such, Section 2 suffers from a fatal constitutional vice and must be set aside and nullified.
2. To the extent it pertains to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition must be dismissed for lack of an actual, justiciable case or controversy.
fr. atty valles^^
penera vs. comelec (motion for consideration)
Penera vs. Commission on Elections, et al.
G.R. No. 181613
25 November 2009
(motion for reconsideration)
Facts:
On 11 September 2009, the Supreme Court affirmed the COMELEC’s decision to
disqualify petitioner Rosalinda Penera (Penera) as mayoralty candidate in Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte, for engaging in election campaign outside the campaign period, in violation of Section 80 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (the Omnibus Election Code).
Penera moved for reconsideration, arguing that she was not yet a candidate at the time of the supposed premature campaigning, since under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436 (the law authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated election system for the process of voting, counting of votes, and canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local elections), as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, one is not officially a candidate until the start of the campaign period.
Issue:
Whether or not Penera’s disqualification for engaging in premature campaigning should be reconsidered.
Holding:
Granting Penera’s motion for reconsideration, the Supreme Court En Banc held that
Penera did not engage in premature campaigning and should, thus, not be disqualified as a mayoralty candidate. The Court said –
(A) The Court’s 11 September 2009 Decision (or “the assailed Decision”) considered a
person who files a certificate of candidacy already a “candidate” even before the start of the campaign period. This is contrary to the clear intent and letter of Section 15 of Republic Act 8436, as amended, which states that a person who files his certificate of candidacy will only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period, and unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of such campaign period.
Thus, applying said law:
(1) The effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a
candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the start of the campaign
period, the same partisan political acts are lawful.
(2) Accordingly, a candidate is liable for an election offense only for
acts done during the campaign period, not before. In other words, election
offenses can be committed by a candidate only upon the start of the campaign
period. Before the start of the campaign period, such election offenses cannot be
so committed. Since the law is clear, the Court has no recourse but to apply it. The forum for examining the wisdom of the law, and enacting remedial measures, is not the Court but the Legislature.
(B) Contrary to the assailed Decision, Section 15 of R.A. 8436, as amended, does not
provide that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are unlawful, but may be prosecuted only upon the start of the campaign period. Neither does the law state that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are temporarily lawful, but becomes unlawful upon the start of the campaign period. Besides, such a law as envisioned in the Decision, which defines a criminal act and curtails freedom of expression and speech, would be void for vagueness.
(C) That Section 15 of R.A. 8436 does not expressly state that campaigning before the start of the campaign period is lawful, as the assailed Decision asserted, is of no moment. It is a basic principle of law that any act is lawful unless expressly declared unlawful by law. The mere fact that the law does not declare an act unlawful ipso facto means that the act is lawful. Thus, there is no need for Congress to declare in Section 15 of R.A. 8436 that partisan political activities before the start of the campaign period are lawful. It is sufficient for Congress to state that “any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period.” The only inescapable and logical result is that the same acts, if done before the start of the campaign period, are lawful.
(D) The Court’s 11 September 2009 Decision also reversed Lanot vs. COMELEC (G.R.
No. 164858; 16 November 2006). Lanot was decided on the ground that one who files a
certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period. This ground was based on the deliberations of the legislators who explained that the early deadline for filing certificates of candidacy under R.A. 8436 was set only to afford time to prepare the machine-readable ballots, and they intended to preserve the existing election periods, such that one who files his certificate of candidacy to meet the early deadline will still not be considered as a candidate.
When Congress amended R.A. 8436, Congress decided to expressly incorporate the
Lanot doctrine into law, thus, the provision in Section 15 of R.A. 8436 that a person who files his certificate of candidacy shall be considered a candidate only at the start of the campaign period. Congress wanted to insure that no person filing a certificate of candidacy under the early deadline required by the automated election system would be disqualified or penalized for any partisan political act done before the start of the campaign period. This provision cannot be annulled by the Court except on the sole ground of its unconstitutionality.
The assailed Decision, however, did not claim that this provision is unconstitutional. In fact, the assailed Decision considered the entire Section 15 good law. Thus, the Decision was self-contradictory — reversing Lanot but maintaining the constitutionality of the said provision.
Ponente: J. Antonio T. Carpio
Vote: 9-5
https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=gmail&attid=0.2&thid=12713dbcf90f83d1&mt=application%2Fpdf&url=https%3A%2F%2Fmail.google.com%2Fmail%2F%3Fui%3D2%26ik%3Ded08149255%26view%3Datt%26th%3D12713dbcf90f83d1%26attid%3D0.2%26disp%3Dattd%26zw&sig=AHIEtbScAiyWBUEytI80uBirie8BkQxZog
G.R. No. 181613
25 November 2009
(motion for reconsideration)
Facts:
On 11 September 2009, the Supreme Court affirmed the COMELEC’s decision to
disqualify petitioner Rosalinda Penera (Penera) as mayoralty candidate in Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte, for engaging in election campaign outside the campaign period, in violation of Section 80 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (the Omnibus Election Code).
Penera moved for reconsideration, arguing that she was not yet a candidate at the time of the supposed premature campaigning, since under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436 (the law authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated election system for the process of voting, counting of votes, and canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local elections), as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, one is not officially a candidate until the start of the campaign period.
Issue:
Whether or not Penera’s disqualification for engaging in premature campaigning should be reconsidered.
Holding:
Granting Penera’s motion for reconsideration, the Supreme Court En Banc held that
Penera did not engage in premature campaigning and should, thus, not be disqualified as a mayoralty candidate. The Court said –
(A) The Court’s 11 September 2009 Decision (or “the assailed Decision”) considered a
person who files a certificate of candidacy already a “candidate” even before the start of the campaign period. This is contrary to the clear intent and letter of Section 15 of Republic Act 8436, as amended, which states that a person who files his certificate of candidacy will only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period, and unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of such campaign period.
Thus, applying said law:
(1) The effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a
candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the start of the campaign
period, the same partisan political acts are lawful.
(2) Accordingly, a candidate is liable for an election offense only for
acts done during the campaign period, not before. In other words, election
offenses can be committed by a candidate only upon the start of the campaign
period. Before the start of the campaign period, such election offenses cannot be
so committed. Since the law is clear, the Court has no recourse but to apply it. The forum for examining the wisdom of the law, and enacting remedial measures, is not the Court but the Legislature.
(B) Contrary to the assailed Decision, Section 15 of R.A. 8436, as amended, does not
provide that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are unlawful, but may be prosecuted only upon the start of the campaign period. Neither does the law state that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are temporarily lawful, but becomes unlawful upon the start of the campaign period. Besides, such a law as envisioned in the Decision, which defines a criminal act and curtails freedom of expression and speech, would be void for vagueness.
(C) That Section 15 of R.A. 8436 does not expressly state that campaigning before the start of the campaign period is lawful, as the assailed Decision asserted, is of no moment. It is a basic principle of law that any act is lawful unless expressly declared unlawful by law. The mere fact that the law does not declare an act unlawful ipso facto means that the act is lawful. Thus, there is no need for Congress to declare in Section 15 of R.A. 8436 that partisan political activities before the start of the campaign period are lawful. It is sufficient for Congress to state that “any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period.” The only inescapable and logical result is that the same acts, if done before the start of the campaign period, are lawful.
(D) The Court’s 11 September 2009 Decision also reversed Lanot vs. COMELEC (G.R.
No. 164858; 16 November 2006). Lanot was decided on the ground that one who files a
certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period. This ground was based on the deliberations of the legislators who explained that the early deadline for filing certificates of candidacy under R.A. 8436 was set only to afford time to prepare the machine-readable ballots, and they intended to preserve the existing election periods, such that one who files his certificate of candidacy to meet the early deadline will still not be considered as a candidate.
When Congress amended R.A. 8436, Congress decided to expressly incorporate the
Lanot doctrine into law, thus, the provision in Section 15 of R.A. 8436 that a person who files his certificate of candidacy shall be considered a candidate only at the start of the campaign period. Congress wanted to insure that no person filing a certificate of candidacy under the early deadline required by the automated election system would be disqualified or penalized for any partisan political act done before the start of the campaign period. This provision cannot be annulled by the Court except on the sole ground of its unconstitutionality.
The assailed Decision, however, did not claim that this provision is unconstitutional. In fact, the assailed Decision considered the entire Section 15 good law. Thus, the Decision was self-contradictory — reversing Lanot but maintaining the constitutionality of the said provision.
Ponente: J. Antonio T. Carpio
Vote: 9-5
https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=gmail&attid=0.2&thid=12713dbcf90f83d1&mt=application%2Fpdf&url=https%3A%2F%2Fmail.google.com%2Fmail%2F%3Fui%3D2%26ik%3Ded08149255%26view%3Datt%26th%3D12713dbcf90f83d1%26attid%3D0.2%26disp%3Dattd%26zw&sig=AHIEtbScAiyWBUEytI80uBirie8BkQxZog
penera vs. comelec
Penera vs. Commission on Elections (COMELEC), et al.
G.R. 181613
11 September 2009
Facts: The COMELEC disqualified petitioner Rosalinda A. Penera (Penera) as a candidate for
mayor of the Municipality of Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte, for unlawfully engaging in election
campaign before the start of the campaign period for the 2007 Synchronized National and Local
Elections, in violation of Section 80 of Batas Pambansa 881 (the Omnibus Election Code).
The COMELEC found that Penera and her party-mates, after filing their Certificates of
Candidacy (CoCs), conducted a motorcade through Sta. Monica and threw candies to onlookers,
aboard trucks festooned with balloons and banners bearing their names and pictures and the
municipal positions for which they were seeking election, one of which trucks had a sound
system that broadcast their intent to run in the 2007 elections.
COMELEC Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented. He emphasized that under
Section 15 of Republic Act 8436 (the law authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated
election system for the process of voting, counting of votes, and canvassing/consolidating the
results of the national and local elections), as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, one is now
considered a candidate only at the start of the campaign period. Thus, before the start of the
campaign period, there can be no election campaign or partisan political activity because there is
no candidate to speak of. Accordingly, Penera could not be disqualified for premature
campaigning because the motorcade took place outside the campaign period – when Penera was
not yet a “candidate.” Sarmiento posited that Section 15 of R.A. No. 8436, as amended by R.A.
9369, has practically made it impossible to commit premature campaigning at any time, and has,
thus, effectively repealed Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Penera filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court to nullify the
disqualification. She argued that the evidence was grossly insufficient to warrant the
COMELEC’s ruling. She maintained that the motorcade was spontaneous and unplanned, and
the supporters merely joined her and the other candidates.
Issue: Whether or not Penera should be disqualified for engaging in election campaign or
partisan political activity outside the campaign period.
Holding: (A) The Supreme Court En Banc dismissed Penera’s Petition and affirmed her
disqualification because:
(1) Penera raised a question of fact. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and the
sole function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion, and does not include a review of the tribunal’s evaluation of the evidence.
(2) The COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion. Evidence presented to the
COMELEC, including Penera’s own evidence and admissions, sufficiently established that
“Penera and her partymates, after filing their COCs x x, participated in a motorcade which
passed through the different barangays of Sta. Monica, waived their hands to the public, and
threw candies to the onlookers.” With vehicles, balloons, and even candies on hand, Penera can
hardly persuade the Court that the motorcade was spontaneous and unplanned.
“(T)he conduct of a motorcade is a form of election campaign or partisan political
activity, falling squarely within the ambit of Section 79(b)(2) of the Omnibus Election Code, on
‘[h]olding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies,
for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against
a candidate[.]’ x x The obvious purpose of the conduct of motorcades is to introduce the
candidates and the positions, to which they seek to be elected, to the voting public; or to make
them more visible so as to facilitate the recognition and recollection of their names in the minds
of the voters come election time. Unmistakably, motorcades are undertaken for no other purpose
than to promote the election of a particular candidate or candidates.”
