Showing posts with label cases after midterms. Show all posts
Showing posts with label cases after midterms. Show all posts
Sunday, February 14, 2010
Defensor- Santiago vs. COMELEC
Miriam Defensor- Santiago vs. COMELEC
G.R No. 127325
March 19, 1997
FACTS:
On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative, filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" citing Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Acting on the petition, the COMELEC set the case for hearing and directed Delfin to have the petition published. After the hearing the arguments between petitioners and opposing parties, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 raising the following arguments, among others:
1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by people’s initiative if there is an enabling law passed by Congress, to which no such law has yet been passed; and
2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on people’s initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative.
ISSUE:
WON R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by people’s initiative.
WON RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and if so WON the Act as worded adequately covers such initiative.
WON COMELEC Res. No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative?
WON the lifting of term limits of elective national and local official, as proposed in the draft petition would constitute a revision of , or an amendment of the constitution.
WON the COMELEC can take cognizance of or has jurisdiction over the petition.
WON it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a pending case before the COMELEC.
HELD:
NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions." The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed" denotes that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local Initiative and Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This means that the main thrust of the law is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.
While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and referendum on national and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is hereby declared void and orders the respondent to forthwith dismiss the Delfin Petition . TRO issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent.
WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.
fr. atty arana^^
G.R No. 127325
March 19, 1997
FACTS:
On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative, filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" citing Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Acting on the petition, the COMELEC set the case for hearing and directed Delfin to have the petition published. After the hearing the arguments between petitioners and opposing parties, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 raising the following arguments, among others:
1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by people’s initiative if there is an enabling law passed by Congress, to which no such law has yet been passed; and
2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on people’s initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative.
ISSUE:
WON R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by people’s initiative.
WON RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and if so WON the Act as worded adequately covers such initiative.
WON COMELEC Res. No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative?
WON the lifting of term limits of elective national and local official, as proposed in the draft petition would constitute a revision of , or an amendment of the constitution.
WON the COMELEC can take cognizance of or has jurisdiction over the petition.
WON it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a pending case before the COMELEC.
HELD:
NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions." The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed" denotes that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local Initiative and Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This means that the main thrust of the law is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.
While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and referendum on national and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is hereby declared void and orders the respondent to forthwith dismiss the Delfin Petition . TRO issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent.
WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.
fr. atty arana^^
De Guzman vs. Board of Canvassers of La Union
De Guzman vs. Board of Canvassers of La Union
48 Phil 211
Facts:
Tomas De Guzman filed a petition for mandamus before the Supreme Court seeking to compel the Board of Canvassers of La Union to annul the votes counted in favor of Juan Lucero and to declare him as the duly elected governor of La Union based on the fact that certificate of candidacy filed by Juan Lucero was not made under oath in violation of Sec. 404 of the Election Law. Lucero filed a motion to dismiss the petition on 3 grounds namely: (1) that the court has no jurisdiction on the subject-matter of the complaint; (2) that the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the members of the board of canvassers; and (3) the petition failed to state a cause of action.
Issue:
WON the failure of Lucero in filing his certificate of candidacy under oath was fatal to his proclamation as the duly elected governor of La Union
Held:
No. The seeming irregularity in the filing of Lucero’s certificate of candidacy does not invalidate his election for the fundamental reason that after it was proven by the count of the votes that Juan T. Lucero had obtained the majority of the legal votes, the will of the people cannot be frustrated by a technicality consisting in that his certificate of candidacy had not been properly sworn to. In the case of Gardiner vs. Romulo, it was held that The provisions of the Election Law declaring that a certain irregularity in an election procedure is fatal to the validity of the ballot or of the returns, or when the purpose and spirit of the law would be plainly defeated by a substantial departure from the prescribed method, are mandatory. When the Election Law does not provide that a departure from a prescribed form will be fatal and such departure has been due to an honest mistake or misinterpretation of the Election Law on the part of him who was obligated to observe it, and such departure has not been used as a means for fraudulent practices or for the intimidation of voters, and it is clear that there has been a free and honest expression of the popular will, the law will be held directory and such departure will be considered a harmless irregularity. And in Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, it was held that he rules and regulations, for the conduct of elections, are mandatory before the election, but when it is sought to enforce them after the election, they are held to be directory only, if that is possible, especially where, if they are held to be mandatory, innocent voters will be deprived of their votes without any fault on their part. The various and numerous provisions of the Election Law were adopted to assist the voters in their participation in the affairs of the government and not to defeat that object. When the voters have honestly cast their ballots, the same should not be nullified simply because the officers appointed under the law to direct the election and guard the purity of the ballot have not done their duty. The law provides a remedy, by criminal action, against them. They should be prosecuted criminally, and the will of the honest voter, as expressed through his ballot, should be protected and upheld.
Hence, even if the legal provision in question is mandatory and non-compliance therewith before the election would have been fatal to the recognition of the status of Juan T. Lucero as candidate but because the people have already expressed their will honestly, the result of the election cannot be defeated by the fact that Lucero who was certified by the provincial secretary to be a legal candidate for the office of provincial governor has not sworn to his certificate of candidacy.
fr. atty Arana^^
48 Phil 211
Facts:
Tomas De Guzman filed a petition for mandamus before the Supreme Court seeking to compel the Board of Canvassers of La Union to annul the votes counted in favor of Juan Lucero and to declare him as the duly elected governor of La Union based on the fact that certificate of candidacy filed by Juan Lucero was not made under oath in violation of Sec. 404 of the Election Law. Lucero filed a motion to dismiss the petition on 3 grounds namely: (1) that the court has no jurisdiction on the subject-matter of the complaint; (2) that the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the members of the board of canvassers; and (3) the petition failed to state a cause of action.
Issue:
WON the failure of Lucero in filing his certificate of candidacy under oath was fatal to his proclamation as the duly elected governor of La Union
Held:
No. The seeming irregularity in the filing of Lucero’s certificate of candidacy does not invalidate his election for the fundamental reason that after it was proven by the count of the votes that Juan T. Lucero had obtained the majority of the legal votes, the will of the people cannot be frustrated by a technicality consisting in that his certificate of candidacy had not been properly sworn to. In the case of Gardiner vs. Romulo, it was held that The provisions of the Election Law declaring that a certain irregularity in an election procedure is fatal to the validity of the ballot or of the returns, or when the purpose and spirit of the law would be plainly defeated by a substantial departure from the prescribed method, are mandatory. When the Election Law does not provide that a departure from a prescribed form will be fatal and such departure has been due to an honest mistake or misinterpretation of the Election Law on the part of him who was obligated to observe it, and such departure has not been used as a means for fraudulent practices or for the intimidation of voters, and it is clear that there has been a free and honest expression of the popular will, the law will be held directory and such departure will be considered a harmless irregularity. And in Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, it was held that he rules and regulations, for the conduct of elections, are mandatory before the election, but when it is sought to enforce them after the election, they are held to be directory only, if that is possible, especially where, if they are held to be mandatory, innocent voters will be deprived of their votes without any fault on their part. The various and numerous provisions of the Election Law were adopted to assist the voters in their participation in the affairs of the government and not to defeat that object. When the voters have honestly cast their ballots, the same should not be nullified simply because the officers appointed under the law to direct the election and guard the purity of the ballot have not done their duty. The law provides a remedy, by criminal action, against them. They should be prosecuted criminally, and the will of the honest voter, as expressed through his ballot, should be protected and upheld.
