Bantay vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 177271
May 4, 2007
FACTS: Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus to nullify and set aside certain issuances of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) respecting party-list groups which have manifested their intention to participate in the party-list elections on May 14, 2007.
A number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations and subsequently were accredited by the Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections. Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR) filed with the Comelec an Urgent Petition to Disqualify, seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list organizations. Docketed in the Comelec as SPA Case No 07-026, this urgent petition has yet to be resolved.
Meanwhile petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed 2 letters to the Director of the Comelec’s Law Department requesting a list of that groups’ nominees. Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was the issuance of Comelec en banc Resolution 07-0724 under date April 3, 2007 virtually declaring the nominees’ names confidential and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales’ basic disclosure request. Comelec’s reason for keeping the names of the party list nominees away from the public is deducible from the excerpts of the news report appearing in the April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin, is that there is nothing in R.A. 7941 that requires the Comelec to disclose the names of nominees, and that party list elections must not be personality oriented according to Chairman Abalos.
In the first petition (G.R. No. 177271), BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR assail the Comelec resolutions accrediting private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the forthcoming party-list elections without simultaneously determining whether or not their respective nominees possess the requisite qualifications defined in R.A. No. 7941, or the "Party-List System Act" and belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector each seeks to.
In the second petition (G.R. No. 177314), petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution dated April 3, 2007.
While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of the various party-list groups named in the petitions, BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR have the additional prayers that the 33 private respondents named therein be "declare[d] as unqualified to participate in the party-list elections and that the Comelec be enjoined from allowing respondent groups from participating in the elections.
ISSUE:
1. Can the Court cancel the accreditation accorded by the Comelec to the respondent party-list groups named in their petition on the ground that these groups and their respective nominees do not appear to be qualified.
2. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the various party-list groups, has violated the right to information and free access to documents as guaranteed by the Constitution; and
3. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to the public the names of said nominees.
HELD: The 1st petition is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to nullify the accreditation of the respondents named therein. However, insofar as it seeks to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections, the 2 petitions are GRANTED. Accordingly, the Comelec is hereby ORDERED to immediately disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups,
1. The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR for cancellation of accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their petition. The exercise would require the Court to make a factual determination, a matter which is outside the office of judicial review by way of special civil action for certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the Court is not called upon to decide factual issues and the case must be decided on the undisputed facts on record. The sole function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and does not include a review of the tribunal’s evaluation of the evidence. (note that nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there a requirement that the qualification of a party-list nominee be determined simultaneously with the accreditation of an organization. )
2. Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz:
Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
COMELEC’s basis of its refusal to disclose the names of the nominees of subject party-list groups, Section 7 of R.A. 7941,which last sentence reads: "[T]he names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list" is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. There is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than the "Certified List" of the names.
It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right to elect their representatives on the basis of an informed judgment. While the vote cast in a party-list elections is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives. The Court frowns upon any interpretation of the law or rules that would hinder in any way the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election
3. COMELEC has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups named in the herein petitions. The right to information is a public right where the real parties in interest are the public, or the citizens to be precise, but like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information and its companion right of access to official records are not absolute. The people’s right to know is limited to "matters of public concern" and is further subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. But no national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list groups subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies.
Sunday, January 31, 2010
Sunday, January 10, 2010
Nicholas- Lewis vs COMELEC
Nicholas- Lewis vs COMELEC
Facts:
Nicholas-Lewis and the other petitioners were dual citizens who retained or re-acquired their Philippine citizenship under RA 9225, the Citizens Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. They filed a petition to the COMELEC praying to avail themselves the right of suffrage under RA 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.
The COMELEC rejected their petition. The COMELEC argued that upon acquisition by the petitioners of their foreign citizenship, they have renounced their Philippine citizenship and have abandoned their domicile. The COMELEC further stated that before they could exercise the right of suffrage, they had to meet the residency requirement among others provided in Section 1 Article 5 of the Constitution by first establishing their domicile in the Philippines through positive acts.
Issue:
WON the dual citizens who have retained or re-acquired their Philippine citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can exercise their right of suffrage under RA 9189
Held:
Yes.
Ratio:
Section 5 of RA 9225 states that those who retained or reacquired their citizenship under this act shall enjoy full civil and political rights, subject to certain conditions including the fulfillment of the requirements under Section 1 Article 5 of the Constitution and RA 9189.
Applying the doctrine of necessary implication, the strategic location of Section 2 Article 5 of the Constitution indicates that it provides for an exception to the residency requirement in Section 1. (as established in a senate debate on the approval of RA 9189).
fr: atty nas >.<
Facts:
Nicholas-Lewis and the other petitioners were dual citizens who retained or re-acquired their Philippine citizenship under RA 9225, the Citizens Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. They filed a petition to the COMELEC praying to avail themselves the right of suffrage under RA 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.
The COMELEC rejected their petition. The COMELEC argued that upon acquisition by the petitioners of their foreign citizenship, they have renounced their Philippine citizenship and have abandoned their domicile. The COMELEC further stated that before they could exercise the right of suffrage, they had to meet the residency requirement among others provided in Section 1 Article 5 of the Constitution by first establishing their domicile in the Philippines through positive acts.
Issue:
WON the dual citizens who have retained or re-acquired their Philippine citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can exercise their right of suffrage under RA 9189
Held:
Yes.
Ratio:
Section 5 of RA 9225 states that those who retained or reacquired their citizenship under this act shall enjoy full civil and political rights, subject to certain conditions including the fulfillment of the requirements under Section 1 Article 5 of the Constitution and RA 9189.
Applying the doctrine of necessary implication, the strategic location of Section 2 Article 5 of the Constitution indicates that it provides for an exception to the residency requirement in Section 1. (as established in a senate debate on the approval of RA 9189).
fr: atty nas >.<
Friday, January 8, 2010
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Glan vs. COMELEC
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Glan vs. COMELEC
Facts:
A pre- proclamation controversy instituted by respondent Flora Benzonan and COMELEC. Benzonan who was a mayoralty candidate in the Municipality of Glan, Sarangani during 2001 sought to declare null and void the canvass conducted by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Glan and to recall the proclamation of petitioners respectively. Respondent argued here pre-proclamation case on the ground that :
1. After the original and second Municipal Board of Canvassers had resigned, the third Municipal Board of Canvassers was illegally constituted as it as its Chairman, Vice Chairman and Secretary which are not qualified over Omnibus Code.
2. The canvassing proceeding with more initially held in the Session Hall of Sangunian Bayan were latter transferred to the Provincial Capitol at Danao contrary to COMELEC Resolution.
3. The Secretary of Municipal Board of Canvassers failed to record the minutes of the canvassing.
4. Neither Benzonan nor her representatives were the last three days of the canvassing proceeding.
5. A sustancial number of election returns had been tampered with of falsificated.
6. Municipal Board of Canvassers falsificated the Certificate of Canvass Vote.
The COMELEC en banc issued a resolution finding the based on the evidence presented the proclamation of the winning candidates were declared null and void. And a re-canvass of the election returns was ordered. Arising from the said decision was a petition for Certiorari filed to review the COMELEC en banc’s resolution and praying that a Temporary Restraining Order be given for the reason that COMELEC was not in the proper jurisdiction to render such resolution.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC en banc has a jurisdiction over the case.
Held:
Not all cases relating to election laws filed before the comelec are required to be first heard by a division. Under the constitution the COMELEC exercise both the administrative and quasi-judicial powers. The COMELEC en banc can act directly on matters falling with in its administrative powers. It is only when the exercise of quasi-judicial powers are involved that the COMELEC is mandated to decide cases first in division. It is clear that this case is one that involves a pre proclamation controversy that requires the exercise of the COMELEC’s quasi-judicial powers as the illegality of the composition and proceedings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers. Also, Benzonan filed her pre proclamation case directly with the COMELEC en banc. Since COMELEC en banc is without jurisdiction to decide cases involving such, the procedure taken by Benzonan resulted in a resolution in her favor thus declare null and void.
fr: atty. gloria >.<
Facts:
A pre- proclamation controversy instituted by respondent Flora Benzonan and COMELEC. Benzonan who was a mayoralty candidate in the Municipality of Glan, Sarangani during 2001 sought to declare null and void the canvass conducted by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Glan and to recall the proclamation of petitioners respectively. Respondent argued here pre-proclamation case on the ground that :
1. After the original and second Municipal Board of Canvassers had resigned, the third Municipal Board of Canvassers was illegally constituted as it as its Chairman, Vice Chairman and Secretary which are not qualified over Omnibus Code.
2. The canvassing proceeding with more initially held in the Session Hall of Sangunian Bayan were latter transferred to the Provincial Capitol at Danao contrary to COMELEC Resolution.
3. The Secretary of Municipal Board of Canvassers failed to record the minutes of the canvassing.
4. Neither Benzonan nor her representatives were the last three days of the canvassing proceeding.
5. A sustancial number of election returns had been tampered with of falsificated.
6. Municipal Board of Canvassers falsificated the Certificate of Canvass Vote.
The COMELEC en banc issued a resolution finding the based on the evidence presented the proclamation of the winning candidates were declared null and void. And a re-canvass of the election returns was ordered. Arising from the said decision was a petition for Certiorari filed to review the COMELEC en banc’s resolution and praying that a Temporary Restraining Order be given for the reason that COMELEC was not in the proper jurisdiction to render such resolution.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC en banc has a jurisdiction over the case.
