Nolasco v COMELEC
FACTS
A disqualification case was filed against Meycauayan, Bulacan Mayor-elect Florentino Blanco for alleged performing acts which are grounds for disqualification under the Omnibus Election Code – giving money to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing election functions: for committing acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy, and for spending an amount for his campaign in excess of what is allowed by the law.
The COMELEC First Division required both parties to submit their position papers. The case was decided against Blanco.
A reconsideration was moved by Blanco in the COMELEC En Banc. Nolasco, the vice-mayor-elect took part as intervenor, urging that should Blanco be finally disqualified, the mayoralty position be turned over to him. The parties were allowed to file their memoranda. En Banc denied Blanco and Nolasco’s motions thus this petition for certiorari.
Issues:
1. WON Blanco was denied due process and equal protection of laws
2. WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in proclaiming Alarilla as the duly elected mayor
Held:
1. Blanco was not denied due process and equal protection of the laws. He was given all the opportunity to prove that the evidence on his disqualification was not strong. Blanco’s contention that the minimum quantum of evidence was not met is untenable. What RA 6646 and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure require is a mere evidence of guilt that should be strong to justify the COMELEC in suspending a winning candidate’s proclamation.
2. Nolasco, not Alarilla, is adjudged as the Mayor of Meycauayan. It is already a settled principle in the case of Reyes v COMELEC that the candidate with the second highest number of votes cannot be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate be disqualified. There cannot be an assumption that the second placer would have received the other votes otherwise it is a judgment substituting the mind of a voter. It cannot be assumed that the second placer would have won the elections because in the situation where the disqualified candidate is excluded, the condition would have substantially changed.
fr. atty nas^^
Sunday, February 28, 2010
marquez vs. comelec
Marquez v COMELEC
Facts:
Marquez, a candidate for an elective position in Quezon Province during the 1998 elections, filed a petition praying for the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of Rodriguez on the ground of disqualification under section 40 of the Local Government Code (Section 40. Disqualification. The following persons are disqualified from running for any local elective position... (e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad.)
Rodriguez is allegedly criminally charged with insurance fraud in the United States and that his arrest is yet to be served because of his flight from the country.
The COMELEC dismissed Marquez’s Petition.
Rodriguez was proclaimed the Governor-elect of Quezon.
Issues:
WON Rodriguez, at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy, is said to be a fugitive from justice as provided for in section 40 of the Local Government Code.
Held:
“Fugitive from justice” does not mean a person convicted by final judgment. It includes those who after being charged flee to avoid prosecution. The COMELEC is directed to proceed and settle the case in conformity of the given clarification with the term “fugitive from justice”.
fr. atty nas^^
Facts:
Marquez, a candidate for an elective position in Quezon Province during the 1998 elections, filed a petition praying for the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of Rodriguez on the ground of disqualification under section 40 of the Local Government Code (Section 40. Disqualification. The following persons are disqualified from running for any local elective position... (e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad.)
Rodriguez is allegedly criminally charged with insurance fraud in the United States and that his arrest is yet to be served because of his flight from the country.
The COMELEC dismissed Marquez’s Petition.
Rodriguez was proclaimed the Governor-elect of Quezon.
Issues:
WON Rodriguez, at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy, is said to be a fugitive from justice as provided for in section 40 of the Local Government Code.
Held:
“Fugitive from justice” does not mean a person convicted by final judgment. It includes those who after being charged flee to avoid prosecution. The COMELEC is directed to proceed and settle the case in conformity of the given clarification with the term “fugitive from justice”.
fr. atty nas^^
adiong vs. comelec
ADIONG vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 103956
March 31, 1992
FACTS:
On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its powers granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws.
Section 15(a) of the resolution provides:
Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. — The following are lawful election propaganda:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals… Provided, That decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof.
Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:
Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda. —
It is unlawful:…
(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place, whether public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or billboards…
Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections assails the COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes.
HELD:
the petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of Section 15 (a) of Resolution No. 2347 of the COMELEC providing that "decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof" is DECLARED NULL and VOID.
The COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds.
The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him.
Also, the questioned prohibition premised on the statute (RA 6646) and as couched in the resolution is void for overbreadth. The restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle (The provisions allowing regulation are so loosely worded that they include the posting of decals or stickers in the privacy of one's living room or bedroom.) In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. (The right to property may be subject to a greater degree of regulation but when this right is joined by a "liberty" interest, the burden of justification on the part of the Government must be exceptionally convincing and irrefutable. The burden is not met in this case.)
Additionally, the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII, section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles. It is to be reiterated that the posting of decals and stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen becomes crucial in this kind of election propaganda not the financial resources of the candidate.
In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution:
NOTES:
-A statute is considered void for overbreadth when "it offends the constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms
- Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns, it includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose of it; and the Constitution
- The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles does not endanger any substantial government interest. There is no clear public interest threatened by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen's right of free speech and expression. Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled.
Complete provisions (for review)
Resolution No. 2347:
Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. — The following are lawful election propaganda:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers, handwritten or printed letters, or other written or printed materials not more than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches in width and fourteen (14) inches in length. Provided, That decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof.
Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:
Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda. —
It is unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place, whether public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or billboards, at the campaign headquarters of the candidate or political party, organization or coalition, or at the candidate's own residential house or one of his residential houses, if he has more than one: Provided, that such posters or election propaganda shall not exceed two (2) feet by three (3) feet in size. (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code -on lawful election propaganda
Lawful election propaganda. — Lawful election propaganda shall include:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers or other written or printed materials of a size not more than eight and one-half inches in width and fourteen inches in length;
(b) Handwritten or printed letters urging voters to vote for or against any particular candidate;
(c) Cloth, paper or cardboard posters, whether framed or posted, with an area not exceeding two feet by three feet, except that, at the site and on the occasion of a public meeting or rally, or in announcing the holding of said meeting or rally, streamers not exceeding three feet by eight feet in size, shall be allowed: Provided, That said streamers may not be displayed except one week before the date of the meeting or rally and that it shall be removed within seventy-two hours after said meeting or rally; or
(d) All other forms of election propaganda not prohibited by this Code as the Commission may authorize after due notice to all interested parties and hearing where all the interested parties were given an equal opportunity to be heard: Provided, That the Commission's authorization shall be published in two newspapers of general circulation throughout the nation for at least twice within one week after the authorization has been granted. (Section 37, 1978 EC)
Republic Act No. 6646-
Section 11(a): Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. — In addition to the forms of election propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful: (a) to draw, paint, inscribe, write, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place, whether private, or public, except in the common poster areas and/or billboards provided in the immediately preceding section, at the candidate's own residence, or at the campaign headquarters of the candidate or political party: Provided, That such posters or election propaganda shall in no case exceed two (2) feet by three (3) feet in area: Provided, Further, That at the site of and on the occasion of a public meeting or rally, streamers, not more than two (2) and not exceeding three (3) feet by eight (8) feet each may be displayed five (5) days before the date of the meeting or rally, and shall be removed within twenty-four (24) hours after said meeting or rally; . . . (Emphasis supplied)
G.R. No. 103956
March 31, 1992
FACTS:
On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its powers granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws.
Section 15(a) of the resolution provides:
Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. — The following are lawful election propaganda:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals… Provided, That decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof.
Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:
Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda. —
It is unlawful:…
(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place, whether public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or billboards…
Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections assails the COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes.
HELD:
the petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of Section 15 (a) of Resolution No. 2347 of the COMELEC providing that "decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof" is DECLARED NULL and VOID.
The COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds.
The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him.
Also, the questioned prohibition premised on the statute (RA 6646) and as couched in the resolution is void for overbreadth. The restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle (The provisions allowing regulation are so loosely worded that they include the posting of decals or stickers in the privacy of one's living room or bedroom.) In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. (The right to property may be subject to a greater degree of regulation but when this right is joined by a "liberty" interest, the burden of justification on the part of the Government must be exceptionally convincing and irrefutable. The burden is not met in this case.)
Additionally, the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII, section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles. It is to be reiterated that the posting of decals and stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen becomes crucial in this kind of election propaganda not the financial resources of the candidate.
In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution:
NOTES:
-A statute is considered void for overbreadth when "it offends the constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms
- Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns, it includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose of it; and the Constitution
- The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles does not endanger any substantial government interest. There is no clear public interest threatened by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen's right of free speech and expression. Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled.
Complete provisions (for review)
Resolution No. 2347:
Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. — The following are lawful election propaganda:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers, handwritten or printed letters, or other written or printed materials not more than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches in width and fourteen (14) inches in length. Provided, That decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof.
Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:
Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda. —
It is unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place, whether public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or billboards, at the campaign headquarters of the candidate or political party, organization or coalition, or at the candidate's own residential house or one of his residential houses, if he has more than one: Provided, that such posters or election propaganda shall not exceed two (2) feet by three (3) feet in size. (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code -on lawful election propaganda
Lawful election propaganda. — Lawful election propaganda shall include:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers or other written or printed materials of a size not more than eight and one-half inches in width and fourteen inches in length;
(b) Handwritten or printed letters urging voters to vote for or against any particular candidate;
(c) Cloth, paper or cardboard posters, whether framed or posted, with an area not exceeding two feet by three feet, except that, at the site and on the occasion of a public meeting or rally, or in announcing the holding of said meeting or rally, streamers not exceeding three feet by eight feet in size, shall be allowed: Provided, That said streamers may not be displayed except one week before the date of the meeting or rally and that it shall be removed within seventy-two hours after said meeting or rally; or
(d) All other forms of election propaganda not prohibited by this Code as the Commission may authorize after due notice to all interested parties and hearing where all the interested parties were given an equal opportunity to be heard: Provided, That the Commission's authorization shall be published in two newspapers of general circulation throughout the nation for at least twice within one week after the authorization has been granted. (Section 37, 1978 EC)
Republic Act No. 6646-
Section 11(a): Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. — In addition to the forms of election propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful: (a) to draw, paint, inscribe, write, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place, whether private, or public, except in the common poster areas and/or billboards provided in the immediately preceding section, at the candidate's own residence, or at the campaign headquarters of the candidate or political party: Provided, That such posters or election propaganda shall in no case exceed two (2) feet by three (3) feet in area: Provided, Further, That at the site of and on the occasion of a public meeting or rally, streamers, not more than two (2) and not exceeding three (3) feet by eight (8) feet each may be displayed five (5) days before the date of the meeting or rally, and shall be removed within twenty-four (24) hours after said meeting or rally; . . . (Emphasis supplied)
pilar vs. comelec
JUANITO C. PILAR vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 115245/ 245 SCRA 759
July 11, 1995
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolution of the COMELEC in UND No. 94-040.
Petitioner Pilar filed his COC for the position of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. 3 days after, petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy.
The COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of P10,000.00 for failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2348, in turn implementing R.A. No. 7166 which provides that:
Statement of Contributions and Expenditures: Effect of Failure to File Statement. Every candidate and treasurer of the political party shall, within thirty (30) days after the day of the election, file in duplicate with the offices of the Commission the full, true and itemized statement of all contributions and expenditures in connection with the election.
Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and expenditures because he was a "non-candidate," having withdrawn his certificates of candidacy three days after its filing. Petitioner posits that "it is . . . clear from the law that candidate must have entered the political contest, and should have either won or lost"
COMELEC denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner and deemed final its first decision. Petitioner went to the COMELEC En Banc (UND No. 94-040), which denied the petition. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Did Petitioner's withdrawal of his candidacy extinguish his liability for the administrative fine.
HELD:
The petition is DISMISSED.
Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that "every candidate" has the obligation to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term "every candidate" must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy. Furthermore, Section 14 of the law uses the word "shall." As a general rule, the use of the word "shall" in a statute implies that the statute is mandatory, and imposes a duty which may be enforced , particularly if public policy is in favor of this meaning or where public interest is involved. We apply the general rule.