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits any person, whether a voter, a
candidate or a party, from engaging in any election campaign or partisan political activity outside
the campaign period (except that political parties may hold political conventions or meetings to
nominate their official candidates within 30 days before the campaign period and 45 days for
Presidential and Vice-Presidential election).
And, under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, a candidate declared by final
decision to have engaged in premature campaigning shall be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Said candidate may also face
criminal prosecution for an election offense under Section 262 of the same Code.
Thus, Penera, who had been elected Mayor of Sta. Monica before the COMELEC
rendered its decision, was disqualified from holding the said office. The proclaimed Vice-Mayor
was declared her rightful successor pursuant to Section 44 of the Local Government Code which
provides that if the mayor fails to qualify or is removed from office, the vice-mayor shall become
the mayor.
(B) The Supreme Court disagreed with COMELEC Commissioner Sarmiento, saying that
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code remains relevant and applicable despite Section 15 of
Republic Act No. 8436, as amended. The Court gave the following reasons:
(1) Republic Act No. 9369, which amended Republic Act No. 8436, did not expressly
repeal Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. An express repeal may not be presumed.
Implied repeals are disfavored, absent a showing of repugnance clear and convincing in
character. When confronted with apparently conflicting statutes, courts should endeavor to
reconcile the same instead of declaring outright the invalidity of one as against the other.
(2) There is no absolute and irreconcilable incompatibility between Section 15 of
Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, and Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, which
prohibits premature campaigning. It is possible to harmonize and reconcile these two provisions
and, thus, give effect to both, to wit:
(a) Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits “any person,
whether or not a voter or candidate” from engaging in election campaign or
partisan political activity outside the campaign period. Thus, premature
campaigning may be committed even by a person who is not a candidate.
Accordingly, the declaration in Lanot vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 164858; 16
November 2006) that “(w)hat Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits
is ‘an election campaign or partisan political activity’ by a ‘candidate’ ‘outside’
of the campaign period,” is erroneous.
(b) It is true that under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended,
a person is not yet officially considered a candidate before the start of the
campaign period, even after the filing of his CoC. Nonetheless, upon the filing
of his COC, such person already explicitly declares his intention to run as a
candidate. When the campaign period starts and he proceeds with his candidacy,
his intent turning into actuality, act/s constituting election campaign or partisan
activity under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code (holding rallies or
parades, making speeches, etc.), which he may have committed after filing his
CoC and before the campaign period, can already be considered as the promotion
of his election as a candidate, constituting premature campaigning, for which he
may be disqualified. Conversely, if he withdraws his CoC before the campaign
period, his act can no longer be viewed as for the promotion of his election, and
there can be no premature campaigning as there is no candidate to begin with.
Thus, a person, after filing his/her COC but prior to his becoming a
candidate (prior to the start of the campaign period), can already commit the acts
described under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code as election
campaign or partisan political activity. However, it is only after said person
officially becomes a candidate, at the beginning of the campaign period, can said
acts be given effect as premature campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code. Only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the start
of the campaign period, can his/her disqualification be sought for acts constituting
premature campaigning.
(c) While a proviso in Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended,
provides that “any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall
take effect only upon the start of the campaign period,” this does not mean
that the acts constituting premature campaigning can only be committed during
the campaign period. Nowhere in the said proviso was it stated that campaigning
before the start of the campaign period is lawful.
If the Court were to rule otherwise, “not only will the prohibited act of premature
campaigning be officially decriminalized, the significance of having a campaign period before
the elections would also be negated. Any unscrupulous individual with the deepest of campaign
war chests could then afford to spend his/her resources to promote his/her candidacy well ahead
of everyone else, thus, undermine the conduct of fair and credible elections. Such is the very
evil that the law seeks to prevent. Our lawmakers could not have intended to cause such an
absurd situation.”
Ponente: J. Minita V. Chico-Nazario
https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=gmail&attid=0.1&thid=12713dbcf90f83d1&mt=application%2Fpdf&url=https%3A%2F%2Fmail.google.com%2Fmail%2F%3Fui%3D2%26ik%3Ded08149255%26view%3Datt%26th%3D12713dbcf90f83d1%26attid%3D0.1%26disp%3Dattd%26zw&sig=AHIEtbTsoKzO7tWsebRTgZkeXABiQQ6GdQ
G.R. 181613
11 September 2009
Facts: The COMELEC disqualified petitioner Rosalinda A. Penera (Penera) as a candidate for
mayor of the Municipality of Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte, for unlawfully engaging in election
campaign before the start of the campaign period for the 2007 Synchronized National and Local
Elections, in violation of Section 80 of Batas Pambansa 881 (the Omnibus Election Code).
The COMELEC found that Penera and her party-mates, after filing their Certificates of
Candidacy (CoCs), conducted a motorcade through Sta. Monica and threw candies to onlookers,
aboard trucks festooned with balloons and banners bearing their names and pictures and the
municipal positions for which they were seeking election, one of which trucks had a sound
system that broadcast their intent to run in the 2007 elections.
COMELEC Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented. He emphasized that under
Section 15 of Republic Act 8436 (the law authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated
election system for the process of voting, counting of votes, and canvassing/consolidating the
results of the national and local elections), as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, one is now
considered a candidate only at the start of the campaign period. Thus, before the start of the
campaign period, there can be no election campaign or partisan political activity because there is
no candidate to speak of. Accordingly, Penera could not be disqualified for premature
campaigning because the motorcade took place outside the campaign period – when Penera was
not yet a “candidate.” Sarmiento posited that Section 15 of R.A. No. 8436, as amended by R.A.
9369, has practically made it impossible to commit premature campaigning at any time, and has,
thus, effectively repealed Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Penera filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court to nullify the
disqualification. She argued that the evidence was grossly insufficient to warrant the
COMELEC’s ruling. She maintained that the motorcade was spontaneous and unplanned, and
the supporters merely joined her and the other candidates.
Issue: Whether or not Penera should be disqualified for engaging in election campaign or
partisan political activity outside the campaign period.
Holding: (A) The Supreme Court En Banc dismissed Penera’s Petition and affirmed her
disqualification because:
(1) Penera raised a question of fact. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and the
sole function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion, and does not include a review of the tribunal’s evaluation of the evidence.
(2) The COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion. Evidence presented to the
COMELEC, including Penera’s own evidence and admissions, sufficiently established that
“Penera and her partymates, after filing their COCs x x, participated in a motorcade which
passed through the different barangays of Sta. Monica, waived their hands to the public, and
threw candies to the onlookers.” With vehicles, balloons, and even candies on hand, Penera can
hardly persuade the Court that the motorcade was spontaneous and unplanned.
“(T)he conduct of a motorcade is a form of election campaign or partisan political
activity, falling squarely within the ambit of Section 79(b)(2) of the Omnibus Election Code, on
‘[h]olding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies,
for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against
a candidate[.]’ x x The obvious purpose of the conduct of motorcades is to introduce the
candidates and the positions, to which they seek to be elected, to the voting public; or to make
them more visible so as to facilitate the recognition and recollection of their names in the minds
of the voters come election time. Unmistakably, motorcades are undertaken for no other purpose
than to promote the election of a particular candidate or candidates.”
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits any person, whether a voter, a
candidate or a party, from engaging in any election campaign or partisan political activity outside
the campaign period (except that political parties may hold political conventions or meetings to
nominate their official candidates within 30 days before the campaign period and 45 days for
Presidential and Vice-Presidential election).
And, under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, a candidate declared by final
decision to have engaged in premature campaigning shall be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Said candidate may also face
criminal prosecution for an election offense under Section 262 of the same Code.
Thus, Penera, who had been elected Mayor of Sta. Monica before the COMELEC
rendered its decision, was disqualified from holding the said office. The proclaimed Vice-Mayor
was declared her rightful successor pursuant to Section 44 of the Local Government Code which
provides that if the mayor fails to qualify or is removed from office, the vice-mayor shall become
the mayor.
(B) The Supreme Court disagreed with COMELEC Commissioner Sarmiento, saying that
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code remains relevant and applicable despite Section 15 of
Republic Act No. 8436, as amended. The Court gave the following reasons:
(1) Republic Act No. 9369, which amended Republic Act No. 8436, did not expressly
repeal Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. An express repeal may not be presumed.
Implied repeals are disfavored, absent a showing of repugnance clear and convincing in
character. When confronted with apparently conflicting statutes, courts should endeavor to
reconcile the same instead of declaring outright the invalidity of one as against the other.
(2) There is no absolute and irreconcilable incompatibility between Section 15 of
Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, and Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, which
prohibits premature campaigning. It is possible to harmonize and reconcile these two provisions
and, thus, give effect to both, to wit:
(a) Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits “any person,
whether or not a voter or candidate” from engaging in election campaign or
partisan political activity outside the campaign period. Thus, premature
campaigning may be committed even by a person who is not a candidate.
Accordingly, the declaration in Lanot vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 164858; 16
November 2006) that “(w)hat Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits
is ‘an election campaign or partisan political activity’ by a ‘candidate’ ‘outside’
of the campaign period,” is erroneous.
(b) It is true that under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended,
a person is not yet officially considered a candidate before the start of the
campaign period, even after the filing of his CoC. Nonetheless, upon the filing
of his COC, such person already explicitly declares his intention to run as a
candidate. When the campaign period starts and he proceeds with his candidacy,
his intent turning into actuality, act/s constituting election campaign or partisan
activity under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code (holding rallies or
parades, making speeches, etc.), which he may have committed after filing his
CoC and before the campaign period, can already be considered as the promotion
of his election as a candidate, constituting premature campaigning, for which he
may be disqualified. Conversely, if he withdraws his CoC before the campaign
period, his act can no longer be viewed as for the promotion of his election, and
there can be no premature campaigning as there is no candidate to begin with.
Thus, a person, after filing his/her COC but prior to his becoming a
candidate (prior to the start of the campaign period), can already commit the acts
described under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code as election
campaign or partisan political activity. However, it is only after said person
officially becomes a candidate, at the beginning of the campaign period, can said
acts be given effect as premature campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code. Only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the start
of the campaign period, can his/her disqualification be sought for acts constituting
premature campaigning.
(c) While a proviso in Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended,
provides that “any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall
take effect only upon the start of the campaign period,” this does not mean
that the acts constituting premature campaigning can only be committed during
the campaign period. Nowhere in the said proviso was it stated that campaigning
before the start of the campaign period is lawful.
If the Court were to rule otherwise, “not only will the prohibited act of premature
campaigning be officially decriminalized, the significance of having a campaign period before
the elections would also be negated. Any unscrupulous individual with the deepest of campaign
war chests could then afford to spend his/her resources to promote his/her candidacy well ahead
of everyone else, thus, undermine the conduct of fair and credible elections. Such is the very
evil that the law seeks to prevent. Our lawmakers could not have intended to cause such an
absurd situation.”
Ponente: J. Minita V. Chico-Nazario
https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=gmail&attid=0.1&thid=12713dbcf90f83d1&mt=application%2Fpdf&url=https%3A%2F%2Fmail.google.com%2Fmail%2F%3Fui%3D2%26ik%3Ded08149255%26view%3Datt%26th%3D12713dbcf90f83d1%26attid%3D0.1%26disp%3Dattd%26zw&sig=AHIEtbTsoKzO7tWsebRTgZkeXABiQQ6GdQ
teves vs. comelec
Teves vs. Comelec
FACTS:
Petitioner was a candidate for the position of Representative of the 3rd legislative district of Negros Oriental during the May 14, 2007 elections. On March 30, 2007, respondent Herminio G. Teves filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that in Teves v. Sandiganbayan, he was convicted of violating Section 3(h), Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for possessing pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit, which is prohibited under Section 89(2) of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, and was sentenced to pay a fine of P10,000.00. Respondent alleged that petitioner is disqualified from running for public office because he was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude which carries the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office.