Held:
Not all cases relating to election laws filed before the comelec are required to be first heard by a division. Under the constitution the COMELEC exercise both the administrative and quasi-judicial powers. The COMELEC en banc can act directly on matters falling with in its administrative powers. It is only when the exercise of quasi-judicial powers are involved that the COMELEC is mandated to decide cases first in division. It is clear that this case is one that involves a pre proclamation controversy that requires the exercise of the COMELEC’s quasi-judicial powers as the illegality of the composition and proceedings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers. Also, Benzonan filed her pre proclamation case directly with the COMELEC en banc. Since COMELEC en banc is without jurisdiction to decide cases involving such, the procedure taken by Benzonan resulted in a resolution in her favor thus declare null and void.
fr: atty. gloria >.<
Matsura vs. Comelec
Matsura vs. Comelec
Facts:
Petitioner Michael Matsura and private respondent Didagen Dilanggalen were congressional candidates for the first district of Maguindanao. Dilanggalen objected to the inclusion of the Certificate of Canvass of Municipality of Matanog on the ground that the same was allegedly tampered. The COMELEC ordered the production and examination of the election returns of the Municipality of Matanog. During the examination, four (4) ballot boxes were produced and opened. Upon the examination and comparison the COMELEC found that indeed the Certificate had been tampered. Meanwhile, the Municipal Board of Canvassers convenes and re canvassed the votes. Matsura objected to the inclusion of fifty(50) out of fifty seven(57) election returns on the ground that the COMELEC copy of the election returns was not reflective of the true results unless compared with the copy of the original of Municipal Board of Canvassers. Matsura thereafter walked out while the new Municipal Board of Canvassers continued with the canvassing. After the proceedings, private respondent was proclaimed the duly elected member and Maguindao. Matsura filed a petition for Certiorari; prohibition and Mandamus praying the annulment of said decision due to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELED.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC exercise a grave abuse of discretion by not including the seven (7) remaining election returns for the re canvassing of votes.
Held:
No, COMELEC can suspend the canvass of votes pending its inquiry whether mere existence of a discrepancy between the various copies of election returns from the disputed voting centers. Once the election returns were found to be falsificated or tampered with, the COMELEC can annul the illegal canvass and order the Board of Canvassers to reconvene and proclaim the winners on the basis of the genuine returns.
fr: atty gloria >.<
Facts:
Petitioner Michael Matsura and private respondent Didagen Dilanggalen were congressional candidates for the first district of Maguindanao. Dilanggalen objected to the inclusion of the Certificate of Canvass of Municipality of Matanog on the ground that the same was allegedly tampered. The COMELEC ordered the production and examination of the election returns of the Municipality of Matanog. During the examination, four (4) ballot boxes were produced and opened. Upon the examination and comparison the COMELEC found that indeed the Certificate had been tampered. Meanwhile, the Municipal Board of Canvassers convenes and re canvassed the votes. Matsura objected to the inclusion of fifty(50) out of fifty seven(57) election returns on the ground that the COMELEC copy of the election returns was not reflective of the true results unless compared with the copy of the original of Municipal Board of Canvassers. Matsura thereafter walked out while the new Municipal Board of Canvassers continued with the canvassing. After the proceedings, private respondent was proclaimed the duly elected member and Maguindao. Matsura filed a petition for Certiorari; prohibition and Mandamus praying the annulment of said decision due to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELED.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC exercise a grave abuse of discretion by not including the seven (7) remaining election returns for the re canvassing of votes.
Held:
No, COMELEC can suspend the canvass of votes pending its inquiry whether mere existence of a discrepancy between the various copies of election returns from the disputed voting centers. Once the election returns were found to be falsificated or tampered with, the COMELEC can annul the illegal canvass and order the Board of Canvassers to reconvene and proclaim the winners on the basis of the genuine returns.
fr: atty gloria >.<
BANAGA, JR. vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 134696)
BANAGA, JR. vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 134696
July 31, 2000
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to annul the en banc resolution of public respondent Commission on Elections promulgated on June 29, 1998, in a COMELEC special action case, SPA No. 98-383.
Facts:
Petitioner Banaga, Jr. and respondent Bernabe, Jr. were both candidates for vice-mayor of the City of Parañaque in the May 1998 election. In said election, the city board of canvassers proclaimed respondent Bernabe, Jr., as the winner for having garnered 71,977 votes over petitioner Banaga, Jr.’s 68,970 votes.
Dissatisfied with the result, petitioner filed with the COMELEC on May 1998, a Petition to Declare Failure of Elections and/or For Annulment of Elections, alleging that said election was replete with election offenses, such as vote buying and flying voters. He also alleged that numerous Election Returns pertaining to the position of Vice-Mayor in the City of Parañaque appear to be altered, falsified or fabricated.
In fact, there were people arrested who admitted the said election offenses. Therefore, the incidents were sufficient to declare a failure of elections because it cannot be considered as the true will of the people.
Petitioner Banaga, Jr. is praying that he should be adjudged as the duly elected Vice-Mayor in the City of Parañaque, during the May 1998 local elections.
Respondent COMELEC dismissed petitioner’s suit and held that the election offenses relied upon by petitioner do not fall under any of the instances enumerated in Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code. The election tribunal concluded that based on the allegations of the petition, it is clear that an election took place and that it did not result in a failure to elect and therefore, cannot be viewed as an election protest.
Thus, this petition for certiorari alleging that the respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for dismissing his petition motu propio without any basis whatsoever and without giving him the benefit of a hearing.
Issue:
WON petition to declare a failure of elections and/or for annulment of election is considered as an election protest.
WON respondent COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners petition, in the light of petitioners foregoing contentions.
Decision:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The assailed RESOLUTION of public respondent is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
Ratio Decidendi:
1) No. Mr. Banaga, Jr.’s petition docketed as SPA-98-383 before the COMELEC was a special action under the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure. An election protest is an ordinary governed by Rule 20 on ordinary actions, while a petition to declare failure of elections is covered by Rule 26 under special actions. Petitioner also did not comply with the requirements for filing an election protest such as failing to pay filing fee and cash deposits for an election protest.
2) No. Respondent COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition to declare failure of elections and/or for annulment of elections for being groundless. The petition to declare a failure of election and/or to annul election results must show on its face that the conditions necessary to declare a failure to elect are present. Respondent COMELEC only based its decision on the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code with regard to declaring a failure of election. There are three instances where a failure of election may be declared, namely:
(a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes;
(b) the election in any polling place has been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes; or
(c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes.
The instances being not present in the petition of Mr. Banaga, Jr. The respondent COMELEC have no other recourse but to dismiss the petition.
fr: atty. manuel >.<
G.R. No. 134696
July 31, 2000
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to annul the en banc resolution of public respondent Commission on Elections promulgated on June 29, 1998, in a COMELEC special action case, SPA No. 98-383.
Facts:
Petitioner Banaga, Jr. and respondent Bernabe, Jr. were both candidates for vice-mayor of the City of Parañaque in the May 1998 election. In said election, the city board of canvassers proclaimed respondent Bernabe, Jr., as the winner for having garnered 71,977 votes over petitioner Banaga, Jr.’s 68,970 votes.
Dissatisfied with the result, petitioner filed with the COMELEC on May 1998, a Petition to Declare Failure of Elections and/or For Annulment of Elections, alleging that said election was replete with election offenses, such as vote buying and flying voters. He also alleged that numerous Election Returns pertaining to the position of Vice-Mayor in the City of Parañaque appear to be altered, falsified or fabricated.
In fact, there were people arrested who admitted the said election offenses. Therefore, the incidents were sufficient to declare a failure of elections because it cannot be considered as the true will of the people.
Petitioner Banaga, Jr. is praying that he should be adjudged as the duly elected Vice-Mayor in the City of Parañaque, during the May 1998 local elections.
Respondent COMELEC dismissed petitioner’s suit and held that the election offenses relied upon by petitioner do not fall under any of the instances enumerated in Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code. The election tribunal concluded that based on the allegations of the petition, it is clear that an election took place and that it did not result in a failure to elect and therefore, cannot be viewed as an election protest.
Thus, this petition for certiorari alleging that the respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for dismissing his petition motu propio without any basis whatsoever and without giving him the benefit of a hearing.
Issue:
WON petition to declare a failure of elections and/or for annulment of election is considered as an election protest.
WON respondent COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners petition, in the light of petitioners foregoing contentions.
Decision:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The assailed RESOLUTION of public respondent is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
Ratio Decidendi:
1) No. Mr. Banaga, Jr.’s petition docketed as SPA-98-383 before the COMELEC was a special action under the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure. An election protest is an ordinary governed by Rule 20 on ordinary actions, while a petition to declare failure of elections is covered by Rule 26 under special actions. Petitioner also did not comply with the requirements for filing an election protest such as failing to pay filing fee and cash deposits for an election protest.
2) No. Respondent COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition to declare failure of elections and/or for annulment of elections for being groundless. The petition to declare a failure of election and/or to annul election results must show on its face that the conditions necessary to declare a failure to elect are present. Respondent COMELEC only based its decision on the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code with regard to declaring a failure of election. There are three instances where a failure of election may be declared, namely:
(a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes;
(b) the election in any polling place has been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes; or
(c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes.
The instances being not present in the petition of Mr. Banaga, Jr. The respondent COMELEC have no other recourse but to dismiss the petition.
fr: atty. manuel >.<
Herrera vs COMELEC
Herrera vs COMELEC
Facts:
In its Resolution no. 68, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Guimaras requested the COMELEC to have the province subdivided into two provincial districts. Acting upon the request, the Provincial Election Supervisor conducted two consultative meetings with the provincial and municipal officials, barangay captains, barangay kagawads, representatives of all political parties, and other interested parties. A consensus was reached in favor of the division.
The PES then issued a memo recommending the division of the province.
Guimaras was then reclassified from 5th class to 4th class province under the Memo Circular No. 97-1 issued by the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the Department of Finance.
The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2950 which allotted 8 Sangguniang Panlalawigan seats to Guimaras—1st district (Buenavista and San Lorenzo)= 3 seats and 2nd district (Jordan, Nueva Valencia, and Sibunag)= 5 seats.
The petitioners questioned Resolution No. 2950, pointing out that:
1.the districts do not comprise a compact, contiguous and adjacent area.