Also, Section 13 of Resolution No. 2348 categorically refers to "all candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy.” It is not improbable that a candidate who withdrew his candidacy has accepted contributions and incurred expenditures, even in the short span of his campaign. The evil sought to be prevented by the law is not all too remote.
Lastly, we note that under the fourth paragraph of Section 73 of the B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, it is provided that "[t]he filing or withdrawal of certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred."
NOTES:
- Admittedly, contributions and expenditures are made for the purpose of influencing the results of the elections. The state has an interest in seeing that the electoral process is clean, and ultimately expressive of the true will of the electorate. One way of attaining such objective is to pass legislation regulating contributions and expenditures of candidates, and compelling the publication of the same.
- It is noteworthy that Resolution No. 2348 even contemplates the situation where a candidate may not have received any contribution or made any expenditure. Such a candidate is not excused from filing a statement, and is in fact required to file a statement to that effect. Under Section 15 of Resolution No. 2348, it is provided that "[i]f a candidate or treasurer of the party has received no contribution, made no expenditure, or has no pending obligation, the statement shall reflect such fact."
Complete provisions (for review)
R.A. No. 7166 entitled "An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes" provides as follows:
Section 14- Statement of Contributions and Expenditures: Effect of Failure to File Statement. Every candidate and treasurer of the political party shall, within thirty (30) days after the day of the election, file in duplicate with the offices of the Commission the full, true and itemized statement of all contributions and expenditures in connection with the election.
No person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has filed the statement of contributions and expenditures herein required.
The same prohibition shall apply if the political party which nominated the winning candidate fails to file the statement required herein within the period prescribed by this Act.
Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file the statements or reports in connection with electoral contributions and expenditures as required herein shall constitute an administrative offense for which the offenders shall be liable to pay an administrative fine ranging from One Thousand Pesos ( P1,000.00) to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00), in the discretion of the Commission.
The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of such failure; otherwise, it shall be enforceable by a writ of execution issued by the Commission against the properties of the offender.
It shall be the duty of every city or municipal election registrar to advise in writing, by personal delivery or registered mail, within five (5) days from the date of election all candidates residing in his jurisdiction to comply with their obligation to file their statements of contributions and expenditures.
For the commission of a second or subsequent offense under this Section, the administrative fine shall be from Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) to Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00), in the discretion of the Commission. In addition, the offender shall be subject to perpetual disqualification to hold public office (Emphasis supplied).
COMELEC Resolution No. 2348 (Re: Rules and Regulations Governing Electoral Contributions and Expenditures in Connection with the National and Local Elections on May 11, 1992)
Sec. 13. Statement of contributions and expenditures: Reminders to candidates to file statements. Within five (5) days from the day of the election, the Law Department of the Commission, the regional election director of the National Capital Region, the provincial election supervisors and the election registrars shall advise in writing by personal delivery or registered mail all candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy with them to comply with their obligation to file their statements of contributions and expenditures in connection with the elections. Every election registrar shall also advise all candidates residing in his jurisdiction to comply with said obligation (Emphasis supplied).
Sec. 17. Effect of failure to file statement. (a) No person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has filed the statement of contributions and expenditures herein required.
The same prohibition shall apply if the political party which nominated the winning candidates fails to file the statement required within the period prescribed by law.
(b) Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file statements or reports in connection with the electoral contributions and expenditures as required herein shall constitute an administrative offense for which the offenders shall be liable to pay an administrative fine ranging from One Thousand Pesos (P1,000) to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000), in the discretion of the Commission.
The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of such failure; otherwise, it shall be enforceable by a writ of execution issued by the Commission against the properties of the offender.
For the commission of a second or subsequent offense under this section, the administrative fine shall be from Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000) to Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000), in the discretion of the Commission. In addition, the offender shall be subject to perpetual disqualification to hold public office.
G.R. No. 115245/ 245 SCRA 759
July 11, 1995
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolution of the COMELEC in UND No. 94-040.
Petitioner Pilar filed his COC for the position of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. 3 days after, petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy.
The COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of P10,000.00 for failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2348, in turn implementing R.A. No. 7166 which provides that:
Statement of Contributions and Expenditures: Effect of Failure to File Statement. Every candidate and treasurer of the political party shall, within thirty (30) days after the day of the election, file in duplicate with the offices of the Commission the full, true and itemized statement of all contributions and expenditures in connection with the election.
Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and expenditures because he was a "non-candidate," having withdrawn his certificates of candidacy three days after its filing. Petitioner posits that "it is . . . clear from the law that candidate must have entered the political contest, and should have either won or lost"
COMELEC denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner and deemed final its first decision. Petitioner went to the COMELEC En Banc (UND No. 94-040), which denied the petition. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Did Petitioner's withdrawal of his candidacy extinguish his liability for the administrative fine.
HELD:
The petition is DISMISSED.
Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that "every candidate" has the obligation to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term "every candidate" must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy. Furthermore, Section 14 of the law uses the word "shall." As a general rule, the use of the word "shall" in a statute implies that the statute is mandatory, and imposes a duty which may be enforced , particularly if public policy is in favor of this meaning or where public interest is involved. We apply the general rule.
Also, Section 13 of Resolution No. 2348 categorically refers to "all candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy.” It is not improbable that a candidate who withdrew his candidacy has accepted contributions and incurred expenditures, even in the short span of his campaign. The evil sought to be prevented by the law is not all too remote.
Lastly, we note that under the fourth paragraph of Section 73 of the B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, it is provided that "[t]he filing or withdrawal of certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred."
NOTES:
- Admittedly, contributions and expenditures are made for the purpose of influencing the results of the elections. The state has an interest in seeing that the electoral process is clean, and ultimately expressive of the true will of the electorate. One way of attaining such objective is to pass legislation regulating contributions and expenditures of candidates, and compelling the publication of the same.