On May 11, 2007, the COMELEC First Division disqualified petitioner from running for the position of member of House of Representatives and ordered the cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy. It appears, however, that [petitioner] lost in the last 14 May 2007 congressional elections for the position of member of the House of Representatives of the Third district of Negros Oriental thereby rendering the instant Motion for Reconsideration moot and academic.
The petitioner filed a petition which the court found to have merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s violation of Section 3(h), R.A. No. 3019 involves moral turpitude.
HELD:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.
Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general.
Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019 of which petitioner was convicted, reads:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
x x x x
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest.
The essential elements of the violation of said provision are as follows: 1) The accused is a public officer; 2) he has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction; 3) he either: a) intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with such interest, or b) is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or by law.
Thus, there are two modes by which a public officer who has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction may violate Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019. The first mode is when the public officer intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with his financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction. The second mode is when he is prohibited from having such an interest by the Constitution or by law.
Section 89. Prohibited Business and Pecuniary Interest. – (a) It shall be unlawful for any local government official or employee, directly or indirectly, to:
x x x x
(2) Hold such interests in any cockpit or other games licensed by a local government unit….
The offense proved, therefore, is the second mode of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, which is possession of a prohibited interest.
However, conviction under the second mode does not automatically mean that the same involved moral turpitude. A determination of all surrounding circumstances of the violation of the statute must be considered. Besides, moral turpitude does not include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being positively prohibited, as in the instant case.
Thus, petitioner, as then Mayor of Valencia, did not use his influence, authority or power to gain such pecuniary or financial interest in the cockpit. Neither did he intentionally hide his interest in the subject cockpit by transferring the management thereof to his wife considering that the said transfer occurred before the effectivity of the present LGC prohibiting possession of such interest.
The crime committed by petitioner (violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019) did not involve moral turpitude.
FACTS:
Petitioner was a candidate for the position of Representative of the 3rd legislative district of Negros Oriental during the May 14, 2007 elections. On March 30, 2007, respondent Herminio G. Teves filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that in Teves v. Sandiganbayan, he was convicted of violating Section 3(h), Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for possessing pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit, which is prohibited under Section 89(2) of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, and was sentenced to pay a fine of P10,000.00. Respondent alleged that petitioner is disqualified from running for public office because he was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude which carries the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office.
On May 11, 2007, the COMELEC First Division disqualified petitioner from running for the position of member of House of Representatives and ordered the cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy. It appears, however, that [petitioner] lost in the last 14 May 2007 congressional elections for the position of member of the House of Representatives of the Third district of Negros Oriental thereby rendering the instant Motion for Reconsideration moot and academic.
The petitioner filed a petition which the court found to have merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s violation of Section 3(h), R.A. No. 3019 involves moral turpitude.
HELD:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.
Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general.
Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019 of which petitioner was convicted, reads:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
x x x x
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest.
The essential elements of the violation of said provision are as follows: 1) The accused is a public officer; 2) he has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction; 3) he either: a) intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with such interest, or b) is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or by law.
Thus, there are two modes by which a public officer who has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction may violate Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019. The first mode is when the public officer intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with his financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction. The second mode is when he is prohibited from having such an interest by the Constitution or by law.
Section 89. Prohibited Business and Pecuniary Interest. – (a) It shall be unlawful for any local government official or employee, directly or indirectly, to:
x x x x
(2) Hold such interests in any cockpit or other games licensed by a local government unit….
The offense proved, therefore, is the second mode of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, which is possession of a prohibited interest.
However, conviction under the second mode does not automatically mean that the same involved moral turpitude. A determination of all surrounding circumstances of the violation of the statute must be considered. Besides, moral turpitude does not include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being positively prohibited, as in the instant case.
Thus, petitioner, as then Mayor of Valencia, did not use his influence, authority or power to gain such pecuniary or financial interest in the cockpit. Neither did he intentionally hide his interest in the subject cockpit by transferring the management thereof to his wife considering that the said transfer occurred before the effectivity of the present LGC prohibiting possession of such interest.
The crime committed by petitioner (violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019) did not involve moral turpitude.
domingo vs comelec
Domingo vs. COMELEC
313 SCRA 311/ G.R. No. 136587
August 30, 1999
FACTS:
Assailed in this special civil action for certiorari are the En Banc Resolution of the COMELEC and the Resolution of the COMELEC 1st Division, which dismissed, for lack of merit, the petition for disqualification filed by Domingo against herein private respondent, the incumbent mayor of Mandaluyong City.
In May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Ernesto Domingo, Jr. and private respondent Benjamin Abalos, Jr. (Benhur) were both mayoralty candidates of Mandaluyong City. After private respondent's proclamation, Domingo filed the instant petition for disqualification, on the ground that, during the campaign period, private respondent "prodded" his father, then incumbent Mandaluyong City Mayor Benjamin Abalos, Sr., to give "substantial allowances" to public school teachers appointed as chairpersons and members of the Boards of Election Inspector (BEIs) for Mandaluyong City.
Petitioner's allegations obtain from the “Pasyal-Aral" outing for Mandaluyong City public school teachers, then Mayor Abalos, Sr. announcing that the teachers appointed to the BEIs will each be given substantial allowances. Petitioner alleged that it was done so as to influence them into voting for him (Benhur) and ensuring his victory. Petitioner presented as evidence photographs and of the said activity, affidavits of 3 public school teachers, and videotapes showing Mayor Abalos Sr. announcing Benhur as the one responsible for such release.
Petitioner alleges that private respondent's act of "prodding" his father constitutes a violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the pertinent provisions of which read:
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. — Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; . . . shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. . . .
In dismissing the petition for disqualification for insufficiency of evidence and lack of merit, the COMELEC 1st Division admonished petitioner and his counsel for attempting to mislead the COMELEC by making false and untruthful statements in his petition.
On reconsideration, the COMELEC, En Banc, affirmed the findings and conclusions of its 1st Division.
ISSUE:
1. Did Mayor Abalos Jr. violate Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code?
2. Did the COMELEC act with grave abuse of discretion in its act of dismissing the petition for disqualification for insufficiency of evidence, despite the "overwhelming" pieces of evidence of petitioner, consisting of the video cassette, pictures and affidavits, which were "not denied" by private respondent and presented "no evidence" to substantiate his defense
HELD:
The petition is DISMISSED. The assailed COMELEC Resolutions dismissing the petition and affirming the proclamation of private respondent Benjamin Abalos, Jr. as duly elected mayor of Mandaluyong City, are hereby AFFIRMED
1. Nothing in the affidavits suggests knowledge on any degree of participation of private respondent in the grant of these allowances. The name of private respondent was not even mentioned or alluded to by any of the three affiants. The videotapes did not prove his participation therein either.
2. The burden of proving that private respondent indirectly influenced the public school teachers of Mandaluyong City, through his father, Abalos, Sr., was a burden that petitioner failed to meet. Neither is this burden overcome by the argument that private respondent, for himself, had "no evidence" to rebut petitioner's allegations, since the burden of proving factual claims rests on the party raising them
Besides, it is not true that private respondent gave only denials and did not present any evidence to his defense. Benhur presented in evidence a certified true copy of Joint Circular No. 1, series of 1998, issued by the DECS, DBM and DILG, which authorized the payment of allowances of public school teachers chargeable to local government funds. The Joint Circular provided the basis for private respondent's argument that the disbursement of funds by then mayor Abalos, Sr. was valid as having been made pursuant to administrative circular, and was not an unlawful attempt made in conspiracy with private respondent to secure the latter's victory in the elections.
In fine, we find no grave abuse of discretion in the COMELEC's decision to dismiss the petition for disqualification. The conclusion that petitioner's evidence is insufficient to support the charge of violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code was arrived at only after a careful scrutiny of the evidence at hand, especially of the videotapes of petitioner.
NOTES:
Other issues:
1. Is the Resolution of COMELEC violative of his right to due process, and thus, issued with grave abuse of discretion.
- It is petitioner's argument that the dismissal of his petition for disqualification on the ground of insufficiency of evidence was unfounded, considering that no hearing on the merits was conducted by public respondent on the matter.
Well-established is the rule that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard. Where opportunity to be heard is accorded, either through oral arguments or pleadings, there is no denial of procedural due process. Deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard in his motion for reconsideration.
2. Private respondent (COMELEC) contends that, inasmuch as the petition for disqualification and the complaint for election offense involve the same issues and charges, (i.e., vote-buying, exerting undue influence on BEI members), petitioner (Domingo) should be held liable for forum-shopping.
We rule to the contrary. Forum-shopping exists when the petitioner files multiple petitions or complaints involving the same issues in two or more tribunals or agencies.
The issues in the two cases are different. The complaint for election offense is a criminal case which involves the ascertainment of the guilt or innocence of the accused candidate and, like any other criminal case, requires a conviction on proof beyond reasonable doubt. A petition for disqualification, meanwhile, requires merely the determination of whether the respondent committed acts as to merit his disqualification from office, and is done through an administrative proceeding which is summary in character and requires only a clear preponderance of evidence
3. In the Petition, petitioner's counsel admitted that the assailed quotation in the petition for disqualification (admonished by COMELEC) was based on "erroneous transcript" of the speech which was prepared by somebody else, and which he in turn failed to verify for errors. However, he denies having intended to mislead the COMELEC with the inclusion of this statement, but instead submits that the word "Benhur" was "derived" from the succeeding pronouncement of Abalos, Sr., "not because he is my son", which may in turn be inferred to refer to private respondent, who was a mayoralty candidate at the time.
-We find no grave abuse of discretion in the COMELEC's finding that Abalos, Sr.'s controversial statement, effectively reduced to this:
“Your President, together with Lito Motivo, walang tigil yan kakapunta sa akin at not because he is my son siya ang nakikipag-usap sa kanila and came up with a beautiful compromise. . . .”
was seriously insufficient and vague to prove violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.
It is upon the videotape recordings that petitioner lays much reliance on, in proving his case for disqualification. The recordings are supposed to document how former mayor Abalos, Sr. announced that his son, private respondent herein, prodded his father to release substantial allowances to teachers who will act as members of the BEIs. As found by the COMELEC 1st Division, the name uttered in the announcement was not "Benhur", private respondent's nickname and what petitioner alleged was uttered, but "Lito Motivo", a name which truly sounded unlike "Benhur". Also, when the COMELEC, through its 1st Division, viewed the videotape submitted by petitioner, "the speech of Mayor Abalos, Sr. was cut and so (they) also did not see and hear that part of Mayor Abalos, Sr.'s speech allegedly uttered by him."
4. Where there is no proof of grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, fraud or error of law in the questioned Resolutions, the Court may not review the factual findings of COMELEC, nor substitute its own findings on the sufficiency of evidence.
5. By law, the mayor is a co-chairman of the City School Board, there is nothing unusual in his (Abalos sr.) having co-sponsored the said event.
313 SCRA 311/ G.R. No. 136587
August 30, 1999
FACTS:
Assailed in this special civil action for certiorari are the En Banc Resolution of the COMELEC and the Resolution of the COMELEC 1st Division, which dismissed, for lack of merit, the petition for disqualification filed by Domingo against herein private respondent, the incumbent mayor of Mandaluyong City.
In May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Ernesto Domingo, Jr. and private respondent Benjamin Abalos, Jr. (Benhur) were both mayoralty candidates of Mandaluyong City. After private respondent's proclamation, Domingo filed the instant petition for disqualification, on the ground that, during the campaign period, private respondent "prodded" his father, then incumbent Mandaluyong City Mayor Benjamin Abalos, Sr., to give "substantial allowances" to public school teachers appointed as chairpersons and members of the Boards of Election Inspector (BEIs) for Mandaluyong City.