2.the consultative meetings did not express the true sentiment of the voters of the province.
3.the apportionment of the two districts are not equitable.
4.there is disparity in the ratio of the number of voters that a Board Member represents.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution No. 2950?
Held:
COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion. The petition is dismissed.
Ratio:
1. The municipalities belonging to each district are compact, contiguous and adjacent. Contiguous and adjacent means adjoining, nearby, abutting, having a common border, connected, and/or touching along boundaries often for considerable distances. On its face, the map of Guimaras shows that the municipalities grouped together are contiguous or adjacent.
2. There were two consultative meetings held by the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor. As required by COMELEC Resoluiton No. 2313, all interested parties were duly notified and represented.
3. Under Republic Act 6636, a 4th class province shall have 8 Sangguniang Panlalawigan members. Also, under Republic Act 7166, provinces with 1 legislative district shall be divided into 2 districts for purposes of electing the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The province of Guimaras, being a 4th class province and having only 1 legislative district, shall have 8 Sangguniang Panlalawigan members and 2 districts.
4. Under Republic Act 7166 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2313, the basis for division shall be the number of inhabitants of the province concerned not the number of listed or registered voters. The districting of the Province of Guimaras was based on the official 1995 Census of Population as certified by the National Statistics Office.
fr: atty nas >.<
Facts:
In its Resolution no. 68, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Guimaras requested the COMELEC to have the province subdivided into two provincial districts. Acting upon the request, the Provincial Election Supervisor conducted two consultative meetings with the provincial and municipal officials, barangay captains, barangay kagawads, representatives of all political parties, and other interested parties. A consensus was reached in favor of the division.
The PES then issued a memo recommending the division of the province.
Guimaras was then reclassified from 5th class to 4th class province under the Memo Circular No. 97-1 issued by the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the Department of Finance.
The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2950 which allotted 8 Sangguniang Panlalawigan seats to Guimaras—1st district (Buenavista and San Lorenzo)= 3 seats and 2nd district (Jordan, Nueva Valencia, and Sibunag)= 5 seats.
The petitioners questioned Resolution No. 2950, pointing out that:
1.the districts do not comprise a compact, contiguous and adjacent area.
2.the consultative meetings did not express the true sentiment of the voters of the province.
3.the apportionment of the two districts are not equitable.
4.there is disparity in the ratio of the number of voters that a Board Member represents.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution No. 2950?
Held:
COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion. The petition is dismissed.
Ratio:
1. The municipalities belonging to each district are compact, contiguous and adjacent. Contiguous and adjacent means adjoining, nearby, abutting, having a common border, connected, and/or touching along boundaries often for considerable distances. On its face, the map of Guimaras shows that the municipalities grouped together are contiguous or adjacent.
2. There were two consultative meetings held by the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor. As required by COMELEC Resoluiton No. 2313, all interested parties were duly notified and represented.
3. Under Republic Act 6636, a 4th class province shall have 8 Sangguniang Panlalawigan members. Also, under Republic Act 7166, provinces with 1 legislative district shall be divided into 2 districts for purposes of electing the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The province of Guimaras, being a 4th class province and having only 1 legislative district, shall have 8 Sangguniang Panlalawigan members and 2 districts.
4. Under Republic Act 7166 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2313, the basis for division shall be the number of inhabitants of the province concerned not the number of listed or registered voters. The districting of the Province of Guimaras was based on the official 1995 Census of Population as certified by the National Statistics Office.
fr: atty nas >.<
TAULE vs. SANTOS (G. R. No. 90336)
TAULE vs. SANTOS
August 12, 1991
G. R. No. 90336
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
This is a petition for certiorari seeking the reversal of the resolutions of respondent Secretary dated August 4, 1989 and September 5, 1989 for being null and void.
Facts:
An election for the officers of the Federation of Associations of Barangay Council (FABC) was held on June 18, 1989 despite the absence of other members of the said council. Including Petitioner was elected as the president.
Respondent Verceles sent a letter of protest to respondent Santos, seeking its nullification in view of several flagrant irregularities in the manner it was conducted.
Petitioner denied the allegations of respondent Verceles and denouncing respondent for intervening in the said election which is a purely non-partisan affair. And requesting for his appointment as a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the province being the duly elected President of the FABC in Catanduanes.
Respondent Santos issued a resolution on August 4, 1989 nullifying the election and ordering a new one to be conducted as early as possible to be presided by the Regional Director of Region V of the Department of Local Government. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by respondent Santos in his resolution on September 5, 1989.
Thus this petition before the Supreme Court.
Issues:
1)WON the respondent Santos has jurisdiction to entertain an election protest involving the election of the officers of the FABC.
2)WON the respondent Verceles has the legal personality to file an election protest.
Decision:
Petition GRANTED. Assailed August 4, 1989 and September 5, 1989 resolution is SET ASIDE for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction. However, the election on June 18, 1989 is annulled. A new election of officers of the FABC be conducted immediately in accordance with the governing rules and regulations. Supplemental petition is likewise partially granted.
Ratio Decidendi:
1. No. The Secretary of Local Government has no jurisdiction to entertain any protest involving the election of officers of the FABC. He is only vested with the power to promulgate rules and regulations and to exercise general supervision over the local government as provided in the Local Government Code and in the Administrative Code.
It is the exclusive original jurisdiction of the inferior to hear election protest and the COMELEC have the appellate jurisdiction over it.
2) Yes. The Governor has the personality to file the protest. Under Section 205 of the Local Government Code, the membership of the sangguniang panlalawigan consists of the governor, the vice-governor, elective members of the said sanggunian, etc. He acted as the presiding officer of the sangguniang panlalawigan. As presiding officer, he has an interest in the election of the officers of the FABC since its elected president becomes a member of the assembly. If said member assumes his place under questionable circumstances, the sanggunian may be vulnerable to attacks as to their validity or legality. Therefore, respondent governor is a proper party to question the regularity of the elections of the officers of the FABC.
The election of officers of the FABC held on June 18, 1989 is null and void for not complying with the provisions of DLG Circular No. 89-09.
DLG Circular No. 89-09 provides that "the incumbent FABC President or the Vice-President shall preside over the reorganizational meeting, there being a quorum." It is admitted that neither the incumbent FABC President nor the Vice-President presided over the meeting and elections but Alberto P. Molina, Jr., the Chairman of the Board of Election Supervisors/Consultants. Therefore, there was a clear violation of the said mandatory provision.
• Pending resolution, petitioner also filed a supplemental petition alleging that public respondent Local Government Secretary, in his memorandum dated June 7, 1990, designated Augusto Antonio, despite him being absent on said election. The Secretary of Local Government has no authority to appoint anyone who does not meet the minimum qualification to be the president of the federation of barangay councils.
fr: atty. manuel >.<
August 12, 1991
G. R. No. 90336
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
This is a petition for certiorari seeking the reversal of the resolutions of respondent Secretary dated August 4, 1989 and September 5, 1989 for being null and void.
Facts:
An election for the officers of the Federation of Associations of Barangay Council (FABC) was held on June 18, 1989 despite the absence of other members of the said council. Including Petitioner was elected as the president.
Respondent Verceles sent a letter of protest to respondent Santos, seeking its nullification in view of several flagrant irregularities in the manner it was conducted.
Petitioner denied the allegations of respondent Verceles and denouncing respondent for intervening in the said election which is a purely non-partisan affair. And requesting for his appointment as a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the province being the duly elected President of the FABC in Catanduanes.
Respondent Santos issued a resolution on August 4, 1989 nullifying the election and ordering a new one to be conducted as early as possible to be presided by the Regional Director of Region V of the Department of Local Government. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by respondent Santos in his resolution on September 5, 1989.
Thus this petition before the Supreme Court.
Issues:
1)WON the respondent Santos has jurisdiction to entertain an election protest involving the election of the officers of the FABC.
2)WON the respondent Verceles has the legal personality to file an election protest.
Decision:
Petition GRANTED. Assailed August 4, 1989 and September 5, 1989 resolution is SET ASIDE for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction. However, the election on June 18, 1989 is annulled. A new election of officers of the FABC be conducted immediately in accordance with the governing rules and regulations. Supplemental petition is likewise partially granted.
Ratio Decidendi:
1. No. The Secretary of Local Government has no jurisdiction to entertain any protest involving the election of officers of the FABC. He is only vested with the power to promulgate rules and regulations and to exercise general supervision over the local government as provided in the Local Government Code and in the Administrative Code.
It is the exclusive original jurisdiction of the inferior to hear election protest and the COMELEC have the appellate jurisdiction over it.
2) Yes. The Governor has the personality to file the protest. Under Section 205 of the Local Government Code, the membership of the sangguniang panlalawigan consists of the governor, the vice-governor, elective members of the said sanggunian, etc. He acted as the presiding officer of the sangguniang panlalawigan. As presiding officer, he has an interest in the election of the officers of the FABC since its elected president becomes a member of the assembly. If said member assumes his place under questionable circumstances, the sanggunian may be vulnerable to attacks as to their validity or legality. Therefore, respondent governor is a proper party to question the regularity of the elections of the officers of the FABC.
The election of officers of the FABC held on June 18, 1989 is null and void for not complying with the provisions of DLG Circular No. 89-09.
DLG Circular No. 89-09 provides that "the incumbent FABC President or the Vice-President shall preside over the reorganizational meeting, there being a quorum." It is admitted that neither the incumbent FABC President nor the Vice-President presided over the meeting and elections but Alberto P. Molina, Jr., the Chairman of the Board of Election Supervisors/Consultants. Therefore, there was a clear violation of the said mandatory provision.