- It is noteworthy that Resolution No. 2348 even contemplates the situation where a candidate may not have received any contribution or made any expenditure. Such a candidate is not excused from filing a statement, and is in fact required to file a statement to that effect. Under Section 15 of Resolution No. 2348, it is provided that "[i]f a candidate or treasurer of the party has received no contribution, made no expenditure, or has no pending obligation, the statement shall reflect such fact."
Complete provisions (for review)
R.A. No. 7166 entitled "An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes" provides as follows:
Section 14- Statement of Contributions and Expenditures: Effect of Failure to File Statement. Every candidate and treasurer of the political party shall, within thirty (30) days after the day of the election, file in duplicate with the offices of the Commission the full, true and itemized statement of all contributions and expenditures in connection with the election.
No person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has filed the statement of contributions and expenditures herein required.
The same prohibition shall apply if the political party which nominated the winning candidate fails to file the statement required herein within the period prescribed by this Act.
Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file the statements or reports in connection with electoral contributions and expenditures as required herein shall constitute an administrative offense for which the offenders shall be liable to pay an administrative fine ranging from One Thousand Pesos ( P1,000.00) to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00), in the discretion of the Commission.
The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of such failure; otherwise, it shall be enforceable by a writ of execution issued by the Commission against the properties of the offender.
It shall be the duty of every city or municipal election registrar to advise in writing, by personal delivery or registered mail, within five (5) days from the date of election all candidates residing in his jurisdiction to comply with their obligation to file their statements of contributions and expenditures.
For the commission of a second or subsequent offense under this Section, the administrative fine shall be from Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) to Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00), in the discretion of the Commission. In addition, the offender shall be subject to perpetual disqualification to hold public office (Emphasis supplied).
COMELEC Resolution No. 2348 (Re: Rules and Regulations Governing Electoral Contributions and Expenditures in Connection with the National and Local Elections on May 11, 1992)
Sec. 13. Statement of contributions and expenditures: Reminders to candidates to file statements. Within five (5) days from the day of the election, the Law Department of the Commission, the regional election director of the National Capital Region, the provincial election supervisors and the election registrars shall advise in writing by personal delivery or registered mail all candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy with them to comply with their obligation to file their statements of contributions and expenditures in connection with the elections. Every election registrar shall also advise all candidates residing in his jurisdiction to comply with said obligation (Emphasis supplied).
Sec. 17. Effect of failure to file statement. (a) No person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has filed the statement of contributions and expenditures herein required.
The same prohibition shall apply if the political party which nominated the winning candidates fails to file the statement required within the period prescribed by law.
(b) Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file statements or reports in connection with the electoral contributions and expenditures as required herein shall constitute an administrative offense for which the offenders shall be liable to pay an administrative fine ranging from One Thousand Pesos (P1,000) to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000), in the discretion of the Commission.
The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of such failure; otherwise, it shall be enforceable by a writ of execution issued by the Commission against the properties of the offender.
For the commission of a second or subsequent offense under this section, the administrative fine shall be from Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000) to Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000), in the discretion of the Commission. In addition, the offender shall be subject to perpetual disqualification to hold public office.
Philippine Press Institute vs. comelec
Phil. Press Institute, Inc. vs. Comelec
244 scra 272
Facts:
In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, PPI, a non-stock, non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers, asks us to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. Petitioner also contends that the 22 March 1995 letter directives of Comelec requiring publishers to give free "Comelec Space" and at the same time process raw data to make it camera-ready, constitute impositions of involuntary servitude, contrary to the provisions of Section 18 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Finally, PPI argues that Section 8 of Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press and of expression.
On the other hand, The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment on behalf of respondent Comelec alleging that Comelec Resolution No. 2772 does not impose upon the publishers any obligation to provide free print space in the newspapers as it does not provide any criminal or administrative sanction for non-compliance with that Resolution. According to the Solicitor General, the questioned Resolution merely established guidelines to be followed in connection with the procurement of "Comelec space," the procedure for and mode of allocation of such space to candidates and the conditions or requirements for the candidate's utilization of the "Comelec space" procured. At the same time, however, the Solicitor General argues that even if the questioned Resolution and its implementing letter directives are viewed as mandatory, the same would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police power of the State. The Solicitor General also maintains that Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the Comelec over the communication and information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.
Issue:
Whether or not Resolution No. 2772 issued by respondent Commission on Elections is valid.
Held:
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED in part and Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 in its present form and the related letter-directives dated 22 March 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE as null and void, and the Temporary Restraining Order is hereby MADE PERMANENT. The Petition is DISMISSED in part, to the extent it relates to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772. No pronouncement as to costs.
Ratio Decidendi:
1. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, in its present form and as interpreted by Comelec in its 22 March 1995 letter directives, purports to require print media enterprises to "donate" free print space to Comelec. As such, Section 2 suffers from a fatal constitutional vice and must be set aside and nullified.
2. To the extent it pertains to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition must be dismissed for lack of an actual, justiciable case or controversy.
fr. atty valles^^
244 scra 272
Facts:
In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, PPI, a non-stock, non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers, asks us to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. Petitioner also contends that the 22 March 1995 letter directives of Comelec requiring publishers to give free "Comelec Space" and at the same time process raw data to make it camera-ready, constitute impositions of involuntary servitude, contrary to the provisions of Section 18 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Finally, PPI argues that Section 8 of Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press and of expression.
On the other hand, The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment on behalf of respondent Comelec alleging that Comelec Resolution No. 2772 does not impose upon the publishers any obligation to provide free print space in the newspapers as it does not provide any criminal or administrative sanction for non-compliance with that Resolution. According to the Solicitor General, the questioned Resolution merely established guidelines to be followed in connection with the procurement of "Comelec space," the procedure for and mode of allocation of such space to candidates and the conditions or requirements for the candidate's utilization of the "Comelec space" procured. At the same time, however, the Solicitor General argues that even if the questioned Resolution and its implementing letter directives are viewed as mandatory, the same would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police power of the State. The Solicitor General also maintains that Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the Comelec over the communication and information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.
Issue:
Whether or not Resolution No. 2772 issued by respondent Commission on Elections is valid.