Hence, even if the legal provision in question is mandatory and non-compliance therewith before the election would have been fatal to the recognition of the status of Juan T. Lucero as candidate but because the people have already expressed their will honestly, the result of the election cannot be defeated by the fact that Lucero who was certified by the provincial secretary to be a legal candidate for the office of provincial governor has not sworn to his certificate of candidacy.
fr. atty Arana^^
Lozano vs. Nograles
ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO and ATTY. EVANGELINE J.LOZANO-ENDRIANO vs. SPEAKER PROSPERO C. NOGRALES, Representative, Majority, House of Representatives
Facts:
The two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in their capacities as concerned citizens and taxpayers, prayed for the nullification of House Resolution No. 1109 entitled “A Resolution Calling upon the Members of Congress to Convene for the Purpose of Considering Proposals to Amend or Revise the Constitution, Upon a Three-fourths Vote of All the Members of Congress.” Both petitions seek to trigger a justiciable controversy that would warrant a definitive interpretation by the Court of Section 1, Article XVII, which provides for the procedure for amending or revising the Constitution. The petitioners alleged that HR 1109 is unconstitutional for deviation from the prescribed procedures to amend the Constitution by excluding the Senate of the Philippines from the complete process of proposing amendments to the Constitution and for lack of thorough debates and consultations.”
Issue:
Whether or not the Congress committed a violation in promulgating the HR1109.
Held:
No, the House that the Congress ought to convene into a Constituent Assembly and adopt some Rules for proposing changes to the charter. The House has said it would forward H.Res.1109 to the Senate for its approval and adoption and the possible promulgation of a Joint and Concurrent Resolution convening the Congress into a Constituent Assembly. Petitioners have not sufficiently proven any adverse injury or hardship from the act complained of. House Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that the House of Representatives shall convene at a future time for the purpose of proposing amendments or revisions to the Constitution. No actual convention has yet transpired and no rules of procedure have yet been adopted. No proposal has yet been made, and hence, no usurpation of power or gross abuse of discretion has yet taken place. House Resolution No. 1109 involves a quintessential example of an uncertain contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. The House has not yet performed a positive act that would warrant an intervention from this Court. Judicial review is exercised only to remedy a particular and concrete injury.
The petitions were dismissed.
Facts:
The two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in their capacities as concerned citizens and taxpayers, prayed for the nullification of House Resolution No. 1109 entitled “A Resolution Calling upon the Members of Congress to Convene for the Purpose of Considering Proposals to Amend or Revise the Constitution, Upon a Three-fourths Vote of All the Members of Congress.” Both petitions seek to trigger a justiciable controversy that would warrant a definitive interpretation by the Court of Section 1, Article XVII, which provides for the procedure for amending or revising the Constitution. The petitioners alleged that HR 1109 is unconstitutional for deviation from the prescribed procedures to amend the Constitution by excluding the Senate of the Philippines from the complete process of proposing amendments to the Constitution and for lack of thorough debates and consultations.”
Issue:
Whether or not the Congress committed a violation in promulgating the HR1109.
Held:
No, the House that the Congress ought to convene into a Constituent Assembly and adopt some Rules for proposing changes to the charter. The House has said it would forward H.Res.1109 to the Senate for its approval and adoption and the possible promulgation of a Joint and Concurrent Resolution convening the Congress into a Constituent Assembly. Petitioners have not sufficiently proven any adverse injury or hardship from the act complained of. House Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that the House of Representatives shall convene at a future time for the purpose of proposing amendments or revisions to the Constitution. No actual convention has yet transpired and no rules of procedure have yet been adopted. No proposal has yet been made, and hence, no usurpation of power or gross abuse of discretion has yet taken place. House Resolution No. 1109 involves a quintessential example of an uncertain contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. The House has not yet performed a positive act that would warrant an intervention from this Court. Judicial review is exercised only to remedy a particular and concrete injury.
The petitions were dismissed.
salcedo vs. comelec
VICTORINO SALCEDO II vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERMELITA CACAO SALCEDO
August 16, 1999
Facts:
This is a petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner Victorino Salcedo II seeking to reverse the earlier Resolution issued by its Second Division on August 12, 1998.
Neptali P. Salcedo married Agnes Celiz, which marriage was evidenced by a certified true copy of the marriage contract issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Ajuy, Iloilo. Without his first marriage having been dissolved, Neptali P. Salcedo married private respondent Ermelita Cacao in a civil ceremony. Two days later, Ermelita Cacao contracted another marriage with a certain Jesus Aguirre, as shown by a marriage certificate filed with the Office of the Civil Registrar.
Petitioner Victorino Salcedo II and private respondent Ermelita Cacao Salcedo both ran for the position of mayor of the municipality of Sara, Iloilo in the May 11, 1998 elections, both of them having filed their respective certificates of candidacy However, petitioner filed with the Comelec a petition seeking the cancellation of private respondent's certificate of candidacy on the ground that she had made a false representation therein by stating that her surname was "Salcedo." Petitioner contended that private respondent had no right to use said surname because she was not legally married to Neptali Salcedo. Private respondent was proclaimed as the duly elected mayor of Sara, Iloilo.
In her answer, private respondent claimed that she had no information or knowledge at the time she married Neptali Salcedo that he was in fact already married; that, upon learning of his existing marriage, she encouraged her husband to take steps to annul his marriage with Agnes Celiz because the latter had abandoned their marital home. Neptali Salcedo filed a petition for declaration of presumptive death which was granted by the court that Neptali Salcedo and Jesus Aguirre are one and the same person; and that since 1986 up to the present she has been using the surname "Salcedo" in all her personal, commercial and public transactions.
Comelec's Second Division ruled that since there is an existing valid marriage between Neptali Salcedo and Agnes Celiz, the subsequent marriage of the former with private respondent is null and void. Consequently, the use by private respondent of the surname "Salcedo" constitutes material misrepresentation and is a ground for the cancellation of her certificate of candidacy.
However, in its en banc Resolution, the Comelec overturned its previous resolution, ruling that private respondent's certificate of candidacy did not contain any material misrepresentation. A Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioner was affirmed by the division which gives rise to the petition to review such promulgation.
Issue:
1.Whether or not the use by respondent of the surname "Salcedo" in her certificate of candidacy constitutes material misrepresentation under Section 78 in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Held:
Private respondent did not commit any material misrepresentation by the use of the surname "Salcedo" in her certificate of candidacy.