• Pending resolution, petitioner also filed a supplemental petition alleging that public respondent Local Government Secretary, in his memorandum dated June 7, 1990, designated Augusto Antonio, despite him being absent on said election. The Secretary of Local Government has no authority to appoint anyone who does not meet the minimum qualification to be the president of the federation of barangay councils.
fr: atty. manuel >.<
Zarate vs COMELEC
Zarate vs COMELEC
FACTS:
Julian Lallave, Jr. won the 1996 SK Elections of Brgy Ican, Malasiqui, Pangasinan, garnering a total of 46 votes over Marivic Zarate who garnered 45 votes.
Unsatisfied with the proclamation by the Barangay Board of Canvassers, Zarate filed an election protest before the Municipal Trial Court stating that three or more votes that read “JL” should not have been credited in favor of Lallave. Zarate further stated that the votes bearing “JL” were stray votes and that there was no candidate with the name or nickname of “JL”.
The Municipal Trial Court rendered it decision in favor of petitioner Zarate, declaring 8 of the original 46 votes invalid.
Lallave appealed to the Commission on Elections theorizing that the votes reading “JL” should be credited in his favour considering that such initials sufficiently identify him as the candidate and that the votes bearing “Julian, Jr de Real”, “Notno Lallave”, and “Nono de Real” should have been credited as well being his nickname and middlename, respectively.
The appeal by Lallave was not referred to a division of the Commission but was, instead, submitted to the Commission en banc.The COMELEC en banc annulled the decision of the Municipal Trial Court and declared Lallave as the elected SK chairman.
Issue:
Whether or not the Commission on Elections committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction?
Held:
Yes. The COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction without first referring the case to any of its division. The petition for annulling the COMELEC’s decision was granted and was set aside. The Commission was ordered to assign the case to a division.
Ratio:
The recourse of respondent Lallave transgressed Section 3 Article IX of the Constitution which provides that “...election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.”
FACTS:
Julian Lallave, Jr. won the 1996 SK Elections of Brgy Ican, Malasiqui, Pangasinan, garnering a total of 46 votes over Marivic Zarate who garnered 45 votes.
Unsatisfied with the proclamation by the Barangay Board of Canvassers, Zarate filed an election protest before the Municipal Trial Court stating that three or more votes that read “JL” should not have been credited in favor of Lallave. Zarate further stated that the votes bearing “JL” were stray votes and that there was no candidate with the name or nickname of “JL”.
The Municipal Trial Court rendered it decision in favor of petitioner Zarate, declaring 8 of the original 46 votes invalid.
Lallave appealed to the Commission on Elections theorizing that the votes reading “JL” should be credited in his favour considering that such initials sufficiently identify him as the candidate and that the votes bearing “Julian, Jr de Real”, “Notno Lallave”, and “Nono de Real” should have been credited as well being his nickname and middlename, respectively.
The appeal by Lallave was not referred to a division of the Commission but was, instead, submitted to the Commission en banc.The COMELEC en banc annulled the decision of the Municipal Trial Court and declared Lallave as the elected SK chairman.
Issue:
Whether or not the Commission on Elections committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction?
Held:
Yes. The COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction without first referring the case to any of its division. The petition for annulling the COMELEC’s decision was granted and was set aside. The Commission was ordered to assign the case to a division.
Ratio:
The recourse of respondent Lallave transgressed Section 3 Article IX of the Constitution which provides that “...election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.”
Tan v. COMELEC
Tan v. COMELEC
Facts:
On 10 May 1992, Antonio Tan, as incumbent city Prosecutor of Davao City, was designated by the Commission on Elections as Vice-Chairman of the City Board of Canvassers of Davao City for the 11th May 1992 synchronized national and local elections conformably with the provisions of Section 20(a) of Republic Act No. 6646 and Section 221(b) of the Omnibus Election Code
On the basis of the votes canvassed by the Board of Canvassers, Manuel Garcia was proclaimed the winning candidate for a congressional seat to represent the 2nd District of Davao City in the House of Representatives.
Senforiano Alterado, another candidate for the position, filed a number of cases questioning the validity of the proclamation of Manuel Garcia and accusing the members of the City Board of Canvassers of "unlawful, erroneous, incomplete and irregular canvass." Meanwhile, the electoral protest of Alterado was dismissed by the HRET. The criminal complaint for "Falsification of Public Documents and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" before the Office of the Ombudsman was likewise dismissed on the ground of lack of criminal intent on the part of therein respondents. An administrative charge was instituted in the COMELEC against the City Board of Canvassers, including Antonio Tan, for "Misconduct, Neglect of Duty, Gross Incompetence and Acts Inimical to the Service."
Tan moved to dismiss the administrative complaint against him for alleged lack of jurisdiction of the COMELEC, he being under the Executive Department of the government and that COMELEC’s power to deputize public officers belonging to the executive department is for the purpose of insuring free, orderly and honest elections. It does not include and comprehend administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over officials belonging to the executive branch of government. That jurisdiction over deputized executive officers cannot be deemed to include such powers as would allow encroachment into the domain of the executive branch under guise of administering laws relative to elections. . Motion to dismiss was denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss
Held:
No. The COMELEC's authority under Section 2(6-8), Article IX, of the Constitution is virtually all-encompassing when it comes to election matters. The administrative case against Tan, taken cognizance of by, and still pending with, the COMELEC, is in relation to the performance of his duties as an election canvasser and not as a city prosecutor. The COMELEC's mandate includes its authority to exercise direct and immediate supervision and control over national and local officials or employees, including members of any national or local law enforcement agency and instrumentality of the government, required by law to perform duties relative to the conduct of elections. In order to help ensure that such duly deputized officials and employees of government carry out their respective assigned tasks, the law has also provided than upon the COMELEC's recommendation, the corresponding proper authority (the Secretary of the Department of Justice in the case at bar) shall take appropriate action, either to suspend or remove from office the officer or employee who may, after due process, be found guilty of violation of election laws or failure to comply with instructions, orders, decision or rulings of the COMELEC. However, the COMELEC, prior to making its recommendation, must first satisfy itself that there indeed has been an infraction of the law, or of its directives issued conformably therewith, by the person administratively charged. It also stands to reason that it is the COMELEC, being in the best position to assess how its deputized officials and employees perform or have performed in their duties that should conduct the administrative inquiry. To say that the COMELEC is without jurisdiction to look into charges of election offenses committed by officials and employees of government outside the regular employ of the COMELEC would be to unduly deny to it the proper and sound exercise of such recommendatory power and, perhaps more than that, even a possible denial of due process to the official or employee concerned.
The COMELEC merely may issue a recommendation for disciplinary action but that it is the executive department to which the charged official or employee belongs which has the ultimate authority to impose the disciplinary penalty. The law then does not detract from, but is congruent with, the general administrative authority of the department of government concerned over its own personnel.
Facts:
On 10 May 1992, Antonio Tan, as incumbent city Prosecutor of Davao City, was designated by the Commission on Elections as Vice-Chairman of the City Board of Canvassers of Davao City for the 11th May 1992 synchronized national and local elections conformably with the provisions of Section 20(a) of Republic Act No. 6646 and Section 221(b) of the Omnibus Election Code
On the basis of the votes canvassed by the Board of Canvassers, Manuel Garcia was proclaimed the winning candidate for a congressional seat to represent the 2nd District of Davao City in the House of Representatives.
Senforiano Alterado, another candidate for the position, filed a number of cases questioning the validity of the proclamation of Manuel Garcia and accusing the members of the City Board of Canvassers of "unlawful, erroneous, incomplete and irregular canvass." Meanwhile, the electoral protest of Alterado was dismissed by the HRET. The criminal complaint for "Falsification of Public Documents and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" before the Office of the Ombudsman was likewise dismissed on the ground of lack of criminal intent on the part of therein respondents. An administrative charge was instituted in the COMELEC against the City Board of Canvassers, including Antonio Tan, for "Misconduct, Neglect of Duty, Gross Incompetence and Acts Inimical to the Service."
Tan moved to dismiss the administrative complaint against him for alleged lack of jurisdiction of the COMELEC, he being under the Executive Department of the government and that COMELEC’s power to deputize public officers belonging to the executive department is for the purpose of insuring free, orderly and honest elections. It does not include and comprehend administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over officials belonging to the executive branch of government. That jurisdiction over deputized executive officers cannot be deemed to include such powers as would allow encroachment into the domain of the executive branch under guise of administering laws relative to elections. . Motion to dismiss was denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss
Held:
No. The COMELEC's authority under Section 2(6-8), Article IX, of the Constitution is virtually all-encompassing when it comes to election matters. The administrative case against Tan, taken cognizance of by, and still pending with, the COMELEC, is in relation to the performance of his duties as an election canvasser and not as a city prosecutor. The COMELEC's mandate includes its authority to exercise direct and immediate supervision and control over national and local officials or employees, including members of any national or local law enforcement agency and instrumentality of the government, required by law to perform duties relative to the conduct of elections. In order to help ensure that such duly deputized officials and employees of government carry out their respective assigned tasks, the law has also provided than upon the COMELEC's recommendation, the corresponding proper authority (the Secretary of the Department of Justice in the case at bar) shall take appropriate action, either to suspend or remove from office the officer or employee who may, after due process, be found guilty of violation of election laws or failure to comply with instructions, orders, decision or rulings of the COMELEC. However, the COMELEC, prior to making its recommendation, must first satisfy itself that there indeed has been an infraction of the law, or of its directives issued conformably therewith, by the person administratively charged. It also stands to reason that it is the COMELEC, being in the best position to assess how its deputized officials and employees perform or have performed in their duties that should conduct the administrative inquiry. To say that the COMELEC is without jurisdiction to look into charges of election offenses committed by officials and employees of government outside the regular employ of the COMELEC would be to unduly deny to it the proper and sound exercise of such recommendatory power and, perhaps more than that, even a possible denial of due process to the official or employee concerned.
The COMELEC merely may issue a recommendation for disciplinary action but that it is the executive department to which the charged official or employee belongs which has the ultimate authority to impose the disciplinary penalty. The law then does not detract from, but is congruent with, the general administrative authority of the department of government concerned over its own personnel.