Held:
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED in part and Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 in its present form and the related letter-directives dated 22 March 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE as null and void, and the Temporary Restraining Order is hereby MADE PERMANENT. The Petition is DISMISSED in part, to the extent it relates to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772. No pronouncement as to costs.
Ratio Decidendi:
1. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, in its present form and as interpreted by Comelec in its 22 March 1995 letter directives, purports to require print media enterprises to "donate" free print space to Comelec. As such, Section 2 suffers from a fatal constitutional vice and must be set aside and nullified.
2. To the extent it pertains to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition must be dismissed for lack of an actual, justiciable case or controversy.
fr. atty valles^^
penera vs. comelec (motion for consideration)
Penera vs. Commission on Elections, et al.
G.R. No. 181613
25 November 2009
(motion for reconsideration)
Facts:
On 11 September 2009, the Supreme Court affirmed the COMELEC’s decision to
disqualify petitioner Rosalinda Penera (Penera) as mayoralty candidate in Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte, for engaging in election campaign outside the campaign period, in violation of Section 80 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (the Omnibus Election Code).
Penera moved for reconsideration, arguing that she was not yet a candidate at the time of the supposed premature campaigning, since under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436 (the law authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated election system for the process of voting, counting of votes, and canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local elections), as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, one is not officially a candidate until the start of the campaign period.
Issue:
Whether or not Penera’s disqualification for engaging in premature campaigning should be reconsidered.
Holding:
Granting Penera’s motion for reconsideration, the Supreme Court En Banc held that
Penera did not engage in premature campaigning and should, thus, not be disqualified as a mayoralty candidate. The Court said –
(A) The Court’s 11 September 2009 Decision (or “the assailed Decision”) considered a
person who files a certificate of candidacy already a “candidate” even before the start of the campaign period. This is contrary to the clear intent and letter of Section 15 of Republic Act 8436, as amended, which states that a person who files his certificate of candidacy will only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period, and unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of such campaign period.
Thus, applying said law:
(1) The effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a
candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the start of the campaign
period, the same partisan political acts are lawful.
(2) Accordingly, a candidate is liable for an election offense only for
acts done during the campaign period, not before. In other words, election
offenses can be committed by a candidate only upon the start of the campaign
period. Before the start of the campaign period, such election offenses cannot be
so committed. Since the law is clear, the Court has no recourse but to apply it. The forum for examining the wisdom of the law, and enacting remedial measures, is not the Court but the Legislature.
(B) Contrary to the assailed Decision, Section 15 of R.A. 8436, as amended, does not
provide that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are unlawful, but may be prosecuted only upon the start of the campaign period. Neither does the law state that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are temporarily lawful, but becomes unlawful upon the start of the campaign period. Besides, such a law as envisioned in the Decision, which defines a criminal act and curtails freedom of expression and speech, would be void for vagueness.
(C) That Section 15 of R.A. 8436 does not expressly state that campaigning before the start of the campaign period is lawful, as the assailed Decision asserted, is of no moment. It is a basic principle of law that any act is lawful unless expressly declared unlawful by law. The mere fact that the law does not declare an act unlawful ipso facto means that the act is lawful. Thus, there is no need for Congress to declare in Section 15 of R.A. 8436 that partisan political activities before the start of the campaign period are lawful. It is sufficient for Congress to state that “any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period.” The only inescapable and logical result is that the same acts, if done before the start of the campaign period, are lawful.
(D) The Court’s 11 September 2009 Decision also reversed Lanot vs. COMELEC (G.R.
No. 164858; 16 November 2006). Lanot was decided on the ground that one who files a
certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period. This ground was based on the deliberations of the legislators who explained that the early deadline for filing certificates of candidacy under R.A. 8436 was set only to afford time to prepare the machine-readable ballots, and they intended to preserve the existing election periods, such that one who files his certificate of candidacy to meet the early deadline will still not be considered as a candidate.
When Congress amended R.A. 8436, Congress decided to expressly incorporate the
Lanot doctrine into law, thus, the provision in Section 15 of R.A. 8436 that a person who files his certificate of candidacy shall be considered a candidate only at the start of the campaign period. Congress wanted to insure that no person filing a certificate of candidacy under the early deadline required by the automated election system would be disqualified or penalized for any partisan political act done before the start of the campaign period. This provision cannot be annulled by the Court except on the sole ground of its unconstitutionality.
The assailed Decision, however, did not claim that this provision is unconstitutional. In fact, the assailed Decision considered the entire Section 15 good law. Thus, the Decision was self-contradictory — reversing Lanot but maintaining the constitutionality of the said provision.
Ponente: J. Antonio T. Carpio
Vote: 9-5
https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=gmail&attid=0.2&thid=12713dbcf90f83d1&mt=application%2Fpdf&url=https%3A%2F%2Fmail.google.com%2Fmail%2F%3Fui%3D2%26ik%3Ded08149255%26view%3Datt%26th%3D12713dbcf90f83d1%26attid%3D0.2%26disp%3Dattd%26zw&sig=AHIEtbScAiyWBUEytI80uBirie8BkQxZog
G.R. No. 181613
25 November 2009
(motion for reconsideration)
Facts:
On 11 September 2009, the Supreme Court affirmed the COMELEC’s decision to
disqualify petitioner Rosalinda Penera (Penera) as mayoralty candidate in Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte, for engaging in election campaign outside the campaign period, in violation of Section 80 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (the Omnibus Election Code).
Penera moved for reconsideration, arguing that she was not yet a candidate at the time of the supposed premature campaigning, since under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436 (the law authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated election system for the process of voting, counting of votes, and canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local elections), as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, one is not officially a candidate until the start of the campaign period.
Issue:
Whether or not Penera’s disqualification for engaging in premature campaigning should be reconsidered.