A false representation under section 78 must consist of a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." It must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications for public office. The use of a surname, when not intended to mislead or deceive the public as to one's identity, is not within the scope of the provision. There is absolutely no showing that the inhabitants of Sara, Iloilo were deceived by the use of such surname by private respondent. Petitioner does not allege that the electorate did not know who they were voting for when they cast their ballots in favor of "Ermelita Cacao Salcedo" or that they were fooled into voting for someone else by the use of such name.
The Court AFFIRMS the en banc Resolution of the Commission on Elections denying the petition to cancel private respondent's certificate of candidacy.
August 16, 1999
Facts:
This is a petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner Victorino Salcedo II seeking to reverse the earlier Resolution issued by its Second Division on August 12, 1998.
Neptali P. Salcedo married Agnes Celiz, which marriage was evidenced by a certified true copy of the marriage contract issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Ajuy, Iloilo. Without his first marriage having been dissolved, Neptali P. Salcedo married private respondent Ermelita Cacao in a civil ceremony. Two days later, Ermelita Cacao contracted another marriage with a certain Jesus Aguirre, as shown by a marriage certificate filed with the Office of the Civil Registrar.
Petitioner Victorino Salcedo II and private respondent Ermelita Cacao Salcedo both ran for the position of mayor of the municipality of Sara, Iloilo in the May 11, 1998 elections, both of them having filed their respective certificates of candidacy However, petitioner filed with the Comelec a petition seeking the cancellation of private respondent's certificate of candidacy on the ground that she had made a false representation therein by stating that her surname was "Salcedo." Petitioner contended that private respondent had no right to use said surname because she was not legally married to Neptali Salcedo. Private respondent was proclaimed as the duly elected mayor of Sara, Iloilo.
In her answer, private respondent claimed that she had no information or knowledge at the time she married Neptali Salcedo that he was in fact already married; that, upon learning of his existing marriage, she encouraged her husband to take steps to annul his marriage with Agnes Celiz because the latter had abandoned their marital home. Neptali Salcedo filed a petition for declaration of presumptive death which was granted by the court that Neptali Salcedo and Jesus Aguirre are one and the same person; and that since 1986 up to the present she has been using the surname "Salcedo" in all her personal, commercial and public transactions.
Comelec's Second Division ruled that since there is an existing valid marriage between Neptali Salcedo and Agnes Celiz, the subsequent marriage of the former with private respondent is null and void. Consequently, the use by private respondent of the surname "Salcedo" constitutes material misrepresentation and is a ground for the cancellation of her certificate of candidacy.
However, in its en banc Resolution, the Comelec overturned its previous resolution, ruling that private respondent's certificate of candidacy did not contain any material misrepresentation. A Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioner was affirmed by the division which gives rise to the petition to review such promulgation.
Issue:
1.Whether or not the use by respondent of the surname "Salcedo" in her certificate of candidacy constitutes material misrepresentation under Section 78 in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Held:
Private respondent did not commit any material misrepresentation by the use of the surname "Salcedo" in her certificate of candidacy.
A false representation under section 78 must consist of a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." It must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications for public office. The use of a surname, when not intended to mislead or deceive the public as to one's identity, is not within the scope of the provision. There is absolutely no showing that the inhabitants of Sara, Iloilo were deceived by the use of such surname by private respondent. Petitioner does not allege that the electorate did not know who they were voting for when they cast their ballots in favor of "Ermelita Cacao Salcedo" or that they were fooled into voting for someone else by the use of such name.
The Court AFFIRMS the en banc Resolution of the Commission on Elections denying the petition to cancel private respondent's certificate of candidacy.
Romualdez-Marcos vs. comelec
Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC
G.R. No.119976
September 18, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte. Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, a candidate for the same position, filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. Private respondent contended that petitioner lacked the Constitution's one-year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has satisfied the residency requirement as mandated by Art. VI, Sec. 6 of the Constitution
Decision:
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.
Ratio Decidendi:
Yes. For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with domicile. The Court upheld the qualification of petitioner, despite her own declaration in her certificate of candidacy that she had resided in the district for only 7 months, because of the following: (a) a minor follows the domicile of her parents; Tacloban became petitioner’s domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought the family to Leyte; (b) domicile of origin is lost only when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose; in the absence of clear and positive proof of the concurrence of all these, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue; (c) the wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law; when petitioner married President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium; (d) even assuming that she gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired the right to choose a new one only after her husband died, her acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice.
G.R. No.119976
September 18, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte. Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, a candidate for the same position, filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. Private respondent contended that petitioner lacked the Constitution's one-year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has satisfied the residency requirement as mandated by Art. VI, Sec. 6 of the Constitution
Decision:
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.
Ratio Decidendi:
Yes. For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with domicile. The Court upheld the qualification of petitioner, despite her own declaration in her certificate of candidacy that she had resided in the district for only 7 months, because of the following: (a) a minor follows the domicile of her parents; Tacloban became petitioner’s domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought the family to Leyte; (b) domicile of origin is lost only when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose; in the absence of clear and positive proof of the concurrence of all these, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue; (c) the wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law; when petitioner married President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium; (d) even assuming that she gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired the right to choose a new one only after her husband died, her acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice.
gador vs. comelec
GADOR vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. L-52365
January 22, 1980
This petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction was filed on January 21, 1980 at 4:47pm asking the Supreme Court to immediately order the respondent COMELEC to include the name his name in the list of candidates for Mayor of the City of Ozamiz.
Facts:
The petition alleges that the petitioner is a candidate for the Office of Mayor of the City of Ozamiz as Independent this coming January 30, 1980 local election. He filed his certificate of candidacy with the Election Registrar of Ozamis City on January 7, 1980 because of the news in the Bulletin Today. The said news stated that the respondent COMELEC issued a resolution for the extension of time for filing COC. However, the President denied said resolution. Therefore, respondent COMELEC informed the petitioner that his name might not be included in the list of candidates for mayor because of the said incident. Thus, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner which was filed on January 7, 1980 is valid.
DECISION:
WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
NO. A certificate of candidacy filed beyond reglementary period is void.
Section 7, Batasang Pambansa Bilang 52, provides that "The sworn certificate of candidacy shall be filed in triplicate not later than January 4, 1980." It is a fact admitted by the petitioner that the President had not extended the period within which to file the certificate of candidacy.
This Court is powerless to grant the remedy prayed for in the petition. Having been filed beyond January 4, 1980, the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner is void.
G.R. No. L-52365
January 22, 1980
This petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction was filed on January 21, 1980 at 4:47pm asking the Supreme Court to immediately order the respondent COMELEC to include the name his name in the list of candidates for Mayor of the City of Ozamiz.
Facts:
The petition alleges that the petitioner is a candidate for the Office of Mayor of the City of Ozamiz as Independent this coming January 30, 1980 local election. He filed his certificate of candidacy with the Election Registrar of Ozamis City on January 7, 1980 because of the news in the Bulletin Today. The said news stated that the respondent COMELEC issued a resolution for the extension of time for filing COC. However, the President denied said resolution. Therefore, respondent COMELEC informed the petitioner that his name might not be included in the list of candidates for mayor because of the said incident. Thus, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner which was filed on January 7, 1980 is valid.