TUPAY T. LOONG vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ABDUSAKUR TAN ( G.R. No. 133676)
TUPAY T. LOONG vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ABDUSAKUR TAN
G.R. No. 133676
April 14, 1999
FACTS:
Automated elections systems was used for the May 11, 1998 regular elections held in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) which includes the Province of Sulu. Atty. Jose Tolentino, Jr. headed the COMELEC Task Force to have administrative oversight of the elections in Sulu.
On May 12, 1998, some election inspectors and watchers informed Atty. Tolentino, Jr. of discrepancies between the election returns and the votes cast for the mayoralty candidates in the municipality of Pata. To avoid a situation where proceeding with automation will result in an erroneous count, he suspended the automated counting of ballots in Pata and immediately communicated the problem to the technical experts of COMELEC and the suppliers of the automated machine. After the consultations, the experts told him that the problem was caused by misalignment of the ovals opposite the names of candidates in the local ballots. They found nothing wrong with the automated machines. The error was in the printing of the local ballots, as a consequence of which, the automated machines failed to read them correctly. Atty. Tolentino, Jr. called for an emergency meeting of the local candidates and the military-police officials overseeing the Sulu elections. Among those who attended were petitioner Tupay Loong and private respondent Abdusakar Tan and intervenor Yusop Jikiri (candidates for governor.) The meeting discussed how the ballots in Pata should be counted in light of the misaligned ovals. There was lack of agreement. Some recommended a shift to manual count (Tan et al) while the others insisted on automated counting (Loong AND Jikiri).
Reports that the automated counting of ballots in other municipalities in Sulu was not working well were received by the COMELEC Task Force. Local ballots in five (5) municipalities were rejected by the automated machines. These municipalities were Talipao, Siasi, Tudanan, Tapul and Jolo. The ballots were rejected because they had the wrong sequence code.
Before midnight of May 12, 1998, Atty. Tolentino, Jr. was able to send to the COMELEC en banc his report and recommendation, urging the use of the manual count in the entire Province of Sulu. 6 On the same day, COMELEC issued Minute Resolution No. 98-1747 ordering a manual count but only in the municipality of Pata.. The next day, May 13, 1998, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 98-1750 approving, Atty. Tolentino, Jr.'s recommendation and the manner of its implementation. On May 15, 1998, the COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No. 98-1796 laying down the rules for the manual count. Minute Resolution 98-1798 laid down the procedure for the counting of votes for Sulu at the PICC.
COMELEC started the manual count on May 18, 1998.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the appropriate remedy to invalidate the disputed COMELEC resolutions.
2. Assuming the appropriateness of the remedy, whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering a manual count. (The main issue in the case at bar)
2.a. Is there a legal basis for the manual count?
2.b. Are its factual bases reasonable?
2.c. Were the petitioner and the intervenor denied due process by the COMELEC when it ordered a manual count?
3. Assuming the manual count is illegal and that its result is unreliable, whether or not it is proper to call for a special election for the position of governor of Sulu.
HELD:
the petition of Tupay Loong and the petition in intervention of Yusop Jikiri are dismissed, there being no showing that public respondent gravely abused its discretion in issuing Minute Resolution Nos. 98-1748, 98-1750, 98-1796 and 98-1798. Our status quo order of June 23, 1998 is lifted.
(1.) Certiorari is the proper remedy of the petitioner. The issue is not only legal but one of first impression and undoubtedly suffered with significance to the entire nation. It is adjudicatory of the right of the petitioner, the private respondents and the intervenor to the position of governor of Sulu. These are enough considerations to call for an exercise of the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court.
(2a). A resolution of the issue will involve an interpretation of R.A. No. 8436 on automated election in relation to the broad power of the COMELEC under Section 2(1), Article IX(C) of the Constitution "to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election , plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall." Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
The order for a manual count cannot be characterized as arbitrary, capricious or whimsical. It is well established that the automated machines failed to read correctly the ballots in the municipality of Pata The technical experts of COMELEC and the supplier of the automated machines found nothing wrong the automated machines. They traced the problem to the printing of local ballots by the National Printing Office. It is plain that to continue with the automated count would result in a grossly erroneous count. An automated count of the local votes in Sulu would have resulted in a wrong count, a travesty of the sovereignty of the electorate
In enacting R.A. No. 8436, Congress obviously failed to provide a remedy where the error in counting is not machine-related for human foresight is not all-seeing. We hold, however, that the vacuum in the law cannot prevent the COMELEC from levitating above the problem. . We cannot kick away the will of the people by giving a literal interpretation to R.A. 8436. R.A. 8436 did not prohibit manual counting when machine count does not work. Counting is part and parcel of the conduct of an election which is under the control and supervision of the COMELEC. It ought to be self-evident that the Constitution did not envision a COMELEC that cannot count the result of an election.
It is also important to consider that the failures of automated counting created post election tension in Sulu, a province with a history of violent elections. COMELEC had to act desively in view of the fast deteriorating peace and order situation caused by the delay in the counting of votes
(2c) Petitioner Loong and intervenor Jikiri were not denied process. The Tolentino memorandum clearly shows that they were given every opportunity to oppose the manual count of the local ballots in Sulu. They were orally heard. They later submitted written position papers. Their representatives escorted the transfer of the ballots and the automated machines from Sulu to Manila. Their watchers observed the manual count from beginning to end.
3. The plea for this Court to call a special election for the governorship of Sulu is completely off-line. The plea can only be grounded on failure of election. Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code tells us when there is a failure of election, viz:
Sec. 6. Failure of election. — If, on account of force majeure, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes, the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election, not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
There is another reason why a special election cannot be ordered by this Court. To hold a special election only for the position of Governor will be discriminatory and will violate the right of private respondent to equal protection of the law. The records show that all elected officials in Sulu have been proclaimed and are now discharging their powers and duties. These officials were proclaimed on the basis of the same manually counted votes of Sulu. If manual counting is illegal, their assumption of office cannot also be countenanced. Private respondent's election cannot be singled out as invalid for alikes cannot be treated unalikes.
The plea for a special election must be addressed to the COMELEC and not to this Court.
G.R. No. 133676
April 14, 1999
FACTS:
Automated elections systems was used for the May 11, 1998 regular elections held in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) which includes the Province of Sulu. Atty. Jose Tolentino, Jr. headed the COMELEC Task Force to have administrative oversight of the elections in Sulu.
On May 12, 1998, some election inspectors and watchers informed Atty. Tolentino, Jr. of discrepancies between the election returns and the votes cast for the mayoralty candidates in the municipality of Pata. To avoid a situation where proceeding with automation will result in an erroneous count, he suspended the automated counting of ballots in Pata and immediately communicated the problem to the technical experts of COMELEC and the suppliers of the automated machine. After the consultations, the experts told him that the problem was caused by misalignment of the ovals opposite the names of candidates in the local ballots. They found nothing wrong with the automated machines. The error was in the printing of the local ballots, as a consequence of which, the automated machines failed to read them correctly. Atty. Tolentino, Jr. called for an emergency meeting of the local candidates and the military-police officials overseeing the Sulu elections. Among those who attended were petitioner Tupay Loong and private respondent Abdusakar Tan and intervenor Yusop Jikiri (candidates for governor.) The meeting discussed how the ballots in Pata should be counted in light of the misaligned ovals. There was lack of agreement. Some recommended a shift to manual count (Tan et al) while the others insisted on automated counting (Loong AND Jikiri).
Reports that the automated counting of ballots in other municipalities in Sulu was not working well were received by the COMELEC Task Force. Local ballots in five (5) municipalities were rejected by the automated machines. These municipalities were Talipao, Siasi, Tudanan, Tapul and Jolo. The ballots were rejected because they had the wrong sequence code.
Before midnight of May 12, 1998, Atty. Tolentino, Jr. was able to send to the COMELEC en banc his report and recommendation, urging the use of the manual count in the entire Province of Sulu. 6 On the same day, COMELEC issued Minute Resolution No. 98-1747 ordering a manual count but only in the municipality of Pata.. The next day, May 13, 1998, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 98-1750 approving, Atty. Tolentino, Jr.'s recommendation and the manner of its implementation. On May 15, 1998, the COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No. 98-1796 laying down the rules for the manual count. Minute Resolution 98-1798 laid down the procedure for the counting of votes for Sulu at the PICC.
COMELEC started the manual count on May 18, 1998.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the appropriate remedy to invalidate the disputed COMELEC resolutions.
2. Assuming the appropriateness of the remedy, whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering a manual count. (The main issue in the case at bar)
2.a. Is there a legal basis for the manual count?
2.b. Are its factual bases reasonable?
2.c. Were the petitioner and the intervenor denied due process by the COMELEC when it ordered a manual count?
3. Assuming the manual count is illegal and that its result is unreliable, whether or not it is proper to call for a special election for the position of governor of Sulu.
HELD:
the petition of Tupay Loong and the petition in intervention of Yusop Jikiri are dismissed, there being no showing that public respondent gravely abused its discretion in issuing Minute Resolution Nos. 98-1748, 98-1750, 98-1796 and 98-1798. Our status quo order of June 23, 1998 is lifted.
(1.) Certiorari is the proper remedy of the petitioner. The issue is not only legal but one of first impression and undoubtedly suffered with significance to the entire nation. It is adjudicatory of the right of the petitioner, the private respondents and the intervenor to the position of governor of Sulu. These are enough considerations to call for an exercise of the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court.