Petitioner's allegations obtain from the “Pasyal-Aral" outing for Mandaluyong City public school teachers, then Mayor Abalos, Sr. announcing that the teachers appointed to the BEIs will each be given substantial allowances. Petitioner alleged that it was done so as to influence them into voting for him (Benhur) and ensuring his victory. Petitioner presented as evidence photographs and of the said activity, affidavits of 3 public school teachers, and videotapes showing Mayor Abalos Sr. announcing Benhur as the one responsible for such release.
Petitioner alleges that private respondent's act of "prodding" his father constitutes a violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the pertinent provisions of which read:
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. — Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; . . . shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. . . .
In dismissing the petition for disqualification for insufficiency of evidence and lack of merit, the COMELEC 1st Division admonished petitioner and his counsel for attempting to mislead the COMELEC by making false and untruthful statements in his petition.
On reconsideration, the COMELEC, En Banc, affirmed the findings and conclusions of its 1st Division.
ISSUE:
1. Did Mayor Abalos Jr. violate Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code?
2. Did the COMELEC act with grave abuse of discretion in its act of dismissing the petition for disqualification for insufficiency of evidence, despite the "overwhelming" pieces of evidence of petitioner, consisting of the video cassette, pictures and affidavits, which were "not denied" by private respondent and presented "no evidence" to substantiate his defense
HELD:
The petition is DISMISSED. The assailed COMELEC Resolutions dismissing the petition and affirming the proclamation of private respondent Benjamin Abalos, Jr. as duly elected mayor of Mandaluyong City, are hereby AFFIRMED
1. Nothing in the affidavits suggests knowledge on any degree of participation of private respondent in the grant of these allowances. The name of private respondent was not even mentioned or alluded to by any of the three affiants. The videotapes did not prove his participation therein either.
2. The burden of proving that private respondent indirectly influenced the public school teachers of Mandaluyong City, through his father, Abalos, Sr., was a burden that petitioner failed to meet. Neither is this burden overcome by the argument that private respondent, for himself, had "no evidence" to rebut petitioner's allegations, since the burden of proving factual claims rests on the party raising them
Besides, it is not true that private respondent gave only denials and did not present any evidence to his defense. Benhur presented in evidence a certified true copy of Joint Circular No. 1, series of 1998, issued by the DECS, DBM and DILG, which authorized the payment of allowances of public school teachers chargeable to local government funds. The Joint Circular provided the basis for private respondent's argument that the disbursement of funds by then mayor Abalos, Sr. was valid as having been made pursuant to administrative circular, and was not an unlawful attempt made in conspiracy with private respondent to secure the latter's victory in the elections.
In fine, we find no grave abuse of discretion in the COMELEC's decision to dismiss the petition for disqualification. The conclusion that petitioner's evidence is insufficient to support the charge of violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code was arrived at only after a careful scrutiny of the evidence at hand, especially of the videotapes of petitioner.
NOTES:
Other issues:
1. Is the Resolution of COMELEC violative of his right to due process, and thus, issued with grave abuse of discretion.
- It is petitioner's argument that the dismissal of his petition for disqualification on the ground of insufficiency of evidence was unfounded, considering that no hearing on the merits was conducted by public respondent on the matter.
Well-established is the rule that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard. Where opportunity to be heard is accorded, either through oral arguments or pleadings, there is no denial of procedural due process. Deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard in his motion for reconsideration.
2. Private respondent (COMELEC) contends that, inasmuch as the petition for disqualification and the complaint for election offense involve the same issues and charges, (i.e., vote-buying, exerting undue influence on BEI members), petitioner (Domingo) should be held liable for forum-shopping.
We rule to the contrary. Forum-shopping exists when the petitioner files multiple petitions or complaints involving the same issues in two or more tribunals or agencies.
The issues in the two cases are different. The complaint for election offense is a criminal case which involves the ascertainment of the guilt or innocence of the accused candidate and, like any other criminal case, requires a conviction on proof beyond reasonable doubt. A petition for disqualification, meanwhile, requires merely the determination of whether the respondent committed acts as to merit his disqualification from office, and is done through an administrative proceeding which is summary in character and requires only a clear preponderance of evidence
3. In the Petition, petitioner's counsel admitted that the assailed quotation in the petition for disqualification (admonished by COMELEC) was based on "erroneous transcript" of the speech which was prepared by somebody else, and which he in turn failed to verify for errors. However, he denies having intended to mislead the COMELEC with the inclusion of this statement, but instead submits that the word "Benhur" was "derived" from the succeeding pronouncement of Abalos, Sr., "not because he is my son", which may in turn be inferred to refer to private respondent, who was a mayoralty candidate at the time.
-We find no grave abuse of discretion in the COMELEC's finding that Abalos, Sr.'s controversial statement, effectively reduced to this:
“Your President, together with Lito Motivo, walang tigil yan kakapunta sa akin at not because he is my son siya ang nakikipag-usap sa kanila and came up with a beautiful compromise. . . .”
was seriously insufficient and vague to prove violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.
It is upon the videotape recordings that petitioner lays much reliance on, in proving his case for disqualification. The recordings are supposed to document how former mayor Abalos, Sr. announced that his son, private respondent herein, prodded his father to release substantial allowances to teachers who will act as members of the BEIs. As found by the COMELEC 1st Division, the name uttered in the announcement was not "Benhur", private respondent's nickname and what petitioner alleged was uttered, but "Lito Motivo", a name which truly sounded unlike "Benhur". Also, when the COMELEC, through its 1st Division, viewed the videotape submitted by petitioner, "the speech of Mayor Abalos, Sr. was cut and so (they) also did not see and hear that part of Mayor Abalos, Sr.'s speech allegedly uttered by him."
4. Where there is no proof of grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, fraud or error of law in the questioned Resolutions, the Court may not review the factual findings of COMELEC, nor substitute its own findings on the sufficiency of evidence.
5. By law, the mayor is a co-chairman of the City School Board, there is nothing unusual in his (Abalos sr.) having co-sponsored the said event.
Sunday, February 14, 2010
pnoc-edc vs. nlrc
PNOC-EDC v NLRC
Facts:
Danilo Mercado, an employee of the Philippine National Oil Company- Energy Development Corporation, was dismissed on the grounds of serious acts of dishonesty and violation of company rules and regulations allegedly committed as follows:
1. Withdrew P1680.00 from company funds, appropriated P680.00 for personal use and paid the nipa supplier P1000.00.
2. Withdrew P28.66 as payment for the fabrication of rubber stamp but appropriated the P8.66 for personal use.
3. Absence without leave and without proper turn-over thus disrupting and delaying company work activities.
4. Vacation leave without prior leave.
Mercado filed a complaint against PNOC-EDC before the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch. After considerations of position papers presented by both parties, the labor arbiter ruled in favour of Mercado.
Issues:
1. Whether or not matters of employment of PNOC-EDC is within the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and the NLRC.
2. Whether or not the labor arbiter and the NLRC are justified in ordering the reinstatement of the private respondent, payment of his savings, 13th month pay, and payment of damages as well as attorney’s fees.
Held:
The High Court affirmed the resolution of the respondent NLRC with modification: reducing moral damages to P10000 and exemplary damages to P5000.
1. The test whether a government-owned or controlled corporation is subject to Civil Service Law is the manner of its creation. Those created by special charter are subject to its provision while those created under General Corporation Law are not within its coverage. The PNOC-EDC, having been incorporated under General Corporation Law, is subject to the provisions of the Labor Law.
2. PNOC-EDC’s accusations are not supported by evidence. Loss of trust or breach of confidence is a valid ground for dismissing an employee, but such loss or breach must have some basis.
fr. atty nas^^
Facts:
Danilo Mercado, an employee of the Philippine National Oil Company- Energy Development Corporation, was dismissed on the grounds of serious acts of dishonesty and violation of company rules and regulations allegedly committed as follows:
1. Withdrew P1680.00 from company funds, appropriated P680.00 for personal use and paid the nipa supplier P1000.00.
2. Withdrew P28.66 as payment for the fabrication of rubber stamp but appropriated the P8.66 for personal use.
3. Absence without leave and without proper turn-over thus disrupting and delaying company work activities.
4. Vacation leave without prior leave.
Mercado filed a complaint against PNOC-EDC before the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch. After considerations of position papers presented by both parties, the labor arbiter ruled in favour of Mercado.
Issues:
1. Whether or not matters of employment of PNOC-EDC is within the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and the NLRC.
2. Whether or not the labor arbiter and the NLRC are justified in ordering the reinstatement of the private respondent, payment of his savings, 13th month pay, and payment of damages as well as attorney’s fees.
Held:
The High Court affirmed the resolution of the respondent NLRC with modification: reducing moral damages to P10000 and exemplary damages to P5000.
1. The test whether a government-owned or controlled corporation is subject to Civil Service Law is the manner of its creation. Those created by special charter are subject to its provision while those created under General Corporation Law are not within its coverage. The PNOC-EDC, having been incorporated under General Corporation Law, is subject to the provisions of the Labor Law.
2. PNOC-EDC’s accusations are not supported by evidence. Loss of trust or breach of confidence is a valid ground for dismissing an employee, but such loss or breach must have some basis.
fr. atty nas^^
Dimaporo v. Mitra
Dimaporo v. Mitra
202 SCRA 779 / G.R. No. 96859
October 15, 1991
FACTS:
Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections. On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao in the immediately following elections. Upon being informed of this development by the COMELEC, respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of Representatives excluded petitioner's name from the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives pursuant to Section 67, Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code which states:
Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner, in a letter addressed to respondent Speaker, expressed his intention "to resume performing my duties and functions as elected Member of Congress. He maintains that he did not thereby lose his seat as congressman because Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not operative under the present Constitution, being contrary thereto, and therefore not applicable to the present members of Congress.
In support of his contention, petitioner points out that the term of office of members of the House of Representatives, as well as the grounds by which the incumbency of said members may be shortened, are provided for in the Constitution. Section 2, Article XVIII thereof provides that "the Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992," while Section 7, Article VI states: "The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. He asserts that under the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is repugnant to these constitutional provisions in that it provides for the shortening of a congressman's term of office on a ground not provided for in the Constitution.
Moreover, he claims that he cannot be said to have forfeited his seat as it is only when a congressman holds another office or employment that forfeiture is decreed. Filing a certificate of candidacy is not equivalent to holding another office or employment.
ISSUE:
1. IS SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX, OF B.P. BLG. 881 OPERATIVE UNDER THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION?
2. COULD THE RESPONDENT SPEAKER AND/OR THE RESPONDENT SECRETARY, 'BY ADMINISTRATIVE ACT', EXCLUDE THE PETITIONER FROM THE ROLLS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THEREBY PREVENTING HIM FROM EXERCISING HIS FUNCTIONS AS CONGRESSMAN, AND DEPRIVING HIM OF HIS RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES AS SUCH?
HELD:
The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
1. The officials running for office other than the ones they are holding will be considered resigned not because of abuse of facilities of power or the use of office facilities but primarily because under our Constitution, we have this …chapter on accountability of public officers (both in the 1973 and 1987 constitution). Section 1 of Article XI (1987) on "Accountability of Public Officers" states that:
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Under this commentary on accountability of public officers, the elective public officers must serve their principal, the people, not their own personal ambition. Petitioner failed to discern that rather than cut short the term of office of elective public officials, this statutory provision (Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881) seeks to ensure that such officials serve out their entire term of office by discouraging them from running for another public office and thereby cutting short their tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to their former position. This is consonant with the constitutional edict that all public officials must serve the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate which they have received from their constituents.
Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of candidacy for another office, an overt, concrete act of voluntary renunciation of the elective office presently being held, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term. Forfeiture (is) automatic and permanently effective upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy for another office. Only the moment and act of filing are considered. Once the certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited and nothing save a new election or appointment can restore the ousted official. The law does not make the forfeiture dependent upon future contingencies, unforeseen and unforeseeable.
That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in the Constitution itself as a mode of shortening the tenure of office of members of Congress, does not preclude its application to present members of Congress. Section 2 of Article XI provides that "(t)he President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment … All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. Such constitutional expression clearly recognizes that the four (4) grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened are not exclusive. The expression in the constitution of the circumstances which shall bring about a vacancy does not preclude the legislature from prescribing other grounds
Additionally, this Court has enunciated the presumption in favor of constitutionality of legislative enactment. To justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication. A doubt, even if well-founded, does not suffice.
2. As administrative officers, both the Speaker and House Secretary-General perform ministerial functions; It was their duty to remove petitioner's name from the Roll considering the unequivocal tenor of Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881. When the COMELEC communicated to the House of Representatives that petitioner had filed his certificate of candidacy for regional governor of Muslim Mindanao, respondents had no choice but to abide by the clear and unmistakable legal effect of Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881. These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.
In conclusion, We reiterate the basic concept that a public office is a public trust. It is created for the interest and benefit of the people. As such, the holder thereof is subject to such regulations and conditions as the law may impose and he cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his office.
NOTES:
- In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of a Member of Congress, petitioner seems to confuse "term" with "tenure" of office: The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the period during which an officer actually holds the office (tenure) may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer. Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may not exist at all. These situations will not change the duration of the term of office (see Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil 12).
- 4 grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened:
a) Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or subsidiaries;
b) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior;
c) Section 17: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribunal in an election contest; and,
d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of office.
202 SCRA 779 / G.R. No. 96859
October 15, 1991
FACTS:
Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections. On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao in the immediately following elections. Upon being informed of this development by the COMELEC, respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of Representatives excluded petitioner's name from the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives pursuant to Section 67, Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code which states:
Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner, in a letter addressed to respondent Speaker, expressed his intention "to resume performing my duties and functions as elected Member of Congress. He maintains that he did not thereby lose his seat as congressman because Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not operative under the present Constitution, being contrary thereto, and therefore not applicable to the present members of Congress.
In support of his contention, petitioner points out that the term of office of members of the House of Representatives, as well as the grounds by which the incumbency of said members may be shortened, are provided for in the Constitution. Section 2, Article XVIII thereof provides that "the Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992," while Section 7, Article VI states: "The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. He asserts that under the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is repugnant to these constitutional provisions in that it provides for the shortening of a congressman's term of office on a ground not provided for in the Constitution.
Moreover, he claims that he cannot be said to have forfeited his seat as it is only when a congressman holds another office or employment that forfeiture is decreed. Filing a certificate of candidacy is not equivalent to holding another office or employment.
ISSUE:
1. IS SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX, OF B.P. BLG. 881 OPERATIVE UNDER THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION?
2. COULD THE RESPONDENT SPEAKER AND/OR THE RESPONDENT SECRETARY, 'BY ADMINISTRATIVE ACT', EXCLUDE THE PETITIONER FROM THE ROLLS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THEREBY PREVENTING HIM FROM EXERCISING HIS FUNCTIONS AS CONGRESSMAN, AND DEPRIVING HIM OF HIS RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES AS SUCH?
HELD:
The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
1. The officials running for office other than the ones they are holding will be considered resigned not because of abuse of facilities of power or the use of office facilities but primarily because under our Constitution, we have this …chapter on accountability of public officers (both in the 1973 and 1987 constitution). Section 1 of Article XI (1987) on "Accountability of Public Officers" states that:
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Under this commentary on accountability of public officers, the elective public officers must serve their principal, the people, not their own personal ambition. Petitioner failed to discern that rather than cut short the term of office of elective public officials, this statutory provision (Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881) seeks to ensure that such officials serve out their entire term of office by discouraging them from running for another public office and thereby cutting short their tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to their former position. This is consonant with the constitutional edict that all public officials must serve the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate which they have received from their constituents.
Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of candidacy for another office, an overt, concrete act of voluntary renunciation of the elective office presently being held, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term. Forfeiture (is) automatic and permanently effective upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy for another office. Only the moment and act of filing are considered. Once the certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited and nothing save a new election or appointment can restore the ousted official. The law does not make the forfeiture dependent upon future contingencies, unforeseen and unforeseeable.
That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in the Constitution itself as a mode of shortening the tenure of office of members of Congress, does not preclude its application to present members of Congress. Section 2 of Article XI provides that "(t)he President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment … All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. Such constitutional expression clearly recognizes that the four (4) grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened are not exclusive. The expression in the constitution of the circumstances which shall bring about a vacancy does not preclude the legislature from prescribing other grounds
Additionally, this Court has enunciated the presumption in favor of constitutionality of legislative enactment. To justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication. A doubt, even if well-founded, does not suffice.
2. As administrative officers, both the Speaker and House Secretary-General perform ministerial functions; It was their duty to remove petitioner's name from the Roll considering the unequivocal tenor of Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881. When the COMELEC communicated to the House of Representatives that petitioner had filed his certificate of candidacy for regional governor of Muslim Mindanao, respondents had no choice but to abide by the clear and unmistakable legal effect of Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881. These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.
In conclusion, We reiterate the basic concept that a public office is a public trust. It is created for the interest and benefit of the people. As such, the holder thereof is subject to such regulations and conditions as the law may impose and he cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his office.
NOTES:
- In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of a Member of Congress, petitioner seems to confuse "term" with "tenure" of office: The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the period during which an officer actually holds the office (tenure) may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer. Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may not exist at all. These situations will not change the duration of the term of office (see Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil 12).
- 4 grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened:
a) Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or subsidiaries;
b) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior;
c) Section 17: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribunal in an election contest; and,
d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of office.
Philippine Bar Association (PBA) vs. COMELEC
Philippine Bar Association vs. COMELEC
140 SCRA 455
January 7, 1986
FACTS:
11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP 883 which calls for special national elections on February 7, 1986 (Snap elections) for the offices of President and Vice President of the Philippines. BP 883 in conflict with the constitution in that it allows the President to continue holding office after the calling of the special election.
Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos’ letter of conditional “resignation” did not create the actual vacancy required in Section 9, Article 7 of the Constitution which could be the basis of the holding of a special election for President and Vice President earlier than the regular elections for such positions in 1987. The letter states that the President is: “irrevocably vacat(ing) the position of President effective only when the election is held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as President by taking his oath office ten (10) days after his proclamation.”
The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with the cited constitutional provision that the incumbent President actually resign, vacate his office and turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as acting President, their standard bearers have not filed any suit or petition in intervention for the purpose nor repudiated the scheduled election. They have not insisted that President Marcos vacate his office, so long as the election is clean, fair and honest.
ISSUE:
Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court therefore stop and prohibit the holding of the elections
HELD:
The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the issuance of an injunction restraining respondents from holding the election on February 7, 1986, in as much as there are less than the required 10 votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional.
The events that have transpired since December 3,as the Court did not issue any restraining order, have turned the issue into a political question (from the purely justiciable issue of the questioned constitutionality of the act due to the lack of the actual vacancy of the President’s office) which can be truly decided only by the people in their sovereign capacity at the scheduled election, since there is no issue more political than the election. The Court cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide through their ballot, either to give the incumbent president a new mandate or to elect a new president.
140 SCRA 455
January 7, 1986
FACTS:
11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP 883 which calls for special national elections on February 7, 1986 (Snap elections) for the offices of President and Vice President of the Philippines. BP 883 in conflict with the constitution in that it allows the President to continue holding office after the calling of the special election.
Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos’ letter of conditional “resignation” did not create the actual vacancy required in Section 9, Article 7 of the Constitution which could be the basis of the holding of a special election for President and Vice President earlier than the regular elections for such positions in 1987. The letter states that the President is: “irrevocably vacat(ing) the position of President effective only when the election is held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as President by taking his oath office ten (10) days after his proclamation.”
The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with the cited constitutional provision that the incumbent President actually resign, vacate his office and turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as acting President, their standard bearers have not filed any suit or petition in intervention for the purpose nor repudiated the scheduled election. They have not insisted that President Marcos vacate his office, so long as the election is clean, fair and honest.
ISSUE:
Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court therefore stop and prohibit the holding of the elections
HELD:
The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the issuance of an injunction restraining respondents from holding the election on February 7, 1986, in as much as there are less than the required 10 votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional.
The events that have transpired since December 3,as the Court did not issue any restraining order, have turned the issue into a political question (from the purely justiciable issue of the questioned constitutionality of the act due to the lack of the actual vacancy of the President’s office) which can be truly decided only by the people in their sovereign capacity at the scheduled election, since there is no issue more political than the election. The Court cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide through their ballot, either to give the incumbent president a new mandate or to elect a new president.
conquilla vs. comelec
CONQUILLA vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 139801
May 31, 2000
FACTS:
ROBERTO CONQUILLA assails in this special civil action for certiorari the En Banc Resolution of COMELEC which affirmed the Resolution of its First Division dismissing his Petition for Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy and Disqualification (SPA No. 98-132) against private respondent EDUARDO A. ALARILLA for lack of merit.
EDUARDO A ALARILLA filed his Certificate of Candidacy with the Municipal Election Officer of Meycauayan, Bulacan, without however indicating the elective position which he was aspiring for. However, attached thereto and filed with his Certificate of Candidacy was ALARILLAs Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance, which states:
…I , JOSE DE VENECIA, JR. ... (LAKAS NUCD-UMDP) as its Secretary-General, hereby nominate: EDUARDO A. ALARILLA as the Party’s official candidate in the May 11, 1998 elections for the position of MUNICIPAL MAYOR of the Municipality of Meycauayan in the Fourth District of Bulacan. …
On 14 April 1998 CONQUILLA filed with the COMELEC a Petition for docketed as SPA No. 98-132, praying that private respondent ALARILLA's Certificate of Candidacy be expunged and cancelled on the ground that it was null and void for failing to specify the elective position he was running for and, consequently, he be disqualified to run for any position n Meycauayan, Bulacan.
During the pendency of SPA No. 98-132 the Board of Canvassers proclaimed ALARILLA as the Mayor-elect of Meycauayan, Bulacan. Thereafter, the First Division of COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 98-132.
ISSUE:
CONQUILLA contends that public respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion:
1. in affirming in toto the Resolution of the First Division dismissing SPA No. 98-132 for lack of merit and in ruling that the Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance attached to private respondents Certificate of Candidacy could be used as basis in determining the elective position private respondent was seeking; and,
2. In not resolving the motion to suspend private respondents proclamation as Mayor-elect of Meycauayan, Bulacan.
3. Additionally, CONQUILLA contends that COMELEC erred in dismissing his appeal for late filing
HELD:
1. It is correctly observed by the First Division of COMELEC and affirmed by COMELEC En Banc that the information omitted in the Certificate of Candidacy was supplied in the Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance attached thereto. As the COMELEC itself has clarified, certificates of nomination and acceptance are procedurally required to be filed with, and form an integral part of, the certificates of candidacy of official candidates of political parties. Additionally, the First Division ruled that ALARILLA was able to correct his omission by filing an Amended Certificate of Candidacy on 21 April 1998 (after the filing and before the dismissal of SPC no. 98-132) clearly indicating therein that he was running for the position of Municipal Mayor, Meycauayan, Bulacan.