DECISION:
WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
NO. A certificate of candidacy filed beyond reglementary period is void.
Section 7, Batasang Pambansa Bilang 52, provides that "The sworn certificate of candidacy shall be filed in triplicate not later than January 4, 1980." It is a fact admitted by the petitioner that the President had not extended the period within which to file the certificate of candidacy.
This Court is powerless to grant the remedy prayed for in the petition. Having been filed beyond January 4, 1980, the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner is void.
pimentel vs. hret
Pimentel, et al. vs. House of Representives Electoral Tribunal
GR 141489
29 November 2002;
also Pimentel, et al. v. Commission on Appointments [GR 141490]
En Banc, Carpio (J): 11 concur, 2 took no part, 1 on leave
Facts:
On 3 March 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. On 11 May 1998, in accordance with the Party-List System Act, national elections were held which included, for the first time, the election through popular vote of party-list groups and organizations whose nominees would become members of the House. Proclaimed winners were 14 party-list representatives from 13 organizations, including Melvyn D. Eballe, Leonardo Q. Montemayor, Cresente C. Paez, Loretta Ann P. Rosales and Patricia M. Sarenas from party-list groups Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives[5] (APEC), Alyansang Bayanihan ng mga Magsasaka, Manggagawang Bukid at Mangingisda (ABA), NATCO Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), and Abanse! Pinay (ABANSE). Due to the votes it garnered, APEC was able to send 2 representatives to the House, while the 12 other party-list groups had one representative each. Also elected were district representatives belonging to various political parties. Subsequently, the House constituted its HRET and CA contingent by electing its representatives to these two constitutional bodies. In practice, the procedure involves the nomination by the political parties of House members who are to occupy seats in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Commission on Appointments (CA). From available records, it does not appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections the party-list groups in the House nominated any of their representatives to the HRET or the CA. As of the date of filing of the present petitions for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction, the House contingents to the HRET and the CA were composed solely of district representatives belonging to the different political parties. On 18 January 2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters addressed to then Senate President Blas F. Ople, as Chairman of the CA, and to Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Jose A. R. Melo (now retired), as Chairman of the HRET. The letters requested Senate President Ople and Justice Melo to cause the restructuring of the CA and the HRET, respectively, to include party-list representatives to conform to Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In its meeting of 20 January 2000, the HRET resolved to direct the Secretary of the Tribunal to refer Senator Pimentel’s letter to the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives. On the same day, HRET Secretary Daisy B. Panga-Vega, in an Indorsement of even date, referred the letter to House of Representatives Secretary General Roberto P. Nazareno. On 2 February 2000, Eballe, et al. filed with this Court their Petitions for Prohibition, Mandamus and Preliminary Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order) against the HRET, its Chairman and Members, and against the CA, its Chairman and Members. They contend that, under the Constitution and the Party-List System Act, party-list representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET, and 2.4 seats in the CA. They charge that the HRET, CA, et al. committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to act positively on the letter of Senator Pimentel. In its Resolution of 8 February 2000, the Court en banc directed the consolidation of GR 141490 with GR 141489. On 11 February 2000, Eballe et al. filed in both cases a motion to amend their petitions to implead then Speaker Manuel B. Villar, Jr. as an additional respondent, in his capacity as Speaker of the House and as one of the members of the CA. The Court granted both motions and admitted the amended petitions. Senator Pimentel filed the present petitions on the strength of his oath to protect, defend and uphold the Constitution and in his capacity as taxpayer ‘and as a member of the CA. He was joined by 5 party-list representatives from APEC, ABA, ABANSE, AKBAYAN and COOP-NATCCO as co-petitioners.
Issue:
[1] Whether the present composition of the House Electoral Tribunal violates the constitutional requirement of proportional representation because there are no party-list representatives in the hret.
[2]: Whether the refusal of the HRET and the CA to reconstitute themselves to include party-list representatives constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Held:
[1] NO. The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their members those who would fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, each chamber of Congress exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who among their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chamber’s respective electoral tribunal. These constitutional provisions are reiterated in Rules 3 and 4 (a) of the 1998 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being subject to the mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation.[26] However, under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not interfere with the exercise by the House of this constitutionally mandated duty, absent a clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[27] Otherwise, ‘the doctrine of separation of powers calls for each branch of government to be left alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit.[28] Neither can the Court speculate on what action the House may take if party-list representatives are duly nominated for membership in the HRET and the CA. The petitions are bereft of any allegation that respondents prevented the party-list groups in the House from participating in the election of members of the HRET and the CA. Neither does it appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections, the House barred the party-list representatives from seeking membership in the HRET or the CA. Rather, it appears from the available facts that the party-list groups in the House at that time simply refrained from participating in the election process. The party-list representatives did not designate their nominees even up to the time they filed the petitions, with the predictable result that the House did not consider any party-list representative for election to the HRET or the CA. As the primary recourse of the party-list representatives lies with the House of Representatives, ‘the Court cannot resolve the issues presented by petitioners at this time.
[2]: There is no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and the CA in response to the letters of Senator Pimentel. Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and their internal rules, the HRET and the CA are bereft of any power to reconstitute themselves.
GR 141489
29 November 2002;
also Pimentel, et al. v. Commission on Appointments [GR 141490]
En Banc, Carpio (J): 11 concur, 2 took no part, 1 on leave
Facts:
On 3 March 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. On 11 May 1998, in accordance with the Party-List System Act, national elections were held which included, for the first time, the election through popular vote of party-list groups and organizations whose nominees would become members of the House. Proclaimed winners were 14 party-list representatives from 13 organizations, including Melvyn D. Eballe, Leonardo Q. Montemayor, Cresente C. Paez, Loretta Ann P. Rosales and Patricia M. Sarenas from party-list groups Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives[5] (APEC), Alyansang Bayanihan ng mga Magsasaka, Manggagawang Bukid at Mangingisda (ABA), NATCO Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), and Abanse! Pinay (ABANSE). Due to the votes it garnered, APEC was able to send 2 representatives to the House, while the 12 other party-list groups had one representative each. Also elected were district representatives belonging to various political parties. Subsequently, the House constituted its HRET and CA contingent by electing its representatives to these two constitutional bodies. In practice, the procedure involves the nomination by the political parties of House members who are to occupy seats in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Commission on Appointments (CA). From available records, it does not appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections the party-list groups in the House nominated any of their representatives to the HRET or the CA. As of the date of filing of the present petitions for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction, the House contingents to the HRET and the CA were composed solely of district representatives belonging to the different political parties. On 18 January 2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters addressed to then Senate President Blas F. Ople, as Chairman of the CA, and to Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Jose A. R. Melo (now retired), as Chairman of the HRET. The letters requested Senate President Ople and Justice Melo to cause the restructuring of the CA and the HRET, respectively, to include party-list representatives to conform to Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In its meeting of 20 January 2000, the HRET resolved to direct the Secretary of the Tribunal to refer Senator Pimentel’s letter to the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives. On the same day, HRET Secretary Daisy B. Panga-Vega, in an Indorsement of even date, referred the letter to House of Representatives Secretary General Roberto P. Nazareno. On 2 February 2000, Eballe, et al. filed with this Court their Petitions for Prohibition, Mandamus and Preliminary Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order) against the HRET, its Chairman and Members, and against the CA, its Chairman and Members. They contend that, under the Constitution and the Party-List System Act, party-list representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET, and 2.4 seats in the CA. They charge that the HRET, CA, et al. committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to act positively on the letter of Senator Pimentel. In its Resolution of 8 February 2000, the Court en banc directed the consolidation of GR 141490 with GR 141489. On 11 February 2000, Eballe et al. filed in both cases a motion to amend their petitions to implead then Speaker Manuel B. Villar, Jr. as an additional respondent, in his capacity as Speaker of the House and as one of the members of the CA. The Court granted both motions and admitted the amended petitions. Senator Pimentel filed the present petitions on the strength of his oath to protect, defend and uphold the Constitution and in his capacity as taxpayer ‘and as a member of the CA. He was joined by 5 party-list representatives from APEC, ABA, ABANSE, AKBAYAN and COOP-NATCCO as co-petitioners.