(2a). A resolution of the issue will involve an interpretation of R.A. No. 8436 on automated election in relation to the broad power of the COMELEC under Section 2(1), Article IX(C) of the Constitution "to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election , plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall." Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
The order for a manual count cannot be characterized as arbitrary, capricious or whimsical. It is well established that the automated machines failed to read correctly the ballots in the municipality of Pata The technical experts of COMELEC and the supplier of the automated machines found nothing wrong the automated machines. They traced the problem to the printing of local ballots by the National Printing Office. It is plain that to continue with the automated count would result in a grossly erroneous count. An automated count of the local votes in Sulu would have resulted in a wrong count, a travesty of the sovereignty of the electorate
In enacting R.A. No. 8436, Congress obviously failed to provide a remedy where the error in counting is not machine-related for human foresight is not all-seeing. We hold, however, that the vacuum in the law cannot prevent the COMELEC from levitating above the problem. . We cannot kick away the will of the people by giving a literal interpretation to R.A. 8436. R.A. 8436 did not prohibit manual counting when machine count does not work. Counting is part and parcel of the conduct of an election which is under the control and supervision of the COMELEC. It ought to be self-evident that the Constitution did not envision a COMELEC that cannot count the result of an election.
It is also important to consider that the failures of automated counting created post election tension in Sulu, a province with a history of violent elections. COMELEC had to act desively in view of the fast deteriorating peace and order situation caused by the delay in the counting of votes
(2c) Petitioner Loong and intervenor Jikiri were not denied process. The Tolentino memorandum clearly shows that they were given every opportunity to oppose the manual count of the local ballots in Sulu. They were orally heard. They later submitted written position papers. Their representatives escorted the transfer of the ballots and the automated machines from Sulu to Manila. Their watchers observed the manual count from beginning to end.
3. The plea for this Court to call a special election for the governorship of Sulu is completely off-line. The plea can only be grounded on failure of election. Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code tells us when there is a failure of election, viz:
Sec. 6. Failure of election. — If, on account of force majeure, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes, the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election, not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
There is another reason why a special election cannot be ordered by this Court. To hold a special election only for the position of Governor will be discriminatory and will violate the right of private respondent to equal protection of the law. The records show that all elected officials in Sulu have been proclaimed and are now discharging their powers and duties. These officials were proclaimed on the basis of the same manually counted votes of Sulu. If manual counting is illegal, their assumption of office cannot also be countenanced. Private respondent's election cannot be singled out as invalid for alikes cannot be treated unalikes.
The plea for a special election must be addressed to the COMELEC and not to this Court.
DATU INOCENCIO C. SIAWAN vs. JUDGE AQUILINO A. INOPIQUEZ, JR. (A.M. No. MTJ-95-1056)
DATU INOCENCIO C. SIAWAN vs. JUDGE AQUILINO A. INOPIQUEZ, JR.
A.M. No. MTJ-95-1056
May 21, 2001
FACTS:
This is a complaint filed by Datu Inocencio Siawan against Judge Aquilino. A. Inopiquez, Jr. of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Kananga-Matag-ob, Leyte, for gross ignorance of the law, gross abuse of power, and misconduct in connection with the latter's handling of a criminal case (Crim. Case No. 584) and two election cases for inclusion of voters (Election Case Nos. 333 and 292.) .
In Crim. Case No. 584 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Julia Enriqua Seco . . ., the accused then was charged of Usurpation of Authority and Official Functions , involving, as the complaint states, a "paquiao" contract in which the accused Julia Seco allegedly signed as the Barangay Captain of Brgy. Cansuso, Matag-ob, Leyte; In the course of the proceedings after the prosecution had already presented its witnesses, the complaint was dismissed on the basis of an Affidavit of Desistance executed by complainant Restituto C. Pedrano. This Affidavit of Desistance is opposite to the earlier affidavit of the same complainant, which was made the basis of the Complaint. Prior to the issuance of the Affidavit of Desistance ,accused Seco had filed before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court a Motion for Inhibition of the Presiding Judge now respondent in this case .The meat of this motion for inhibition is that the father-in-law of the Presiding Judge, herein respondent, was conspicuously present in the proceedings during which time he gave consultation to the complainant. Without addressing the issues raised by accused Seco, respondent denied her motion for inhibition in his order, dated May 22, 1987. Apparently realizing that the motion for disqualification was meritorious, respondent, after partially hearing the case, dismissed it on the basis of an affidavit of desistance of the complainant, Restituto Pedrano. But, as Seco sued Pedrano for damages for filing the criminal case, respondent judge ordered the withdrawal of Pedrano's affidavit of desistance from the record and recalled his order dismissing the criminal case. Respondent then revived Criminal Case No. 584 only to dismiss it again, saying the complainant in the criminal case could always refile it. He then inhibited himself on the ground of delicadeza citing his relationship to counsel for the private prosecutor. When Criminal Case No. 1181 was filed against accused Seco, based on the same facts as Criminal Case No. 584, respondent, to whom the case was again assigned, issued an order, dated April 28, 1994, inhibiting himself, reiterating that he is related to the private prosecutor which was later denied by the RTC of Ormoc city and soon thereafter, respondent judge in an Order dated September 5, 1994 dismissed Criminal Case No. 1181. A Motion For Reconsideration re the Order of dismissal was filed by the private complainant. The respondent judge issued the Order of November 14, 1994 denying the motion for reconsideration complainant to which the respondent judge directed accused's counsel, to file comment to the motion; a second motion for reconsideration was again filed by the private complainant and the respondent in an Order dated December 23, 1994 directed anew the accused's counsel for another comment; Atty. Custodio Cañete complied and filed his comment dated December 26, 1994 and later a supplemental comment. Criminal Case No. 1181 was finally laid to rest on February 17, 1995 as per admission of complainant
(b)Election Case Nos. 333 was a petition for inclusion of a voter in the voter's list. Respondent judge admits that the petitioner, retired Judge Ponciano C. Inopiquez, Sr., is his uncle. Nonetheless, he justifies his failure to recuse himself on the ground that the petition of Ponciano C. Inopiquez, Sr. was meritorious.
(c) In Election Case No. 292, on the other hand, the seven petitioners, all surnamed Herbas, alleged that they were refused registration on February 1, 1992 at Brgy. San Sebastian, Matag-ob, Leyte by the Board of Election Inspectors; and that they have not voted for two consecutive elections.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Judge Aquilino A. Inopiquez, Jr is guilty of grave abuse of authority and ignorance of the law for his mishandling of the 3 cases mentioned above. .
HELD:
Respondent Judge Aquilino A. Inopiquez, Jr. is hereby ORDERED to pay a fine of P20,000.00 for violation of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court and is SUSPENDED without pay for a period of three months for abuse of authority and ignorance of the law
(a) Complainant's counsel in Criminal Case No. 584 was Atty. Eusebio Otadoy, Jr. Respondent admits that he is related to Atty. Otadoy. Although respondent is not related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity to Atty Otadoy, the evidence shows that because of his relationship not only to Atty Otadoy but also to those helping the complainant, Restituto Pedrano, one of whom, Guillermo Laurente, is respondent's father-in-law, while the other one, Atty. Felix Sun, is his brother-in-law, respondent judge acted with obvious partiality for complainant in the criminal case.
It is obvious that respondent got entangled in his own maneuverings in his desire to favor and protect the complainant Restituto Pedrano and those helping the latter .Respondent could have recused himself from the moment his disqualification was sought by the accused Seco in Criminal Case No. 594. Respondent hung on to the case as long as he could until this case was filed against him. But then he realized that it was untenable for him to continue hearing the criminal case not only because of his relationship to Atty. Otadoy but also to Atty. Felix Sun and Edgardo Laurente, both of whom were his brothers-in-law, who were actively participating in the prosecution of the criminal case.
Indeed, although the disqualification of judges is limited only to cases where the judge is related to counsel within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity, the Rules nonetheless provide that a judge may, in the exercise of his discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case for other just and valid reasons. (Rule 137, §1 of the Rules of Court.)
It may also be added that a well-meaning judge may not just order the reopening of an already dismissed criminal case or direct the removal of a vital evidence on record without first going over the record of the case.
We are referring to the irregular actuations of respondent in the same Crim. Case No. 584 wherein he granted the motion of the private prosecutor to withdraw or detach the Affidavit of Desistance executed by the private complainant 1) without the approval of the private prosecutor; 2) despite the fact that the dismissal of the case was already final; and 3) stating in the order that the accused was not yet arraigned, when the truth is the prosecution has already rested when the case was dismissed on December 22, 1992
(b) Respondent judge's contention is without merit. Rule 137, §1 of the Rules of Court provides:
No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
Similarly, Rule 3.12 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides:
A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. These cases include, among others, proceedings where:
. . . .
(d) the judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth degree or to counsel within the fourth degree;
. . . .
In every instance the judge shall indicate the legal reason for inhibition.
Under these provisions, respondent judge was disqualified from hearing the petition of his uncle and it was immaterial that the petition was meritorious. The purpose of the prohibition is to prevent not only a conflict of interest but also the appearance of impropriety on the part of a judge.
(c) The records show that neither of the petition in Election Case No. 333 and Election Case No. 292 named the board of election inspectors a party to the proceedings. Nor is there any showing that the board of election inspectors was ever notified of hearings to be conducted on such inclusion proceedings either by registered mail or by personal delivery, or by notice posted in a conspicuous place in the city hall or municipal building and in two other conspicuous places within the city or municipality at least 10 days prior to the day set for the hearing as required in paragraph (b) of the above provision.
The Omnibus Election Code provides:
Section 143. Common rules governing judicial proceedings in the matter of inclusion, exclusion, and correction of names of voters. --- (a) Outside of regular office hours, no petition for inclusion, exclusion, or correction of names of voters shall be received.
(b) Notices to the members of the board of election inspectors and to challenged voters shall state the place, day and hour in which such petition shall be heard, and such notice may be made by sending a copy thereof by registered mail or by personal delivery…
The failure of respondent to observe the requirements of the Election Code is inexcusable. As a judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court vested with the jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for inclusion or exclusion of voters, he is expected to be familiar with these requirements because it can be assumed that these election cases were not the first cases he has decided.