2. It cannot be denied that ALARILLA was elected Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, in the 11 May 1998 elections. If substantial compliance with the Election Law should give way to a mere technicality, the will of the electorate, as far as ALARILLA is concerned, would be frustrated
3. However, CONQUILLA’S motion for reconsideration was not filed late on 1 June 1998 considering that 31 May 1998 was a Sunday, hence, he had until the next working day, which was 1 June 1998, within which to ask for reconsideration
NOTES:
-The purpose in requiring a certificate of candidacy (which is to enable the voters to know before the elections the candidates among whom they are to make a choice) was deemed satisfied not only by the Amended Certificate of Candidacy filed before the elections but also by the Certified List of Candidates issued by the Office of the Election Officer, Meycauayan, Bulacan, indubitably listing therein EDUARDO A. ALARILLA as candidate for the position of "mayor" of said municipality
- x.....x.....x.....when the Election Law does not provide that a departure from a prescribed form will be fatal and such departure has been due to an honest mistake or misinterpretation of the Election Law on the part of him who was obligated to observe it, and that such departure has not been used as a means for fraudulent practices x x x the law will be held directory and such departure will be considered a harmless irregularity (Gardiner v. Romulo, 26 Phil. 521, cited in the De Guzman v. Bd. of Canvassers of La Union and Lucero, 48 Phil. 211, 214-215).
G.R. No. 139801
May 31, 2000
FACTS:
ROBERTO CONQUILLA assails in this special civil action for certiorari the En Banc Resolution of COMELEC which affirmed the Resolution of its First Division dismissing his Petition for Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy and Disqualification (SPA No. 98-132) against private respondent EDUARDO A. ALARILLA for lack of merit.
EDUARDO A ALARILLA filed his Certificate of Candidacy with the Municipal Election Officer of Meycauayan, Bulacan, without however indicating the elective position which he was aspiring for. However, attached thereto and filed with his Certificate of Candidacy was ALARILLAs Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance, which states:
…I , JOSE DE VENECIA, JR. ... (LAKAS NUCD-UMDP) as its Secretary-General, hereby nominate: EDUARDO A. ALARILLA as the Party’s official candidate in the May 11, 1998 elections for the position of MUNICIPAL MAYOR of the Municipality of Meycauayan in the Fourth District of Bulacan. …
On 14 April 1998 CONQUILLA filed with the COMELEC a Petition for docketed as SPA No. 98-132, praying that private respondent ALARILLA's Certificate of Candidacy be expunged and cancelled on the ground that it was null and void for failing to specify the elective position he was running for and, consequently, he be disqualified to run for any position n Meycauayan, Bulacan.
During the pendency of SPA No. 98-132 the Board of Canvassers proclaimed ALARILLA as the Mayor-elect of Meycauayan, Bulacan. Thereafter, the First Division of COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 98-132.
ISSUE:
CONQUILLA contends that public respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion:
1. in affirming in toto the Resolution of the First Division dismissing SPA No. 98-132 for lack of merit and in ruling that the Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance attached to private respondents Certificate of Candidacy could be used as basis in determining the elective position private respondent was seeking; and,
2. In not resolving the motion to suspend private respondents proclamation as Mayor-elect of Meycauayan, Bulacan.
3. Additionally, CONQUILLA contends that COMELEC erred in dismissing his appeal for late filing
HELD:
1. It is correctly observed by the First Division of COMELEC and affirmed by COMELEC En Banc that the information omitted in the Certificate of Candidacy was supplied in the Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance attached thereto. As the COMELEC itself has clarified, certificates of nomination and acceptance are procedurally required to be filed with, and form an integral part of, the certificates of candidacy of official candidates of political parties. Additionally, the First Division ruled that ALARILLA was able to correct his omission by filing an Amended Certificate of Candidacy on 21 April 1998 (after the filing and before the dismissal of SPC no. 98-132) clearly indicating therein that he was running for the position of Municipal Mayor, Meycauayan, Bulacan.
2. It cannot be denied that ALARILLA was elected Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, in the 11 May 1998 elections. If substantial compliance with the Election Law should give way to a mere technicality, the will of the electorate, as far as ALARILLA is concerned, would be frustrated
3. However, CONQUILLA’S motion for reconsideration was not filed late on 1 June 1998 considering that 31 May 1998 was a Sunday, hence, he had until the next working day, which was 1 June 1998, within which to ask for reconsideration
NOTES:
-The purpose in requiring a certificate of candidacy (which is to enable the voters to know before the elections the candidates among whom they are to make a choice) was deemed satisfied not only by the Amended Certificate of Candidacy filed before the elections but also by the Certified List of Candidates issued by the Office of the Election Officer, Meycauayan, Bulacan, indubitably listing therein EDUARDO A. ALARILLA as candidate for the position of "mayor" of said municipality
- x.....x.....x.....when the Election Law does not provide that a departure from a prescribed form will be fatal and such departure has been due to an honest mistake or misinterpretation of the Election Law on the part of him who was obligated to observe it, and that such departure has not been used as a means for fraudulent practices x x x the law will be held directory and such departure will be considered a harmless irregularity (Gardiner v. Romulo, 26 Phil. 521, cited in the De Guzman v. Bd. of Canvassers of La Union and Lucero, 48 Phil. 211, 214-215).
Defensor- Santiago vs. COMELEC
Miriam Defensor- Santiago vs. COMELEC
G.R No. 127325
March 19, 1997
FACTS:
On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative, filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" citing Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Acting on the petition, the COMELEC set the case for hearing and directed Delfin to have the petition published. After the hearing the arguments between petitioners and opposing parties, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 raising the following arguments, among others:
1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by people’s initiative if there is an enabling law passed by Congress, to which no such law has yet been passed; and
2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on people’s initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative.
ISSUE:
WON R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by people’s initiative.
WON RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and if so WON the Act as worded adequately covers such initiative.
WON COMELEC Res. No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative?
WON the lifting of term limits of elective national and local official, as proposed in the draft petition would constitute a revision of , or an amendment of the constitution.
WON the COMELEC can take cognizance of or has jurisdiction over the petition.
WON it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a pending case before the COMELEC.
HELD:
NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions." The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed" denotes that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local Initiative and Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This means that the main thrust of the law is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.
While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and referendum on national and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is hereby declared void and orders the respondent to forthwith dismiss the Delfin Petition . TRO issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent.
WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.
fr. atty arana^^
G.R No. 127325
March 19, 1997
FACTS:
On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative, filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" citing Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Acting on the petition, the COMELEC set the case for hearing and directed Delfin to have the petition published. After the hearing the arguments between petitioners and opposing parties, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 raising the following arguments, among others:
1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by people’s initiative if there is an enabling law passed by Congress, to which no such law has yet been passed; and
2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on people’s initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative.
ISSUE:
WON R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by people’s initiative.
WON RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and if so WON the Act as worded adequately covers such initiative.
WON COMELEC Res. No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative?
WON the lifting of term limits of elective national and local official, as proposed in the draft petition would constitute a revision of , or an amendment of the constitution.
WON the COMELEC can take cognizance of or has jurisdiction over the petition.
WON it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a pending case before the COMELEC.
HELD:
NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions." The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed" denotes that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local Initiative and Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This means that the main thrust of the law is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.
While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and referendum on national and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is hereby declared void and orders the respondent to forthwith dismiss the Delfin Petition . TRO issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent.
WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.
fr. atty arana^^
De Guzman vs. Board of Canvassers of La Union
De Guzman vs. Board of Canvassers of La Union
48 Phil 211
Facts:
Tomas De Guzman filed a petition for mandamus before the Supreme Court seeking to compel the Board of Canvassers of La Union to annul the votes counted in favor of Juan Lucero and to declare him as the duly elected governor of La Union based on the fact that certificate of candidacy filed by Juan Lucero was not made under oath in violation of Sec. 404 of the Election Law. Lucero filed a motion to dismiss the petition on 3 grounds namely: (1) that the court has no jurisdiction on the subject-matter of the complaint; (2) that the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the members of the board of canvassers; and (3) the petition failed to state a cause of action.
Issue:
WON the failure of Lucero in filing his certificate of candidacy under oath was fatal to his proclamation as the duly elected governor of La Union
Held:
No. The seeming irregularity in the filing of Lucero’s certificate of candidacy does not invalidate his election for the fundamental reason that after it was proven by the count of the votes that Juan T. Lucero had obtained the majority of the legal votes, the will of the people cannot be frustrated by a technicality consisting in that his certificate of candidacy had not been properly sworn to. In the case of Gardiner vs. Romulo, it was held that The provisions of the Election Law declaring that a certain irregularity in an election procedure is fatal to the validity of the ballot or of the returns, or when the purpose and spirit of the law would be plainly defeated by a substantial departure from the prescribed method, are mandatory. When the Election Law does not provide that a departure from a prescribed form will be fatal and such departure has been due to an honest mistake or misinterpretation of the Election Law on the part of him who was obligated to observe it, and such departure has not been used as a means for fraudulent practices or for the intimidation of voters, and it is clear that there has been a free and honest expression of the popular will, the law will be held directory and such departure will be considered a harmless irregularity. And in Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, it was held that he rules and regulations, for the conduct of elections, are mandatory before the election, but when it is sought to enforce them after the election, they are held to be directory only, if that is possible, especially where, if they are held to be mandatory, innocent voters will be deprived of their votes without any fault on their part. The various and numerous provisions of the Election Law were adopted to assist the voters in their participation in the affairs of the government and not to defeat that object. When the voters have honestly cast their ballots, the same should not be nullified simply because the officers appointed under the law to direct the election and guard the purity of the ballot have not done their duty. The law provides a remedy, by criminal action, against them. They should be prosecuted criminally, and the will of the honest voter, as expressed through his ballot, should be protected and upheld.
Hence, even if the legal provision in question is mandatory and non-compliance therewith before the election would have been fatal to the recognition of the status of Juan T. Lucero as candidate but because the people have already expressed their will honestly, the result of the election cannot be defeated by the fact that Lucero who was certified by the provincial secretary to be a legal candidate for the office of provincial governor has not sworn to his certificate of candidacy.
fr. atty Arana^^
48 Phil 211
Facts:
Tomas De Guzman filed a petition for mandamus before the Supreme Court seeking to compel the Board of Canvassers of La Union to annul the votes counted in favor of Juan Lucero and to declare him as the duly elected governor of La Union based on the fact that certificate of candidacy filed by Juan Lucero was not made under oath in violation of Sec. 404 of the Election Law. Lucero filed a motion to dismiss the petition on 3 grounds namely: (1) that the court has no jurisdiction on the subject-matter of the complaint; (2) that the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the members of the board of canvassers; and (3) the petition failed to state a cause of action.
Issue:
WON the failure of Lucero in filing his certificate of candidacy under oath was fatal to his proclamation as the duly elected governor of La Union
Held:
No. The seeming irregularity in the filing of Lucero’s certificate of candidacy does not invalidate his election for the fundamental reason that after it was proven by the count of the votes that Juan T. Lucero had obtained the majority of the legal votes, the will of the people cannot be frustrated by a technicality consisting in that his certificate of candidacy had not been properly sworn to. In the case of Gardiner vs. Romulo, it was held that The provisions of the Election Law declaring that a certain irregularity in an election procedure is fatal to the validity of the ballot or of the returns, or when the purpose and spirit of the law would be plainly defeated by a substantial departure from the prescribed method, are mandatory. When the Election Law does not provide that a departure from a prescribed form will be fatal and such departure has been due to an honest mistake or misinterpretation of the Election Law on the part of him who was obligated to observe it, and such departure has not been used as a means for fraudulent practices or for the intimidation of voters, and it is clear that there has been a free and honest expression of the popular will, the law will be held directory and such departure will be considered a harmless irregularity. And in Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, it was held that he rules and regulations, for the conduct of elections, are mandatory before the election, but when it is sought to enforce them after the election, they are held to be directory only, if that is possible, especially where, if they are held to be mandatory, innocent voters will be deprived of their votes without any fault on their part. The various and numerous provisions of the Election Law were adopted to assist the voters in their participation in the affairs of the government and not to defeat that object. When the voters have honestly cast their ballots, the same should not be nullified simply because the officers appointed under the law to direct the election and guard the purity of the ballot have not done their duty. The law provides a remedy, by criminal action, against them. They should be prosecuted criminally, and the will of the honest voter, as expressed through his ballot, should be protected and upheld.