Issue:
[1] Whether the present composition of the House Electoral Tribunal violates the constitutional requirement of proportional representation because there are no party-list representatives in the hret.
[2]: Whether the refusal of the HRET and the CA to reconstitute themselves to include party-list representatives constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Held:
[1] NO. The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their members those who would fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, each chamber of Congress exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who among their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chamber’s respective electoral tribunal. These constitutional provisions are reiterated in Rules 3 and 4 (a) of the 1998 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being subject to the mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation.[26] However, under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not interfere with the exercise by the House of this constitutionally mandated duty, absent a clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[27] Otherwise, ‘the doctrine of separation of powers calls for each branch of government to be left alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit.[28] Neither can the Court speculate on what action the House may take if party-list representatives are duly nominated for membership in the HRET and the CA. The petitions are bereft of any allegation that respondents prevented the party-list groups in the House from participating in the election of members of the HRET and the CA. Neither does it appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections, the House barred the party-list representatives from seeking membership in the HRET or the CA. Rather, it appears from the available facts that the party-list groups in the House at that time simply refrained from participating in the election process. The party-list representatives did not designate their nominees even up to the time they filed the petitions, with the predictable result that the House did not consider any party-list representative for election to the HRET or the CA. As the primary recourse of the party-list representatives lies with the House of Representatives, ‘the Court cannot resolve the issues presented by petitioners at this time.
[2]: There is no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and the CA in response to the letters of Senator Pimentel. Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and their internal rules, the HRET and the CA are bereft of any power to reconstitute themselves.
Sunday, February 7, 2010
tolentino vs. comelec
TOLENTINO & MOJICA vs. COMELEC, RECTO & HONASAN
G.R. No. 148334
January 21, 2004
This is a petition for prohibition to set aside Resolution No. NBC 01-005 dated 5 June 2001 (“Resolution No. 01-005”) and Resolution No. NBC 01-006 dated 20 July 2001 (“Resolution No. 01-006”) of respondent Commission on Elections (“COMELEC”). Resolution No. 01-005 proclaimed the 13 candidates elected as Senators in the 14 May 2001 elections while Resolution No. 01-006 declared “official and final” the ranking of the 13 Senators proclaimed in Resolution No. 01-005.
Facts:
Following the appointment of Senator Teofisto Guingona as Vice-President of the Philippines, the Senate on February 8, 2001 passed Resolution No. 84, calling on COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on May 14, 2001. Twelve senators, with 6-year term each, were due to be elected in that election. The resolution further provides that the “Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. which ends on June 30, 2004.
On June 5, 2001, after canvassing the election results, the COMELEC proclaimed 13 candidates as the elected Senators, with the first 12 Senators to serve the unexpired term of 6 years and the 13th Senator to serve the full term of 3 years of Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. Gregorio Honasan ranked 13th.
Petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica, as voters and taxpayers, filed the instant petition for prohibition, praying for the nullification of Resolution No. 01-005. They contend that COMELEC issued Resolution 01-005 without jurisdiction because: (1) it failed to notify the electorate of the position to be filled in the special election as required under Section 2 of RA 6645; (2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy whether they seek election under the special or regular elections as allegedly required under Section 73 of BP 881; and, consequently, (3) it failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates seeking election under the special or regular senatorial elections as purportedly required under Section 4, paragraph 4 of RA 6646. Tolentino and Mojica add that because of these omissions, COMELEC canvassed all the votes cast for the senatorial candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections without distinction such that “there were no two separate Senate elections held simultaneously but just a single election for thirteen seats, irrespective of term.” Tolentino and Mojica sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order during the pendency of their petition. Without issuing any restraining order, the Supreme Court required COMELEC to Comment on the petition. Honasan questioned Tolentino’s and Mojica's standing to bring the instant petition as taxpayers and voters because they do not claim that COMELEC illegally disbursed public funds; nor claim that they sustained personal injury because of the issuance of Resolutions 01-005 and 01-006.
Issue:
WON the Special Election held on May 14, 2001 should be nullified:
(1) for failure to give notice by the body empowered to and
(2) for not following the procedure of filling up the vacancy pursuant to R.A. 6645.
Decision:
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
Ratio Decidendi:
(1) Where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special election but empowers some authority to fix the time and place after the happening of a condition precedent, the statutory provision on the giving of notice is considered mandatory, and failure to do so will render the election a nullity.
The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to give notice of the special election is whether want of notice has resulted in misleading a sufficient number of voters as would change the result of special election. If the lack of official notice misled a substantial number of voters who wrongly believed that there was no special election to fill vacancy, a choice by small percentage of voters would be void.
(2) There is no basis in the petitioners’ claim that the manner by which the COMELEC conducted the special Senatorial election on May 14, 2001 is a nullity because the COMELEC failed to document separately the candidates and to canvass separately the votes cast for the special election. No such requirement exists in our election laws. What is mandatory under Section 2 of R.A. 6645 is that the COMELEC “fix the date of election,” if necessary, and state among others, the office/s to be voted for.
Significantly, the method adopted by the COMELEC in conducting the special election on May 14, 2001 merely implemented the procedure specified by the Senate in Resolution No. 84. Initially, the original draft of said resolution as introduced by Senator Francisco Tatad made no mention of the manner by which the seat vacated by former Senator Guingona would be filled. However, upon the suggestion of Senator Raul Roco, the Senate agreed to amend the resolution by providing as it now appears, that “the senatorial cabdidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto Giongona, Jr.”