A.M. No. MTJ-95-1056
May 21, 2001
FACTS:
This is a complaint filed by Datu Inocencio Siawan against Judge Aquilino. A. Inopiquez, Jr. of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Kananga-Matag-ob, Leyte, for gross ignorance of the law, gross abuse of power, and misconduct in connection with the latter's handling of a criminal case (Crim. Case No. 584) and two election cases for inclusion of voters (Election Case Nos. 333 and 292.) .
In Crim. Case No. 584 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Julia Enriqua Seco . . ., the accused then was charged of Usurpation of Authority and Official Functions , involving, as the complaint states, a "paquiao" contract in which the accused Julia Seco allegedly signed as the Barangay Captain of Brgy. Cansuso, Matag-ob, Leyte; In the course of the proceedings after the prosecution had already presented its witnesses, the complaint was dismissed on the basis of an Affidavit of Desistance executed by complainant Restituto C. Pedrano. This Affidavit of Desistance is opposite to the earlier affidavit of the same complainant, which was made the basis of the Complaint. Prior to the issuance of the Affidavit of Desistance ,accused Seco had filed before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court a Motion for Inhibition of the Presiding Judge now respondent in this case .The meat of this motion for inhibition is that the father-in-law of the Presiding Judge, herein respondent, was conspicuously present in the proceedings during which time he gave consultation to the complainant. Without addressing the issues raised by accused Seco, respondent denied her motion for inhibition in his order, dated May 22, 1987. Apparently realizing that the motion for disqualification was meritorious, respondent, after partially hearing the case, dismissed it on the basis of an affidavit of desistance of the complainant, Restituto Pedrano. But, as Seco sued Pedrano for damages for filing the criminal case, respondent judge ordered the withdrawal of Pedrano's affidavit of desistance from the record and recalled his order dismissing the criminal case. Respondent then revived Criminal Case No. 584 only to dismiss it again, saying the complainant in the criminal case could always refile it. He then inhibited himself on the ground of delicadeza citing his relationship to counsel for the private prosecutor. When Criminal Case No. 1181 was filed against accused Seco, based on the same facts as Criminal Case No. 584, respondent, to whom the case was again assigned, issued an order, dated April 28, 1994, inhibiting himself, reiterating that he is related to the private prosecutor which was later denied by the RTC of Ormoc city and soon thereafter, respondent judge in an Order dated September 5, 1994 dismissed Criminal Case No. 1181. A Motion For Reconsideration re the Order of dismissal was filed by the private complainant. The respondent judge issued the Order of November 14, 1994 denying the motion for reconsideration complainant to which the respondent judge directed accused's counsel, to file comment to the motion; a second motion for reconsideration was again filed by the private complainant and the respondent in an Order dated December 23, 1994 directed anew the accused's counsel for another comment; Atty. Custodio Cañete complied and filed his comment dated December 26, 1994 and later a supplemental comment. Criminal Case No. 1181 was finally laid to rest on February 17, 1995 as per admission of complainant
(b)Election Case Nos. 333 was a petition for inclusion of a voter in the voter's list. Respondent judge admits that the petitioner, retired Judge Ponciano C. Inopiquez, Sr., is his uncle. Nonetheless, he justifies his failure to recuse himself on the ground that the petition of Ponciano C. Inopiquez, Sr. was meritorious.
(c) In Election Case No. 292, on the other hand, the seven petitioners, all surnamed Herbas, alleged that they were refused registration on February 1, 1992 at Brgy. San Sebastian, Matag-ob, Leyte by the Board of Election Inspectors; and that they have not voted for two consecutive elections.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Judge Aquilino A. Inopiquez, Jr is guilty of grave abuse of authority and ignorance of the law for his mishandling of the 3 cases mentioned above. .
HELD:
Respondent Judge Aquilino A. Inopiquez, Jr. is hereby ORDERED to pay a fine of P20,000.00 for violation of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court and is SUSPENDED without pay for a period of three months for abuse of authority and ignorance of the law
(a) Complainant's counsel in Criminal Case No. 584 was Atty. Eusebio Otadoy, Jr. Respondent admits that he is related to Atty. Otadoy. Although respondent is not related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity to Atty Otadoy, the evidence shows that because of his relationship not only to Atty Otadoy but also to those helping the complainant, Restituto Pedrano, one of whom, Guillermo Laurente, is respondent's father-in-law, while the other one, Atty. Felix Sun, is his brother-in-law, respondent judge acted with obvious partiality for complainant in the criminal case.
It is obvious that respondent got entangled in his own maneuverings in his desire to favor and protect the complainant Restituto Pedrano and those helping the latter .Respondent could have recused himself from the moment his disqualification was sought by the accused Seco in Criminal Case No. 594. Respondent hung on to the case as long as he could until this case was filed against him. But then he realized that it was untenable for him to continue hearing the criminal case not only because of his relationship to Atty. Otadoy but also to Atty. Felix Sun and Edgardo Laurente, both of whom were his brothers-in-law, who were actively participating in the prosecution of the criminal case.
Indeed, although the disqualification of judges is limited only to cases where the judge is related to counsel within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity, the Rules nonetheless provide that a judge may, in the exercise of his discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case for other just and valid reasons. (Rule 137, §1 of the Rules of Court.)
It may also be added that a well-meaning judge may not just order the reopening of an already dismissed criminal case or direct the removal of a vital evidence on record without first going over the record of the case.
We are referring to the irregular actuations of respondent in the same Crim. Case No. 584 wherein he granted the motion of the private prosecutor to withdraw or detach the Affidavit of Desistance executed by the private complainant 1) without the approval of the private prosecutor; 2) despite the fact that the dismissal of the case was already final; and 3) stating in the order that the accused was not yet arraigned, when the truth is the prosecution has already rested when the case was dismissed on December 22, 1992
(b) Respondent judge's contention is without merit. Rule 137, §1 of the Rules of Court provides:
No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
Similarly, Rule 3.12 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides:
A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. These cases include, among others, proceedings where:
. . . .
(d) the judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth degree or to counsel within the fourth degree;
. . . .
In every instance the judge shall indicate the legal reason for inhibition.
Under these provisions, respondent judge was disqualified from hearing the petition of his uncle and it was immaterial that the petition was meritorious. The purpose of the prohibition is to prevent not only a conflict of interest but also the appearance of impropriety on the part of a judge.
(c) The records show that neither of the petition in Election Case No. 333 and Election Case No. 292 named the board of election inspectors a party to the proceedings. Nor is there any showing that the board of election inspectors was ever notified of hearings to be conducted on such inclusion proceedings either by registered mail or by personal delivery, or by notice posted in a conspicuous place in the city hall or municipal building and in two other conspicuous places within the city or municipality at least 10 days prior to the day set for the hearing as required in paragraph (b) of the above provision.
The Omnibus Election Code provides:
Section 143. Common rules governing judicial proceedings in the matter of inclusion, exclusion, and correction of names of voters. --- (a) Outside of regular office hours, no petition for inclusion, exclusion, or correction of names of voters shall be received.
(b) Notices to the members of the board of election inspectors and to challenged voters shall state the place, day and hour in which such petition shall be heard, and such notice may be made by sending a copy thereof by registered mail or by personal delivery…
The failure of respondent to observe the requirements of the Election Code is inexcusable. As a judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court vested with the jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for inclusion or exclusion of voters, he is expected to be familiar with these requirements because it can be assumed that these election cases were not the first cases he has decided.
Sarmiento vs. COMELEC (212 SCRA 307)
Sarmiento vs. COMELEC
212 SCRA 307
August 6, 1992
Facts:
This special civil action for certiorari seek to set aside the Resolutions of Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in the following Special Cases:
1) G.R. No. 105628 — SPC No. 92-266
2) G.R. No. 105725 — SPC No. 92-323
3) G.R. No. 105727 — SPC No. 92-288
4) G.R. No. 105730 — SPC No. 92-315
5) G.R. No. 105771 — SPC No. 92-271
6) G.R. No. 105778 — SPC No. 92-039
7) G.R. No. 105797 — SPC No. 92-153
8) G.R. No. 105919 — SPC No. 92-293
9) G.R. No. 105977 — SPC No. 92-087
Issue:
Whether the challenged Resolutions above specified (the SPC) as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion in that, inter alia, the Commission, sitting en banc, took cognizance of and decided the appeals without first referring them to any of it Divisions.
Held:
The COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, when it resolved the appeals of petitioners in the above mentioned Special Cases without first referring them to any of its Divisions. Section 3, subdivision C, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides:
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.
Said Resolutions are therefore, null and void and must be set aside. Consequently, the appeals are deemed pending before the Commission for proper referral to a Division.
A resolution directing the COMELEC to assign said Special Cases to the Divisions pursuant to Section 8, Rule 3 of its Rules on assignment of cases would, logically, be in order. However, Section 16 of R.A. No. 7166 6 provides that all pre-proclamation cases pending before it shall be deemed terminated at the beginning of the term of the office involved. The terms of the offices involved in the Special Cases subject of these petitions commenced at noon of June 30 1992. These cases have thus been rendered moot and such a resolution would only be an exercise in futility.
Therefore, the instant petitions are DISMISSED but without prejudice to the filing by petitioners of regular elections protests. If the winning candidates for the positions involved in the Special Cases subject of these petitions have already been proclaimed, the running of the period to file the protests shall be deemed suspended by the pendency of such cases before the COMELEC and of these petitions before this Court.