Hence, even if the legal provision in question is mandatory and non-compliance therewith before the election would have been fatal to the recognition of the status of Juan T. Lucero as candidate but because the people have already expressed their will honestly, the result of the election cannot be defeated by the fact that Lucero who was certified by the provincial secretary to be a legal candidate for the office of provincial governor has not sworn to his certificate of candidacy.
fr. atty Arana^^
Lozano vs. Nograles
ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO and ATTY. EVANGELINE J.LOZANO-ENDRIANO vs. SPEAKER PROSPERO C. NOGRALES, Representative, Majority, House of Representatives
Facts:
The two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in their capacities as concerned citizens and taxpayers, prayed for the nullification of House Resolution No. 1109 entitled “A Resolution Calling upon the Members of Congress to Convene for the Purpose of Considering Proposals to Amend or Revise the Constitution, Upon a Three-fourths Vote of All the Members of Congress.” Both petitions seek to trigger a justiciable controversy that would warrant a definitive interpretation by the Court of Section 1, Article XVII, which provides for the procedure for amending or revising the Constitution. The petitioners alleged that HR 1109 is unconstitutional for deviation from the prescribed procedures to amend the Constitution by excluding the Senate of the Philippines from the complete process of proposing amendments to the Constitution and for lack of thorough debates and consultations.”
Issue:
Whether or not the Congress committed a violation in promulgating the HR1109.
Held:
No, the House that the Congress ought to convene into a Constituent Assembly and adopt some Rules for proposing changes to the charter. The House has said it would forward H.Res.1109 to the Senate for its approval and adoption and the possible promulgation of a Joint and Concurrent Resolution convening the Congress into a Constituent Assembly. Petitioners have not sufficiently proven any adverse injury or hardship from the act complained of. House Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that the House of Representatives shall convene at a future time for the purpose of proposing amendments or revisions to the Constitution. No actual convention has yet transpired and no rules of procedure have yet been adopted. No proposal has yet been made, and hence, no usurpation of power or gross abuse of discretion has yet taken place. House Resolution No. 1109 involves a quintessential example of an uncertain contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. The House has not yet performed a positive act that would warrant an intervention from this Court. Judicial review is exercised only to remedy a particular and concrete injury.
The petitions were dismissed.
Facts:
The two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in their capacities as concerned citizens and taxpayers, prayed for the nullification of House Resolution No. 1109 entitled “A Resolution Calling upon the Members of Congress to Convene for the Purpose of Considering Proposals to Amend or Revise the Constitution, Upon a Three-fourths Vote of All the Members of Congress.” Both petitions seek to trigger a justiciable controversy that would warrant a definitive interpretation by the Court of Section 1, Article XVII, which provides for the procedure for amending or revising the Constitution. The petitioners alleged that HR 1109 is unconstitutional for deviation from the prescribed procedures to amend the Constitution by excluding the Senate of the Philippines from the complete process of proposing amendments to the Constitution and for lack of thorough debates and consultations.”
Issue:
Whether or not the Congress committed a violation in promulgating the HR1109.
Held:
No, the House that the Congress ought to convene into a Constituent Assembly and adopt some Rules for proposing changes to the charter. The House has said it would forward H.Res.1109 to the Senate for its approval and adoption and the possible promulgation of a Joint and Concurrent Resolution convening the Congress into a Constituent Assembly. Petitioners have not sufficiently proven any adverse injury or hardship from the act complained of. House Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that the House of Representatives shall convene at a future time for the purpose of proposing amendments or revisions to the Constitution. No actual convention has yet transpired and no rules of procedure have yet been adopted. No proposal has yet been made, and hence, no usurpation of power or gross abuse of discretion has yet taken place. House Resolution No. 1109 involves a quintessential example of an uncertain contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. The House has not yet performed a positive act that would warrant an intervention from this Court. Judicial review is exercised only to remedy a particular and concrete injury.
The petitions were dismissed.
salcedo vs. comelec
VICTORINO SALCEDO II vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERMELITA CACAO SALCEDO
August 16, 1999
Facts:
This is a petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner Victorino Salcedo II seeking to reverse the earlier Resolution issued by its Second Division on August 12, 1998.
Neptali P. Salcedo married Agnes Celiz, which marriage was evidenced by a certified true copy of the marriage contract issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Ajuy, Iloilo. Without his first marriage having been dissolved, Neptali P. Salcedo married private respondent Ermelita Cacao in a civil ceremony. Two days later, Ermelita Cacao contracted another marriage with a certain Jesus Aguirre, as shown by a marriage certificate filed with the Office of the Civil Registrar.
Petitioner Victorino Salcedo II and private respondent Ermelita Cacao Salcedo both ran for the position of mayor of the municipality of Sara, Iloilo in the May 11, 1998 elections, both of them having filed their respective certificates of candidacy However, petitioner filed with the Comelec a petition seeking the cancellation of private respondent's certificate of candidacy on the ground that she had made a false representation therein by stating that her surname was "Salcedo." Petitioner contended that private respondent had no right to use said surname because she was not legally married to Neptali Salcedo. Private respondent was proclaimed as the duly elected mayor of Sara, Iloilo.
In her answer, private respondent claimed that she had no information or knowledge at the time she married Neptali Salcedo that he was in fact already married; that, upon learning of his existing marriage, she encouraged her husband to take steps to annul his marriage with Agnes Celiz because the latter had abandoned their marital home. Neptali Salcedo filed a petition for declaration of presumptive death which was granted by the court that Neptali Salcedo and Jesus Aguirre are one and the same person; and that since 1986 up to the present she has been using the surname "Salcedo" in all her personal, commercial and public transactions.
Comelec's Second Division ruled that since there is an existing valid marriage between Neptali Salcedo and Agnes Celiz, the subsequent marriage of the former with private respondent is null and void. Consequently, the use by private respondent of the surname "Salcedo" constitutes material misrepresentation and is a ground for the cancellation of her certificate of candidacy.
However, in its en banc Resolution, the Comelec overturned its previous resolution, ruling that private respondent's certificate of candidacy did not contain any material misrepresentation. A Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioner was affirmed by the division which gives rise to the petition to review such promulgation.
Issue:
1.Whether or not the use by respondent of the surname "Salcedo" in her certificate of candidacy constitutes material misrepresentation under Section 78 in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Held:
Private respondent did not commit any material misrepresentation by the use of the surname "Salcedo" in her certificate of candidacy.
A false representation under section 78 must consist of a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." It must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications for public office. The use of a surname, when not intended to mislead or deceive the public as to one's identity, is not within the scope of the provision. There is absolutely no showing that the inhabitants of Sara, Iloilo were deceived by the use of such surname by private respondent. Petitioner does not allege that the electorate did not know who they were voting for when they cast their ballots in favor of "Ermelita Cacao Salcedo" or that they were fooled into voting for someone else by the use of such name.
The Court AFFIRMS the en banc Resolution of the Commission on Elections denying the petition to cancel private respondent's certificate of candidacy.
August 16, 1999
Facts:
This is a petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner Victorino Salcedo II seeking to reverse the earlier Resolution issued by its Second Division on August 12, 1998.
Neptali P. Salcedo married Agnes Celiz, which marriage was evidenced by a certified true copy of the marriage contract issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Ajuy, Iloilo. Without his first marriage having been dissolved, Neptali P. Salcedo married private respondent Ermelita Cacao in a civil ceremony. Two days later, Ermelita Cacao contracted another marriage with a certain Jesus Aguirre, as shown by a marriage certificate filed with the Office of the Civil Registrar.
Petitioner Victorino Salcedo II and private respondent Ermelita Cacao Salcedo both ran for the position of mayor of the municipality of Sara, Iloilo in the May 11, 1998 elections, both of them having filed their respective certificates of candidacy However, petitioner filed with the Comelec a petition seeking the cancellation of private respondent's certificate of candidacy on the ground that she had made a false representation therein by stating that her surname was "Salcedo." Petitioner contended that private respondent had no right to use said surname because she was not legally married to Neptali Salcedo. Private respondent was proclaimed as the duly elected mayor of Sara, Iloilo.
In her answer, private respondent claimed that she had no information or knowledge at the time she married Neptali Salcedo that he was in fact already married; that, upon learning of his existing marriage, she encouraged her husband to take steps to annul his marriage with Agnes Celiz because the latter had abandoned their marital home. Neptali Salcedo filed a petition for declaration of presumptive death which was granted by the court that Neptali Salcedo and Jesus Aguirre are one and the same person; and that since 1986 up to the present she has been using the surname "Salcedo" in all her personal, commercial and public transactions.
Comelec's Second Division ruled that since there is an existing valid marriage between Neptali Salcedo and Agnes Celiz, the subsequent marriage of the former with private respondent is null and void. Consequently, the use by private respondent of the surname "Salcedo" constitutes material misrepresentation and is a ground for the cancellation of her certificate of candidacy.
However, in its en banc Resolution, the Comelec overturned its previous resolution, ruling that private respondent's certificate of candidacy did not contain any material misrepresentation. A Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioner was affirmed by the division which gives rise to the petition to review such promulgation.
Issue:
1.Whether or not the use by respondent of the surname "Salcedo" in her certificate of candidacy constitutes material misrepresentation under Section 78 in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Held:
Private respondent did not commit any material misrepresentation by the use of the surname "Salcedo" in her certificate of candidacy.
A false representation under section 78 must consist of a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." It must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications for public office. The use of a surname, when not intended to mislead or deceive the public as to one's identity, is not within the scope of the provision. There is absolutely no showing that the inhabitants of Sara, Iloilo were deceived by the use of such surname by private respondent. Petitioner does not allege that the electorate did not know who they were voting for when they cast their ballots in favor of "Ermelita Cacao Salcedo" or that they were fooled into voting for someone else by the use of such name.
The Court AFFIRMS the en banc Resolution of the Commission on Elections denying the petition to cancel private respondent's certificate of candidacy.
Romualdez-Marcos vs. comelec
Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC
G.R. No.119976
September 18, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte. Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, a candidate for the same position, filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. Private respondent contended that petitioner lacked the Constitution's one-year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has satisfied the residency requirement as mandated by Art. VI, Sec. 6 of the Constitution
Decision:
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.
Ratio Decidendi:
Yes. For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with domicile. The Court upheld the qualification of petitioner, despite her own declaration in her certificate of candidacy that she had resided in the district for only 7 months, because of the following: (a) a minor follows the domicile of her parents; Tacloban became petitioner’s domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought the family to Leyte; (b) domicile of origin is lost only when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose; in the absence of clear and positive proof of the concurrence of all these, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue; (c) the wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law; when petitioner married President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium; (d) even assuming that she gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired the right to choose a new one only after her husband died, her acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice.
G.R. No.119976
September 18, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte. Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, a candidate for the same position, filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. Private respondent contended that petitioner lacked the Constitution's one-year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has satisfied the residency requirement as mandated by Art. VI, Sec. 6 of the Constitution
Decision:
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.
Ratio Decidendi:
Yes. For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with domicile. The Court upheld the qualification of petitioner, despite her own declaration in her certificate of candidacy that she had resided in the district for only 7 months, because of the following: (a) a minor follows the domicile of her parents; Tacloban became petitioner’s domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought the family to Leyte; (b) domicile of origin is lost only when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose; in the absence of clear and positive proof of the concurrence of all these, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue; (c) the wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law; when petitioner married President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium; (d) even assuming that she gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired the right to choose a new one only after her husband died, her acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice.
gador vs. comelec
GADOR vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. L-52365
January 22, 1980
This petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction was filed on January 21, 1980 at 4:47pm asking the Supreme Court to immediately order the respondent COMELEC to include the name his name in the list of candidates for Mayor of the City of Ozamiz.