Holding:
Granting Penera’s motion for reconsideration, the Supreme Court En Banc held that
Penera did not engage in premature campaigning and should, thus, not be disqualified as a mayoralty candidate. The Court said –
(A) The Court’s 11 September 2009 Decision (or “the assailed Decision”) considered a
person who files a certificate of candidacy already a “candidate” even before the start of the campaign period. This is contrary to the clear intent and letter of Section 15 of Republic Act 8436, as amended, which states that a person who files his certificate of candidacy will only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period, and unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of such campaign period.
Thus, applying said law:
(1) The effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a
candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the start of the campaign
period, the same partisan political acts are lawful.
(2) Accordingly, a candidate is liable for an election offense only for
acts done during the campaign period, not before. In other words, election
offenses can be committed by a candidate only upon the start of the campaign
period. Before the start of the campaign period, such election offenses cannot be
so committed. Since the law is clear, the Court has no recourse but to apply it. The forum for examining the wisdom of the law, and enacting remedial measures, is not the Court but the Legislature.
(B) Contrary to the assailed Decision, Section 15 of R.A. 8436, as amended, does not
provide that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are unlawful, but may be prosecuted only upon the start of the campaign period. Neither does the law state that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are temporarily lawful, but becomes unlawful upon the start of the campaign period. Besides, such a law as envisioned in the Decision, which defines a criminal act and curtails freedom of expression and speech, would be void for vagueness.
(C) That Section 15 of R.A. 8436 does not expressly state that campaigning before the start of the campaign period is lawful, as the assailed Decision asserted, is of no moment. It is a basic principle of law that any act is lawful unless expressly declared unlawful by law. The mere fact that the law does not declare an act unlawful ipso facto means that the act is lawful. Thus, there is no need for Congress to declare in Section 15 of R.A. 8436 that partisan political activities before the start of the campaign period are lawful. It is sufficient for Congress to state that “any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period.” The only inescapable and logical result is that the same acts, if done before the start of the campaign period, are lawful.
(D) The Court’s 11 September 2009 Decision also reversed Lanot vs. COMELEC (G.R.
No. 164858; 16 November 2006). Lanot was decided on the ground that one who files a
certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period. This ground was based on the deliberations of the legislators who explained that the early deadline for filing certificates of candidacy under R.A. 8436 was set only to afford time to prepare the machine-readable ballots, and they intended to preserve the existing election periods, such that one who files his certificate of candidacy to meet the early deadline will still not be considered as a candidate.
When Congress amended R.A. 8436, Congress decided to expressly incorporate the
Lanot doctrine into law, thus, the provision in Section 15 of R.A. 8436 that a person who files his certificate of candidacy shall be considered a candidate only at the start of the campaign period. Congress wanted to insure that no person filing a certificate of candidacy under the early deadline required by the automated election system would be disqualified or penalized for any partisan political act done before the start of the campaign period. This provision cannot be annulled by the Court except on the sole ground of its unconstitutionality.
The assailed Decision, however, did not claim that this provision is unconstitutional. In fact, the assailed Decision considered the entire Section 15 good law. Thus, the Decision was self-contradictory — reversing Lanot but maintaining the constitutionality of the said provision.
Ponente: J. Antonio T. Carpio
Vote: 9-5
https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=gmail&attid=0.2&thid=12713dbcf90f83d1&mt=application%2Fpdf&url=https%3A%2F%2Fmail.google.com%2Fmail%2F%3Fui%3D2%26ik%3Ded08149255%26view%3Datt%26th%3D12713dbcf90f83d1%26attid%3D0.2%26disp%3Dattd%26zw&sig=AHIEtbScAiyWBUEytI80uBirie8BkQxZog
penera vs. comelec
Penera vs. Commission on Elections (COMELEC), et al.
G.R. 181613
11 September 2009
Facts: The COMELEC disqualified petitioner Rosalinda A. Penera (Penera) as a candidate for
mayor of the Municipality of Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte, for unlawfully engaging in election
campaign before the start of the campaign period for the 2007 Synchronized National and Local
Elections, in violation of Section 80 of Batas Pambansa 881 (the Omnibus Election Code).
The COMELEC found that Penera and her party-mates, after filing their Certificates of
Candidacy (CoCs), conducted a motorcade through Sta. Monica and threw candies to onlookers,
aboard trucks festooned with balloons and banners bearing their names and pictures and the
municipal positions for which they were seeking election, one of which trucks had a sound
system that broadcast their intent to run in the 2007 elections.
COMELEC Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented. He emphasized that under
Section 15 of Republic Act 8436 (the law authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated
election system for the process of voting, counting of votes, and canvassing/consolidating the
results of the national and local elections), as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, one is now
considered a candidate only at the start of the campaign period. Thus, before the start of the
campaign period, there can be no election campaign or partisan political activity because there is
no candidate to speak of. Accordingly, Penera could not be disqualified for premature
campaigning because the motorcade took place outside the campaign period – when Penera was
not yet a “candidate.” Sarmiento posited that Section 15 of R.A. No. 8436, as amended by R.A.
9369, has practically made it impossible to commit premature campaigning at any time, and has,
thus, effectively repealed Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Penera filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court to nullify the
disqualification. She argued that the evidence was grossly insufficient to warrant the
COMELEC’s ruling. She maintained that the motorcade was spontaneous and unplanned, and
the supporters merely joined her and the other candidates.
Issue: Whether or not Penera should be disqualified for engaging in election campaign or
partisan political activity outside the campaign period.
Holding: (A) The Supreme Court En Banc dismissed Penera’s Petition and affirmed her
disqualification because:
(1) Penera raised a question of fact. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and the
sole function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion, and does not include a review of the tribunal’s evaluation of the evidence.
(2) The COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion. Evidence presented to the
COMELEC, including Penera’s own evidence and admissions, sufficiently established that
“Penera and her partymates, after filing their COCs x x, participated in a motorcade which
passed through the different barangays of Sta. Monica, waived their hands to the public, and
threw candies to the onlookers.” With vehicles, balloons, and even candies on hand, Penera can
hardly persuade the Court that the motorcade was spontaneous and unplanned.