G.R. No. 148334
January 21, 2004
This is a petition for prohibition to set aside Resolution No. NBC 01-005 dated 5 June 2001 (“Resolution No. 01-005”) and Resolution No. NBC 01-006 dated 20 July 2001 (“Resolution No. 01-006”) of respondent Commission on Elections (“COMELEC”). Resolution No. 01-005 proclaimed the 13 candidates elected as Senators in the 14 May 2001 elections while Resolution No. 01-006 declared “official and final” the ranking of the 13 Senators proclaimed in Resolution No. 01-005.
Facts:
Following the appointment of Senator Teofisto Guingona as Vice-President of the Philippines, the Senate on February 8, 2001 passed Resolution No. 84, calling on COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on May 14, 2001. Twelve senators, with 6-year term each, were due to be elected in that election. The resolution further provides that the “Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. which ends on June 30, 2004.
On June 5, 2001, after canvassing the election results, the COMELEC proclaimed 13 candidates as the elected Senators, with the first 12 Senators to serve the unexpired term of 6 years and the 13th Senator to serve the full term of 3 years of Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. Gregorio Honasan ranked 13th.
Petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica, as voters and taxpayers, filed the instant petition for prohibition, praying for the nullification of Resolution No. 01-005. They contend that COMELEC issued Resolution 01-005 without jurisdiction because: (1) it failed to notify the electorate of the position to be filled in the special election as required under Section 2 of RA 6645; (2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy whether they seek election under the special or regular elections as allegedly required under Section 73 of BP 881; and, consequently, (3) it failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates seeking election under the special or regular senatorial elections as purportedly required under Section 4, paragraph 4 of RA 6646. Tolentino and Mojica add that because of these omissions, COMELEC canvassed all the votes cast for the senatorial candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections without distinction such that “there were no two separate Senate elections held simultaneously but just a single election for thirteen seats, irrespective of term.” Tolentino and Mojica sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order during the pendency of their petition. Without issuing any restraining order, the Supreme Court required COMELEC to Comment on the petition. Honasan questioned Tolentino’s and Mojica's standing to bring the instant petition as taxpayers and voters because they do not claim that COMELEC illegally disbursed public funds; nor claim that they sustained personal injury because of the issuance of Resolutions 01-005 and 01-006.
Issue:
WON the Special Election held on May 14, 2001 should be nullified:
(1) for failure to give notice by the body empowered to and
(2) for not following the procedure of filling up the vacancy pursuant to R.A. 6645.
Decision:
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
Ratio Decidendi:
(1) Where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special election but empowers some authority to fix the time and place after the happening of a condition precedent, the statutory provision on the giving of notice is considered mandatory, and failure to do so will render the election a nullity.
The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to give notice of the special election is whether want of notice has resulted in misleading a sufficient number of voters as would change the result of special election. If the lack of official notice misled a substantial number of voters who wrongly believed that there was no special election to fill vacancy, a choice by small percentage of voters would be void.
(2) There is no basis in the petitioners’ claim that the manner by which the COMELEC conducted the special Senatorial election on May 14, 2001 is a nullity because the COMELEC failed to document separately the candidates and to canvass separately the votes cast for the special election. No such requirement exists in our election laws. What is mandatory under Section 2 of R.A. 6645 is that the COMELEC “fix the date of election,” if necessary, and state among others, the office/s to be voted for.
Significantly, the method adopted by the COMELEC in conducting the special election on May 14, 2001 merely implemented the procedure specified by the Senate in Resolution No. 84. Initially, the original draft of said resolution as introduced by Senator Francisco Tatad made no mention of the manner by which the seat vacated by former Senator Guingona would be filled. However, upon the suggestion of Senator Raul Roco, the Senate agreed to amend the resolution by providing as it now appears, that “the senatorial cabdidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto Giongona, Jr.”
lcp vs. comelec
LCP vs COMELEC
November 18, 2008
Facts:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 which took effect on June 30, 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirements in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29. During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirements in RA 9009. On December 22, 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on June 7, 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the President's signature. The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city. Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.
Issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
Held:
1. The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.
2. Yes. There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or determine the level of income of a municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress might even have lower annual income than municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills. In short, the classification criterion − mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress − is not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into cities.
fr. atty. valles ^^
November 18, 2008
Facts:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 which took effect on June 30, 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirements in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29. During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirements in RA 9009. On December 22, 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on June 7, 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the President's signature. The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city. Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.
Issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
Held:
1. The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.
2. Yes. There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or determine the level of income of a municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress might even have lower annual income than municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills. In short, the classification criterion − mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress − is not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into cities.
fr. atty. valles ^^
Dumpit-Michelena v. Boado
Dumpit-Michelena v. Boado
Nov. 17, 2005
Facts:
Dumpit-Michelena was a candidate for the position of mayor in the municipality of Agoo, La Union during the May 10, 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections. Engineer Carlos Boado, Rogelio L. De Vera, Fernando Calonge, Benito Carrera, Salvador Carrera and Domingo Carrera sought Dumpit-Michelena's disqualification and the denial or cancellation of her certificate of candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation under Sections 74 and 78of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Boado, et al. alleged that Dumpit-Michelena, the daughter of Congressman Tomas Dumpit, Sr. of the Second District of La Union, is not a resident of Agoo, La Union. Boado, et al. claimed that Dumpit-Michelena is a resident and was a registered voter of Naguilian, La Union and that Dumpit-Michelena only transferred her registration as voter to San Julian West, Agoo, La Union on October 24, 2003. Dumpit-Michelena countered that she already acquired a new domicile in San Julian West when she purchased from her father, Congressman Dumpit, a residential lot on April 19, 2003. She even designated one Gardo Fontanilla as a caretaker of her residential house. Dumpit-Michelena presented the affidavits and certifications of her neighbors in San Julian West to prove that she actually resides in the area. COMELEC rules in favor of Boado et al. The COMELEC En Banc denied in its ruling the motion for reconsideration filed by Dumpit-Michelena. Hence, the present recourse by Dumpit-Michelena.
Issues:
1.Whether Dumpit-Michelena's motion for reconsideration was filed on time;
2.Whether Dumpit-Michelena was denied due process of law; and
3.Whether Dumpit-Michelena satisfied the residency requirement under the Local Government Code of 1991.