Notes:
1) G.R. No. 105628 — SPC No. 92-266 granting the appeal from the ruling of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Virac, Catanduanes which ordered the exclusion from the canvass of one (1) election return;
2) G.R. No. 105725 — SPC No. 92-323 reversing the ruling of the City Board of Canvassers of Iriga City which ordered the exclusion from the canvass of six (6) election returns and in UND No. 92-243 ordering the said Board of Canvassers to include in the canvass the election returns involved therein;
3) G.R. No. 105727 — SPC No. 92-288 dismissing the appeal of petitioner from the ruling of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Catanduanes which ordered the inclusion in the canvass the certificate of canvass for the municipality of Virac, excluding the returns from 48 precincts;
4) G.R. No. 105730 — SPC No. 92-315 affirming the ruling of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte which dismissed petitioner's opposition to the composition of the said Municipal Board of Canvassers;
5) G.R. No. 105771 — SPC No. 92-271 affirming the ruling of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Cabusao, Camarines Sur which, among others, rejected petitioner's objection to certain election returns;
6) G.R. No. 105778 — SPC No. 92-039 dismissing said case for non-compliance with Section 20 of R.A. No. 7166;
7) G.R. No. 105797 — SPC No. 92-153 affirming the rulings of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Davao Oriental which rejected petitioner's objections to the canvass of some certificates of canvass;
8) G.R. No. 105919 — SPC No. 92-293 dismissing petitioner's appeal from the ruling of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Upi Nuro, Maguindanao;
9) G.R. No. 105977 — SPC No. 92-087 denying the amended pre-proclamation petition, which is an appeal from the rulings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Ternate, Cavite, and denying a subsequent motion to resolve the issues raised in said amended petition.
212 SCRA 307
August 6, 1992
Facts:
This special civil action for certiorari seek to set aside the Resolutions of Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in the following Special Cases:
1) G.R. No. 105628 — SPC No. 92-266
2) G.R. No. 105725 — SPC No. 92-323
3) G.R. No. 105727 — SPC No. 92-288
4) G.R. No. 105730 — SPC No. 92-315
5) G.R. No. 105771 — SPC No. 92-271
6) G.R. No. 105778 — SPC No. 92-039
7) G.R. No. 105797 — SPC No. 92-153
8) G.R. No. 105919 — SPC No. 92-293
9) G.R. No. 105977 — SPC No. 92-087
Issue:
Whether the challenged Resolutions above specified (the SPC) as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion in that, inter alia, the Commission, sitting en banc, took cognizance of and decided the appeals without first referring them to any of it Divisions.
Held:
The COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, when it resolved the appeals of petitioners in the above mentioned Special Cases without first referring them to any of its Divisions. Section 3, subdivision C, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides:
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.
Said Resolutions are therefore, null and void and must be set aside. Consequently, the appeals are deemed pending before the Commission for proper referral to a Division.
A resolution directing the COMELEC to assign said Special Cases to the Divisions pursuant to Section 8, Rule 3 of its Rules on assignment of cases would, logically, be in order. However, Section 16 of R.A. No. 7166 6 provides that all pre-proclamation cases pending before it shall be deemed terminated at the beginning of the term of the office involved. The terms of the offices involved in the Special Cases subject of these petitions commenced at noon of June 30 1992. These cases have thus been rendered moot and such a resolution would only be an exercise in futility.
Therefore, the instant petitions are DISMISSED but without prejudice to the filing by petitioners of regular elections protests. If the winning candidates for the positions involved in the Special Cases subject of these petitions have already been proclaimed, the running of the period to file the protests shall be deemed suspended by the pendency of such cases before the COMELEC and of these petitions before this Court.
Notes:
1) G.R. No. 105628 — SPC No. 92-266 granting the appeal from the ruling of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Virac, Catanduanes which ordered the exclusion from the canvass of one (1) election return;
2) G.R. No. 105725 — SPC No. 92-323 reversing the ruling of the City Board of Canvassers of Iriga City which ordered the exclusion from the canvass of six (6) election returns and in UND No. 92-243 ordering the said Board of Canvassers to include in the canvass the election returns involved therein;
3) G.R. No. 105727 — SPC No. 92-288 dismissing the appeal of petitioner from the ruling of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Catanduanes which ordered the inclusion in the canvass the certificate of canvass for the municipality of Virac, excluding the returns from 48 precincts;
4) G.R. No. 105730 — SPC No. 92-315 affirming the ruling of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte which dismissed petitioner's opposition to the composition of the said Municipal Board of Canvassers;
5) G.R. No. 105771 — SPC No. 92-271 affirming the ruling of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Cabusao, Camarines Sur which, among others, rejected petitioner's objection to certain election returns;
6) G.R. No. 105778 — SPC No. 92-039 dismissing said case for non-compliance with Section 20 of R.A. No. 7166;
7) G.R. No. 105797 — SPC No. 92-153 affirming the rulings of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Davao Oriental which rejected petitioner's objections to the canvass of some certificates of canvass;
8) G.R. No. 105919 — SPC No. 92-293 dismissing petitioner's appeal from the ruling of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Upi Nuro, Maguindanao;
9) G.R. No. 105977 — SPC No. 92-087 denying the amended pre-proclamation petition, which is an appeal from the rulings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Ternate, Cavite, and denying a subsequent motion to resolve the issues raised in said amended petition.
Montejo vs. COMELEC (242 SCRA 415)
Montejo vs. COMELEC
242 SCRA 415
March 16, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner Cerilo Roy Montejo, representative of the first district of Leyte, pleads for the annulment of Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte, on the ground that it violates the principle of equality of representation.
The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban and Ormoc is composed of 5 districts. The 3rd district is composed of: Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Calubian, Culaba, Kawayan, Leyte, Maripipi, Naval, San Isidro, Tabango and Villaba.
Biliran, located in the 3rd district of Leyte, was made its subprovince by virtue of Republic Act No. 2141 Section 1 enacted on 1959. Said section spelled out the municipalities comprising the subprovince: Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi and Naval and all the territories comprised therein.
On 1992, the Local Government Code took effect and the subprovince of Biliran became a regular province. (The conversion of Biliran into a regular province was approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite.) As a consequence of the conversion, eight municipalities of the 3rd district composed the new province of Biliran. A further consequence was to reduce the 3rd district to five municipalities (underlined above) with a total population of 146,067 as per the 1990 census.
To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants, voters and municipalities in the province of Leyte, respondent COMELEC held consultation meetings with the incumbent representatives of the province and other interested parties and on December 29, 1994, it promulgated the assailed resolution where, among others, it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the 2nd district and the municipality of Palompon of the 4th district to the 3rd district of Leyte.
Issue:
Whether the unprecedented exercise by the COMELEC of the legislative power of redistricting and reapportionment is valid or not.
Held:
Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736 is annulled and set aside.
The deliberations of the members of the Constitutional Commission shows that COMELEC was denied the major power of legislative apportionment as it itself exercised the power. Regarding the first elections after the enactment of the 1987 constitution, it is the Commission who did the reapportionment of the legislative districts and for the subsequent elections, the power was given to the Congress.
Also, respondent COMELEC relied on the ordinance appended to the 1987 constitution as the source of its power of redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws. Said ordinance states that:
Section 2: The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make minor adjustments to the reapportionment herein made.”
Section 3 : Any province that may hereafter be created…The number of Members apportioned to the province out of which such new province was created or where the city, whose population has so increases, is geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall not be made within one hundred and twenty days before the election.
Minor adjustments does not involve change in the allocations per district. Examples include error in the correct name of a particular municipality or when a municipality in between which is still in the territory of one assigned district is forgotten. And consistent with the limits of its power to make minor adjustments, section 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the respondent COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another district. The power granted by section 3 to the respondent is to adjust the number of members (not municipalities.)
Notes:
Petitioner also prayed for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa from the 1st district to the 2nd district. It is likewise denied.
242 SCRA 415
March 16, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner Cerilo Roy Montejo, representative of the first district of Leyte, pleads for the annulment of Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte, on the ground that it violates the principle of equality of representation.
The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban and Ormoc is composed of 5 districts. The 3rd district is composed of: Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Calubian, Culaba, Kawayan, Leyte, Maripipi, Naval, San Isidro, Tabango and Villaba.
Biliran, located in the 3rd district of Leyte, was made its subprovince by virtue of Republic Act No. 2141 Section 1 enacted on 1959. Said section spelled out the municipalities comprising the subprovince: Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi and Naval and all the territories comprised therein.
On 1992, the Local Government Code took effect and the subprovince of Biliran became a regular province. (The conversion of Biliran into a regular province was approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite.) As a consequence of the conversion, eight municipalities of the 3rd district composed the new province of Biliran. A further consequence was to reduce the 3rd district to five municipalities (underlined above) with a total population of 146,067 as per the 1990 census.
To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants, voters and municipalities in the province of Leyte, respondent COMELEC held consultation meetings with the incumbent representatives of the province and other interested parties and on December 29, 1994, it promulgated the assailed resolution where, among others, it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the 2nd district and the municipality of Palompon of the 4th district to the 3rd district of Leyte.
Issue:
Whether the unprecedented exercise by the COMELEC of the legislative power of redistricting and reapportionment is valid or not.
Held:
Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736 is annulled and set aside.
The deliberations of the members of the Constitutional Commission shows that COMELEC was denied the major power of legislative apportionment as it itself exercised the power. Regarding the first elections after the enactment of the 1987 constitution, it is the Commission who did the reapportionment of the legislative districts and for the subsequent elections, the power was given to the Congress.
Also, respondent COMELEC relied on the ordinance appended to the 1987 constitution as the source of its power of redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws. Said ordinance states that:
Section 2: The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make minor adjustments to the reapportionment herein made.”
Section 3 : Any province that may hereafter be created…The number of Members apportioned to the province out of which such new province was created or where the city, whose population has so increases, is geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall not be made within one hundred and twenty days before the election.
Minor adjustments does not involve change in the allocations per district. Examples include error in the correct name of a particular municipality or when a municipality in between which is still in the territory of one assigned district is forgotten. And consistent with the limits of its power to make minor adjustments, section 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the respondent COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another district. The power granted by section 3 to the respondent is to adjust the number of members (not municipalities.)
Notes:
Petitioner also prayed for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa from the 1st district to the 2nd district. It is likewise denied.
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