“(T)he conduct of a motorcade is a form of election campaign or partisan political
activity, falling squarely within the ambit of Section 79(b)(2) of the Omnibus Election Code, on
‘[h]olding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies,
for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against
a candidate[.]’ x x The obvious purpose of the conduct of motorcades is to introduce the
candidates and the positions, to which they seek to be elected, to the voting public; or to make
them more visible so as to facilitate the recognition and recollection of their names in the minds
of the voters come election time. Unmistakably, motorcades are undertaken for no other purpose
than to promote the election of a particular candidate or candidates.”
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits any person, whether a voter, a
candidate or a party, from engaging in any election campaign or partisan political activity outside
the campaign period (except that political parties may hold political conventions or meetings to
nominate their official candidates within 30 days before the campaign period and 45 days for
Presidential and Vice-Presidential election).
And, under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, a candidate declared by final
decision to have engaged in premature campaigning shall be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Said candidate may also face
criminal prosecution for an election offense under Section 262 of the same Code.
Thus, Penera, who had been elected Mayor of Sta. Monica before the COMELEC
rendered its decision, was disqualified from holding the said office. The proclaimed Vice-Mayor
was declared her rightful successor pursuant to Section 44 of the Local Government Code which
provides that if the mayor fails to qualify or is removed from office, the vice-mayor shall become
the mayor.
(B) The Supreme Court disagreed with COMELEC Commissioner Sarmiento, saying that
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code remains relevant and applicable despite Section 15 of
Republic Act No. 8436, as amended. The Court gave the following reasons:
(1) Republic Act No. 9369, which amended Republic Act No. 8436, did not expressly
repeal Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. An express repeal may not be presumed.
Implied repeals are disfavored, absent a showing of repugnance clear and convincing in
character. When confronted with apparently conflicting statutes, courts should endeavor to
reconcile the same instead of declaring outright the invalidity of one as against the other.
(2) There is no absolute and irreconcilable incompatibility between Section 15 of
Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, and Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, which
prohibits premature campaigning. It is possible to harmonize and reconcile these two provisions
and, thus, give effect to both, to wit:
(a) Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits “any person,
whether or not a voter or candidate” from engaging in election campaign or
partisan political activity outside the campaign period. Thus, premature
campaigning may be committed even by a person who is not a candidate.
Accordingly, the declaration in Lanot vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 164858; 16
November 2006) that “(w)hat Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits
is ‘an election campaign or partisan political activity’ by a ‘candidate’ ‘outside’
of the campaign period,” is erroneous.
(b) It is true that under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended,
a person is not yet officially considered a candidate before the start of the
campaign period, even after the filing of his CoC. Nonetheless, upon the filing
of his COC, such person already explicitly declares his intention to run as a
candidate. When the campaign period starts and he proceeds with his candidacy,
his intent turning into actuality, act/s constituting election campaign or partisan
activity under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code (holding rallies or
parades, making speeches, etc.), which he may have committed after filing his
CoC and before the campaign period, can already be considered as the promotion
of his election as a candidate, constituting premature campaigning, for which he
may be disqualified. Conversely, if he withdraws his CoC before the campaign
period, his act can no longer be viewed as for the promotion of his election, and
there can be no premature campaigning as there is no candidate to begin with.
Thus, a person, after filing his/her COC but prior to his becoming a
candidate (prior to the start of the campaign period), can already commit the acts
described under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code as election
campaign or partisan political activity. However, it is only after said person
officially becomes a candidate, at the beginning of the campaign period, can said
acts be given effect as premature campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code. Only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the start
of the campaign period, can his/her disqualification be sought for acts constituting
premature campaigning.
(c) While a proviso in Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended,
provides that “any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall
take effect only upon the start of the campaign period,” this does not mean
that the acts constituting premature campaigning can only be committed during
the campaign period. Nowhere in the said proviso was it stated that campaigning
before the start of the campaign period is lawful.
If the Court were to rule otherwise, “not only will the prohibited act of premature
campaigning be officially decriminalized, the significance of having a campaign period before
the elections would also be negated. Any unscrupulous individual with the deepest of campaign
war chests could then afford to spend his/her resources to promote his/her candidacy well ahead
of everyone else, thus, undermine the conduct of fair and credible elections. Such is the very
evil that the law seeks to prevent. Our lawmakers could not have intended to cause such an
absurd situation.”
Ponente: J. Minita V. Chico-Nazario
https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=gmail&attid=0.1&thid=12713dbcf90f83d1&mt=application%2Fpdf&url=https%3A%2F%2Fmail.google.com%2Fmail%2F%3Fui%3D2%26ik%3Ded08149255%26view%3Datt%26th%3D12713dbcf90f83d1%26attid%3D0.1%26disp%3Dattd%26zw&sig=AHIEtbTsoKzO7tWsebRTgZkeXABiQQ6GdQ
G.R. 181613
11 September 2009
Facts: The COMELEC disqualified petitioner Rosalinda A. Penera (Penera) as a candidate for
mayor of the Municipality of Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte, for unlawfully engaging in election
campaign before the start of the campaign period for the 2007 Synchronized National and Local
Elections, in violation of Section 80 of Batas Pambansa 881 (the Omnibus Election Code).
The COMELEC found that Penera and her party-mates, after filing their Certificates of
Candidacy (CoCs), conducted a motorcade through Sta. Monica and threw candies to onlookers,
aboard trucks festooned with balloons and banners bearing their names and pictures and the
municipal positions for which they were seeking election, one of which trucks had a sound
system that broadcast their intent to run in the 2007 elections.
COMELEC Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented. He emphasized that under
Section 15 of Republic Act 8436 (the law authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated
election system for the process of voting, counting of votes, and canvassing/consolidating the
results of the national and local elections), as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, one is now
considered a candidate only at the start of the campaign period. Thus, before the start of the
campaign period, there can be no election campaign or partisan political activity because there is
no candidate to speak of. Accordingly, Penera could not be disqualified for premature
campaigning because the motorcade took place outside the campaign period – when Penera was
not yet a “candidate.” Sarmiento posited that Section 15 of R.A. No. 8436, as amended by R.A.