Held:
1. SC ruled that the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Dumpit-Michelena's motion for reconsideration for late filing.
fr. atty valles ^^
Nov. 17, 2005
Facts:
Dumpit-Michelena was a candidate for the position of mayor in the municipality of Agoo, La Union during the May 10, 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections. Engineer Carlos Boado, Rogelio L. De Vera, Fernando Calonge, Benito Carrera, Salvador Carrera and Domingo Carrera sought Dumpit-Michelena's disqualification and the denial or cancellation of her certificate of candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation under Sections 74 and 78of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Boado, et al. alleged that Dumpit-Michelena, the daughter of Congressman Tomas Dumpit, Sr. of the Second District of La Union, is not a resident of Agoo, La Union. Boado, et al. claimed that Dumpit-Michelena is a resident and was a registered voter of Naguilian, La Union and that Dumpit-Michelena only transferred her registration as voter to San Julian West, Agoo, La Union on October 24, 2003. Dumpit-Michelena countered that she already acquired a new domicile in San Julian West when she purchased from her father, Congressman Dumpit, a residential lot on April 19, 2003. She even designated one Gardo Fontanilla as a caretaker of her residential house. Dumpit-Michelena presented the affidavits and certifications of her neighbors in San Julian West to prove that she actually resides in the area. COMELEC rules in favor of Boado et al. The COMELEC En Banc denied in its ruling the motion for reconsideration filed by Dumpit-Michelena. Hence, the present recourse by Dumpit-Michelena.
Issues:
1.Whether Dumpit-Michelena's motion for reconsideration was filed on time;
2.Whether Dumpit-Michelena was denied due process of law; and
3.Whether Dumpit-Michelena satisfied the residency requirement under the Local Government Code of 1991.
Held:
1. SC ruled that the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Dumpit-Michelena's motion for reconsideration for late filing.
fr. atty valles ^^
Quinto V. COMELEC
Quinto V. COMELEC
COMELEC issued a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their positions.
FACTS:
Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the COMELEC for issuing a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their positions. In this defense, the COMELEC avers that it only copied the provision from Sec. 13 of R.A. 9369.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the said COMELEC resolution was valid.
HELD:
NO.
In the Fariñas case, the petitioners challenged Sec. 14 of RA. 9006 repealing Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) for giving undue benefit to elective officials in comparison with appointive officials. Incidentally, the Court upheld the substantial distinctions between the two and pronounced that there was no violation of the equal protection clause.
However in the present case, the Court held that the discussion on the equal protection clause was an obiter dictum since the issue raised therein was against the repealing clause. It didn’t squarely challenge Sec. 66.
Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 unduly discriminated appointive and elective officials. Applying the 4 requisites of a valid classification, the proviso does not comply with the second requirement – that it must be germane to the purpose of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote one’s candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence of the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electorate arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work.
Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to whether they occupy high positions in government or not. Certainly, a utility worker in the government will also be considered as ipso facto resigned once he files his certificate of candidacy for the election. This scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he can use his position in the government to wield influence in the political world.
The provision s directed to the activity any and all public offices, whether they be partisan or non partisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal or brgy. level. Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on such a sweeping scale.
fr. atty pinon ^^
COMELEC issued a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their positions.
FACTS:
Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the COMELEC for issuing a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their positions. In this defense, the COMELEC avers that it only copied the provision from Sec. 13 of R.A. 9369.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the said COMELEC resolution was valid.
HELD:
NO.
In the Fariñas case, the petitioners challenged Sec. 14 of RA. 9006 repealing Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) for giving undue benefit to elective officials in comparison with appointive officials. Incidentally, the Court upheld the substantial distinctions between the two and pronounced that there was no violation of the equal protection clause.
However in the present case, the Court held that the discussion on the equal protection clause was an obiter dictum since the issue raised therein was against the repealing clause. It didn’t squarely challenge Sec. 66.
Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 unduly discriminated appointive and elective officials. Applying the 4 requisites of a valid classification, the proviso does not comply with the second requirement – that it must be germane to the purpose of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote one’s candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence of the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electorate arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work.
Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to whether they occupy high positions in government or not. Certainly, a utility worker in the government will also be considered as ipso facto resigned once he files his certificate of candidacy for the election. This scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he can use his position in the government to wield influence in the political world.
The provision s directed to the activity any and all public offices, whether they be partisan or non partisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal or brgy. level. Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on such a sweeping scale.
fr. atty pinon ^^
Go v. COMELEC
Go v. COMELEC
FACTS:
Petitioner is the incumbent representative of the Fifth District, province of Leyte, whose term of office will expire at noon on 30 June 2001.
On 27 February 2001, petitioner filed with the municipal election officer of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte, a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baybay, Leyte.
On 28 February 2001, at 11:47 p.m., petitioner filed with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte, with office at Tacloban City, another certificate of candidacy for governor of the province of Leyte. Simultaneously therewith, she attempted to file with the provincial election supervisor an affidavit of withdrawal of her candidacy for mayor of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte. Hiowever, the provincial election supervisor of Leyte refused to accept the affidavit of withdrawal and suggested that, pursuant to a COMELEC resolution, she should file it with the municipal election officer of Baybay, Leyte where she filed her certificate of candidacy for mayor.
At that later hour, with only minutes left to midnight, the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy or withdrawal thereof, and considering that the travel time from Tacloban to Baybay was two (2) hours, petitioner decided to send her affidavit of withdrawal by fax4 to her father at Baybay, Leyte and the latter submitted the same to the office of the election officer of Baybay, Leyte at 12:28 a.m., 01 March 2001.5 On the same day, at 1:15 p.m., the election officer of Baybay Leyte, received the original of the affidavit of withdrawal.6
On 05 March 2001 respondent Montejo filed with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte, at Tacloban City a petition to deny due course and/or to cancel the certificates of candidacy of petitioner. Respondent Antoni filed a similar petitions, namely, that for mayor of Baybay, Leyte, and that for governor of Leyte, thus, making her ineligible for both.
On 06 March 2001, Atty. Manuel L. Villegas, the provincial election supervisor of Leyte, by 1st indorsement, referred the cases to the Commission on Election, Manila, Law Department, on the ground that he was inhibiting himself due to his prior action of refusing to receive the petitioner's affidavit of withdrawal tendered simultaneously with the filing of the certificate of candidacy for governor on 28 February 2001.
In the meantime, the Law Department, COMELEC, under Director Jose P. Balbuena, made a study of the cases without affording petitioner an opportunity to be heard or to submit responsive pleadings. On 05 April 2001, they submitted a report and recommendation to the COMELEC en banc.
"Petitioners' ground to deny due course and/or to cancel the said certificate of candidacy is anchored on Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code
"Moreover, petitioners contended that CATALINA LOPEZ LORETO-Go is ineligible to run either Mayor of Baybay, Leyte or Governor of Leyte Province.
"Based on the certified list of candidate for the provincial candidates of Leyte on March 7, 2001, the certificate of candidacy of Catalina Lopez Loreto-Go for the position of Governor of Leyte was filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor on February 28, 2001 at 11:47 p.m., the last day for filing certificates of candidacy.
"In support of the petitions of Atty. Montejo and Atty. Antoni, is a certified machine copy of the affidavit of withdrawal of Catalina L. Loreto-Go, which was filed on march 01, 2001 at the Office of the Election Officer of Baybay, Leyte, which she filed on February 28, 2001.
"The affidavit of withdrawal of Catalina Loreto-Go, a portion of which reads:
"1. That last February 27, 2001 I filed my certificate of candidacy for mayor for the MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, LEYTE;
"2. That due to political exigency and influence form my political leaders urging me to run for mayor of the Municipality of baybay, leyte, I have no other recourse but to follow desire of my political constituents;
"3. That therefore, I am formally withdrawing my certificate of candidacy for Mayor of the Municipality of Baybay, leyte and in it stead I am formally filing my certificate for Governor of Leyte.