Facts:
The petition alleges that the petitioner is a candidate for the Office of Mayor of the City of Ozamiz as Independent this coming January 30, 1980 local election. He filed his certificate of candidacy with the Election Registrar of Ozamis City on January 7, 1980 because of the news in the Bulletin Today. The said news stated that the respondent COMELEC issued a resolution for the extension of time for filing COC. However, the President denied said resolution. Therefore, respondent COMELEC informed the petitioner that his name might not be included in the list of candidates for mayor because of the said incident. Thus, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner which was filed on January 7, 1980 is valid.
DECISION:
WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
NO. A certificate of candidacy filed beyond reglementary period is void.
Section 7, Batasang Pambansa Bilang 52, provides that "The sworn certificate of candidacy shall be filed in triplicate not later than January 4, 1980." It is a fact admitted by the petitioner that the President had not extended the period within which to file the certificate of candidacy.
This Court is powerless to grant the remedy prayed for in the petition. Having been filed beyond January 4, 1980, the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner is void.
G.R. No. L-52365
January 22, 1980
This petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction was filed on January 21, 1980 at 4:47pm asking the Supreme Court to immediately order the respondent COMELEC to include the name his name in the list of candidates for Mayor of the City of Ozamiz.
Facts:
The petition alleges that the petitioner is a candidate for the Office of Mayor of the City of Ozamiz as Independent this coming January 30, 1980 local election. He filed his certificate of candidacy with the Election Registrar of Ozamis City on January 7, 1980 because of the news in the Bulletin Today. The said news stated that the respondent COMELEC issued a resolution for the extension of time for filing COC. However, the President denied said resolution. Therefore, respondent COMELEC informed the petitioner that his name might not be included in the list of candidates for mayor because of the said incident. Thus, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner which was filed on January 7, 1980 is valid.
DECISION:
WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
NO. A certificate of candidacy filed beyond reglementary period is void.
Section 7, Batasang Pambansa Bilang 52, provides that "The sworn certificate of candidacy shall be filed in triplicate not later than January 4, 1980." It is a fact admitted by the petitioner that the President had not extended the period within which to file the certificate of candidacy.
This Court is powerless to grant the remedy prayed for in the petition. Having been filed beyond January 4, 1980, the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner is void.
pimentel vs. hret
Pimentel, et al. vs. House of Representives Electoral Tribunal
GR 141489
29 November 2002;
also Pimentel, et al. v. Commission on Appointments [GR 141490]
En Banc, Carpio (J): 11 concur, 2 took no part, 1 on leave
Facts:
On 3 March 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. On 11 May 1998, in accordance with the Party-List System Act, national elections were held which included, for the first time, the election through popular vote of party-list groups and organizations whose nominees would become members of the House. Proclaimed winners were 14 party-list representatives from 13 organizations, including Melvyn D. Eballe, Leonardo Q. Montemayor, Cresente C. Paez, Loretta Ann P. Rosales and Patricia M. Sarenas from party-list groups Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives[5] (APEC), Alyansang Bayanihan ng mga Magsasaka, Manggagawang Bukid at Mangingisda (ABA), NATCO Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), and Abanse! Pinay (ABANSE). Due to the votes it garnered, APEC was able to send 2 representatives to the House, while the 12 other party-list groups had one representative each. Also elected were district representatives belonging to various political parties. Subsequently, the House constituted its HRET and CA contingent by electing its representatives to these two constitutional bodies. In practice, the procedure involves the nomination by the political parties of House members who are to occupy seats in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Commission on Appointments (CA). From available records, it does not appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections the party-list groups in the House nominated any of their representatives to the HRET or the CA. As of the date of filing of the present petitions for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction, the House contingents to the HRET and the CA were composed solely of district representatives belonging to the different political parties. On 18 January 2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters addressed to then Senate President Blas F. Ople, as Chairman of the CA, and to Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Jose A. R. Melo (now retired), as Chairman of the HRET. The letters requested Senate President Ople and Justice Melo to cause the restructuring of the CA and the HRET, respectively, to include party-list representatives to conform to Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In its meeting of 20 January 2000, the HRET resolved to direct the Secretary of the Tribunal to refer Senator Pimentel’s letter to the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives. On the same day, HRET Secretary Daisy B. Panga-Vega, in an Indorsement of even date, referred the letter to House of Representatives Secretary General Roberto P. Nazareno. On 2 February 2000, Eballe, et al. filed with this Court their Petitions for Prohibition, Mandamus and Preliminary Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order) against the HRET, its Chairman and Members, and against the CA, its Chairman and Members. They contend that, under the Constitution and the Party-List System Act, party-list representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET, and 2.4 seats in the CA. They charge that the HRET, CA, et al. committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to act positively on the letter of Senator Pimentel. In its Resolution of 8 February 2000, the Court en banc directed the consolidation of GR 141490 with GR 141489. On 11 February 2000, Eballe et al. filed in both cases a motion to amend their petitions to implead then Speaker Manuel B. Villar, Jr. as an additional respondent, in his capacity as Speaker of the House and as one of the members of the CA. The Court granted both motions and admitted the amended petitions. Senator Pimentel filed the present petitions on the strength of his oath to protect, defend and uphold the Constitution and in his capacity as taxpayer ‘and as a member of the CA. He was joined by 5 party-list representatives from APEC, ABA, ABANSE, AKBAYAN and COOP-NATCCO as co-petitioners.
Issue:
[1] Whether the present composition of the House Electoral Tribunal violates the constitutional requirement of proportional representation because there are no party-list representatives in the hret.
[2]: Whether the refusal of the HRET and the CA to reconstitute themselves to include party-list representatives constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Held:
[1] NO. The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their members those who would fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, each chamber of Congress exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who among their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chamber’s respective electoral tribunal. These constitutional provisions are reiterated in Rules 3 and 4 (a) of the 1998 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being subject to the mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation.[26] However, under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not interfere with the exercise by the House of this constitutionally mandated duty, absent a clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[27] Otherwise, ‘the doctrine of separation of powers calls for each branch of government to be left alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit.[28] Neither can the Court speculate on what action the House may take if party-list representatives are duly nominated for membership in the HRET and the CA. The petitions are bereft of any allegation that respondents prevented the party-list groups in the House from participating in the election of members of the HRET and the CA. Neither does it appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections, the House barred the party-list representatives from seeking membership in the HRET or the CA. Rather, it appears from the available facts that the party-list groups in the House at that time simply refrained from participating in the election process. The party-list representatives did not designate their nominees even up to the time they filed the petitions, with the predictable result that the House did not consider any party-list representative for election to the HRET or the CA. As the primary recourse of the party-list representatives lies with the House of Representatives, ‘the Court cannot resolve the issues presented by petitioners at this time.
[2]: There is no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and the CA in response to the letters of Senator Pimentel. Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and their internal rules, the HRET and the CA are bereft of any power to reconstitute themselves.
GR 141489
29 November 2002;
also Pimentel, et al. v. Commission on Appointments [GR 141490]
En Banc, Carpio (J): 11 concur, 2 took no part, 1 on leave
Facts:
On 3 March 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. On 11 May 1998, in accordance with the Party-List System Act, national elections were held which included, for the first time, the election through popular vote of party-list groups and organizations whose nominees would become members of the House. Proclaimed winners were 14 party-list representatives from 13 organizations, including Melvyn D. Eballe, Leonardo Q. Montemayor, Cresente C. Paez, Loretta Ann P. Rosales and Patricia M. Sarenas from party-list groups Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives[5] (APEC), Alyansang Bayanihan ng mga Magsasaka, Manggagawang Bukid at Mangingisda (ABA), NATCO Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), and Abanse! Pinay (ABANSE). Due to the votes it garnered, APEC was able to send 2 representatives to the House, while the 12 other party-list groups had one representative each. Also elected were district representatives belonging to various political parties. Subsequently, the House constituted its HRET and CA contingent by electing its representatives to these two constitutional bodies. In practice, the procedure involves the nomination by the political parties of House members who are to occupy seats in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Commission on Appointments (CA). From available records, it does not appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections the party-list groups in the House nominated any of their representatives to the HRET or the CA. As of the date of filing of the present petitions for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction, the House contingents to the HRET and the CA were composed solely of district representatives belonging to the different political parties. On 18 January 2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters addressed to then Senate President Blas F. Ople, as Chairman of the CA, and to Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Jose A. R. Melo (now retired), as Chairman of the HRET. The letters requested Senate President Ople and Justice Melo to cause the restructuring of the CA and the HRET, respectively, to include party-list representatives to conform to Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In its meeting of 20 January 2000, the HRET resolved to direct the Secretary of the Tribunal to refer Senator Pimentel’s letter to the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives. On the same day, HRET Secretary Daisy B. Panga-Vega, in an Indorsement of even date, referred the letter to House of Representatives Secretary General Roberto P. Nazareno. On 2 February 2000, Eballe, et al. filed with this Court their Petitions for Prohibition, Mandamus and Preliminary Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order) against the HRET, its Chairman and Members, and against the CA, its Chairman and Members. They contend that, under the Constitution and the Party-List System Act, party-list representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET, and 2.4 seats in the CA. They charge that the HRET, CA, et al. committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to act positively on the letter of Senator Pimentel. In its Resolution of 8 February 2000, the Court en banc directed the consolidation of GR 141490 with GR 141489. On 11 February 2000, Eballe et al. filed in both cases a motion to amend their petitions to implead then Speaker Manuel B. Villar, Jr. as an additional respondent, in his capacity as Speaker of the House and as one of the members of the CA. The Court granted both motions and admitted the amended petitions. Senator Pimentel filed the present petitions on the strength of his oath to protect, defend and uphold the Constitution and in his capacity as taxpayer ‘and as a member of the CA. He was joined by 5 party-list representatives from APEC, ABA, ABANSE, AKBAYAN and COOP-NATCCO as co-petitioners.
Issue:
[1] Whether the present composition of the House Electoral Tribunal violates the constitutional requirement of proportional representation because there are no party-list representatives in the hret.
[2]: Whether the refusal of the HRET and the CA to reconstitute themselves to include party-list representatives constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Held:
[1] NO. The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their members those who would fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, each chamber of Congress exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who among their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chamber’s respective electoral tribunal. These constitutional provisions are reiterated in Rules 3 and 4 (a) of the 1998 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being subject to the mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation.[26] However, under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not interfere with the exercise by the House of this constitutionally mandated duty, absent a clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[27] Otherwise, ‘the doctrine of separation of powers calls for each branch of government to be left alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit.[28] Neither can the Court speculate on what action the House may take if party-list representatives are duly nominated for membership in the HRET and the CA. The petitions are bereft of any allegation that respondents prevented the party-list groups in the House from participating in the election of members of the HRET and the CA. Neither does it appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections, the House barred the party-list representatives from seeking membership in the HRET or the CA. Rather, it appears from the available facts that the party-list groups in the House at that time simply refrained from participating in the election process. The party-list representatives did not designate their nominees even up to the time they filed the petitions, with the predictable result that the House did not consider any party-list representative for election to the HRET or the CA. As the primary recourse of the party-list representatives lies with the House of Representatives, ‘the Court cannot resolve the issues presented by petitioners at this time.
[2]: There is no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and the CA in response to the letters of Senator Pimentel. Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and their internal rules, the HRET and the CA are bereft of any power to reconstitute themselves.
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