9369, has practically made it impossible to commit premature campaigning at any time, and has,
thus, effectively repealed Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Penera filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court to nullify the
disqualification. She argued that the evidence was grossly insufficient to warrant the
COMELEC’s ruling. She maintained that the motorcade was spontaneous and unplanned, and
the supporters merely joined her and the other candidates.
Issue: Whether or not Penera should be disqualified for engaging in election campaign or
partisan political activity outside the campaign period.
Holding: (A) The Supreme Court En Banc dismissed Penera’s Petition and affirmed her
disqualification because:
(1) Penera raised a question of fact. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and the
sole function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion, and does not include a review of the tribunal’s evaluation of the evidence.
(2) The COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion. Evidence presented to the
COMELEC, including Penera’s own evidence and admissions, sufficiently established that
“Penera and her partymates, after filing their COCs x x, participated in a motorcade which
passed through the different barangays of Sta. Monica, waived their hands to the public, and
threw candies to the onlookers.” With vehicles, balloons, and even candies on hand, Penera can
hardly persuade the Court that the motorcade was spontaneous and unplanned.
“(T)he conduct of a motorcade is a form of election campaign or partisan political
activity, falling squarely within the ambit of Section 79(b)(2) of the Omnibus Election Code, on
‘[h]olding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies,
for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against
a candidate[.]’ x x The obvious purpose of the conduct of motorcades is to introduce the
candidates and the positions, to which they seek to be elected, to the voting public; or to make
them more visible so as to facilitate the recognition and recollection of their names in the minds
of the voters come election time. Unmistakably, motorcades are undertaken for no other purpose
than to promote the election of a particular candidate or candidates.”
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits any person, whether a voter, a
candidate or a party, from engaging in any election campaign or partisan political activity outside
the campaign period (except that political parties may hold political conventions or meetings to
nominate their official candidates within 30 days before the campaign period and 45 days for
Presidential and Vice-Presidential election).
And, under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, a candidate declared by final
decision to have engaged in premature campaigning shall be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Said candidate may also face
criminal prosecution for an election offense under Section 262 of the same Code.
Thus, Penera, who had been elected Mayor of Sta. Monica before the COMELEC
rendered its decision, was disqualified from holding the said office. The proclaimed Vice-Mayor
was declared her rightful successor pursuant to Section 44 of the Local Government Code which
provides that if the mayor fails to qualify or is removed from office, the vice-mayor shall become
the mayor.
(B) The Supreme Court disagreed with COMELEC Commissioner Sarmiento, saying that
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code remains relevant and applicable despite Section 15 of
Republic Act No. 8436, as amended. The Court gave the following reasons:
(1) Republic Act No. 9369, which amended Republic Act No. 8436, did not expressly
repeal Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. An express repeal may not be presumed.
Implied repeals are disfavored, absent a showing of repugnance clear and convincing in
character. When confronted with apparently conflicting statutes, courts should endeavor to
reconcile the same instead of declaring outright the invalidity of one as against the other.
(2) There is no absolute and irreconcilable incompatibility between Section 15 of
Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, and Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, which
prohibits premature campaigning. It is possible to harmonize and reconcile these two provisions
and, thus, give effect to both, to wit:
(a) Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits “any person,
whether or not a voter or candidate” from engaging in election campaign or
partisan political activity outside the campaign period. Thus, premature
campaigning may be committed even by a person who is not a candidate.
Accordingly, the declaration in Lanot vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 164858; 16
November 2006) that “(w)hat Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits
is ‘an election campaign or partisan political activity’ by a ‘candidate’ ‘outside’
of the campaign period,” is erroneous.
(b) It is true that under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended,
a person is not yet officially considered a candidate before the start of the
campaign period, even after the filing of his CoC. Nonetheless, upon the filing
of his COC, such person already explicitly declares his intention to run as a
candidate. When the campaign period starts and he proceeds with his candidacy,
his intent turning into actuality, act/s constituting election campaign or partisan
activity under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code (holding rallies or
parades, making speeches, etc.), which he may have committed after filing his
CoC and before the campaign period, can already be considered as the promotion
of his election as a candidate, constituting premature campaigning, for which he
may be disqualified. Conversely, if he withdraws his CoC before the campaign
period, his act can no longer be viewed as for the promotion of his election, and
there can be no premature campaigning as there is no candidate to begin with.
Thus, a person, after filing his/her COC but prior to his becoming a
candidate (prior to the start of the campaign period), can already commit the acts
described under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code as election
campaign or partisan political activity. However, it is only after said person
officially becomes a candidate, at the beginning of the campaign period, can said
acts be given effect as premature campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code. Only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the start
of the campaign period, can his/her disqualification be sought for acts constituting
premature campaigning.
(c) While a proviso in Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended,
provides that “any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall
take effect only upon the start of the campaign period,” this does not mean
that the acts constituting premature campaigning can only be committed during
the campaign period. Nowhere in the said proviso was it stated that campaigning
before the start of the campaign period is lawful.
If the Court were to rule otherwise, “not only will the prohibited act of premature
campaigning be officially decriminalized, the significance of having a campaign period before
the elections would also be negated. Any unscrupulous individual with the deepest of campaign
war chests could then afford to spend his/her resources to promote his/her candidacy well ahead
of everyone else, thus, undermine the conduct of fair and credible elections. Such is the very
evil that the law seeks to prevent. Our lawmakers could not have intended to cause such an
absurd situation.”
Ponente: J. Minita V. Chico-Nazario
https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=gmail&attid=0.1&thid=12713dbcf90f83d1&mt=application%2Fpdf&url=https%3A%2F%2Fmail.google.com%2Fmail%2F%3Fui%3D2%26ik%3Ded08149255%26view%3Datt%26th%3D12713dbcf90f83d1%26attid%3D0.1%26disp%3Dattd%26zw&sig=AHIEtbTsoKzO7tWsebRTgZkeXABiQQ6GdQ
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