"A careful scrutiny and examination of Catalina Loreto-Go certificate of candidacy for Governor of Leyte Province although filed on the last day of February 28, 2001, her affidavit of withdrawal for Mayor of Baybay, Leyte, was filed only on March 1, 2001 or one (1) day after the February 28, 2001 deadline. In other word, there are two (2) certificates of candidacy filed by Catalina Loreto-Go, one for governor of Leyte and the other for Mayor of Baybay, Leyte.
"Clearly, on March 1, 2001 when she filed her affidavit of withdrawal for Mayor of baybay, Leyte, both her certificates of candidacy for Mayor of Baybay, leyte and Governor of Leyte were still subsisting and effective making her liable for filing two certificates of candidacy on different elective positions, thus, rendering her ineligible for both positions, in accordance with Section (1) (b) of Comelec Resolution No. 3253-A.
On 23 April 2001, the COMELEC en banc approved the recommendation of the Director, Law Department and adopted the resolution in question as set out in the opening paragraph of this decision.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
I. Is petitioner disqualified to be candidate for governor of Leyte and mayor of Baybay, Leyte because she filed certificates of candidacy for both positions?
II. Was there a valid withdrawal of the certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Baybay, Leyte?
(a) Must the affidavit of withdrawal be filed with the election officer of the place where the certificate of candidacy was filed?
(b) May the affidavit of withdrawal be validly filed by fax?
III. Was there denial to petitioner of procedural due process of law?
HELD:
We grant the petition. We annul the COMELEC resolution declaring petitioner disqualified for both positions of governor of Leyte and mayor of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte. The filing of the affidavit of withdrawal with the election officer of Baybay, Leyte, at 12:28 a.m., 1 March 2001 was a substantial compliance with the requirement of the law.14 We hold that petitioner's withdrawal of her certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baybay, Leyte was effective for all legal purposes, and left in full force her certificate of candidacy for governor.
Section 73, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, provides that:
"SEC. 73. Certificate of candidacy. - No person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.
"A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior to the election, withdraw the same by submitting to the office concerned a written declaration under oath.
"No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same election, and if he files his certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for any of them. However, before the expiration of the period for the filing of certificates of candidacy, the person who has file more than one certificate of candidacy may declare under oath the office for which he desires to be eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices."
There is nothing in this Section which mandates that the affidavit of withdrawal must be filed with the same office where the certificate of candidacy to be withdrawn was filed. Thus, it can be filed directly with the main office of the COMELEC, the office of the regional election director concerned, the office of the provincial election supervisor of the province to which the municipality involved belongs, or the office of the municipal election officer of the said municipality.
While it may be true that Section 12 of COMELEC Resolution No. 3253-A, adopted on 20 November 2000, requires that the withdrawal be filed before the election officer of the place where the certificate of candidacy was filed, such requirement is merely directory, and is intended for convenience. It is not mandatory or jurisdictional. An administrative resolution can not contradict, much less amend or repeal a law, or supply a deficiency in the law. Hence, the filing of petitioner's affidavit of withdrawal of candidacy for mayor of Baybay with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte sufficed to effectively withdraw such candidacy. the COMELEC thus acted with grave abuse of discretion when it declare petitioner ineligible for both positions for which she filed certificates of candidacy.
There is another important moiety that affects the validity of the COMELEC resolution canceling petitioner's certificates of candidacy. It is that petitioner was deprived of procedural due process of law. The petition to cancel her certificate of candidacy or to deny due course to both were filed before the provincial election supervisor of Leyte who inhibited himself and referred the cases to the Law Department, COMELEC, Manila. On 11 April 2001, the COMELEC, First Division, acting on the first indorsement of Atty. Villegas approved his inhibition and required the provincial election supervisor of Leyte to immediately forward his copy of the records of these cases to the Regional Election Director, Region 08, at Tacloban, Leyte, for hearing. On 18 April 2001, Regional Election Director, Region 08, Atty. Adolfo A. Ibañez issued summons/subpoena to petitioner Go to submit her consolidated answer to the petitions and counter-affidavits including position paper within three (3) days form notice. On 23 April 2001, petitioner submitted her consolidated position paper. On 25 April 2001, at 9:00 a.m., Director Ibañez set the cases for hearing for reception of evidence of the parties
In the meantime, however, the Law Department, COMELEC conducted an ex-parte study of the cases. It did not give petitioner an opportunity to be heard. Petitioner was not required to submit a comment or opposition to the petitions for cancellation of her certificates of candidacy and/or for disqualification. It did not set the cases for hearing. It was not even aware of the proceedings before Director Ibañez in Tacloban. After an ex-parte study of the cases, on 05 April 2001, the Law Department submitted its report and recommendation, approved by Director Balbuena, to the COMELEC en banc.
During the oral argument on 07 May 2001, Director Balbuena candidly admitted that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure requires that notice be given to the respondent . Indeed, Section 3, Rule 23 of said Rules on petition to deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy explicitly provides:
"Rule 23 - Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificates of Candidacy
"xxxx
"Sec. 3. Summary Proceeding. - The petition shall be heard summarily after due notice.
fr. atty pinon ^^
FACTS:
Petitioner is the incumbent representative of the Fifth District, province of Leyte, whose term of office will expire at noon on 30 June 2001.
On 27 February 2001, petitioner filed with the municipal election officer of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte, a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baybay, Leyte.
On 28 February 2001, at 11:47 p.m., petitioner filed with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte, with office at Tacloban City, another certificate of candidacy for governor of the province of Leyte. Simultaneously therewith, she attempted to file with the provincial election supervisor an affidavit of withdrawal of her candidacy for mayor of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte. Hiowever, the provincial election supervisor of Leyte refused to accept the affidavit of withdrawal and suggested that, pursuant to a COMELEC resolution, she should file it with the municipal election officer of Baybay, Leyte where she filed her certificate of candidacy for mayor.
At that later hour, with only minutes left to midnight, the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy or withdrawal thereof, and considering that the travel time from Tacloban to Baybay was two (2) hours, petitioner decided to send her affidavit of withdrawal by fax4 to her father at Baybay, Leyte and the latter submitted the same to the office of the election officer of Baybay, Leyte at 12:28 a.m., 01 March 2001.5 On the same day, at 1:15 p.m., the election officer of Baybay Leyte, received the original of the affidavit of withdrawal.6
On 05 March 2001 respondent Montejo filed with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte, at Tacloban City a petition to deny due course and/or to cancel the certificates of candidacy of petitioner. Respondent Antoni filed a similar petitions, namely, that for mayor of Baybay, Leyte, and that for governor of Leyte, thus, making her ineligible for both.
On 06 March 2001, Atty. Manuel L. Villegas, the provincial election supervisor of Leyte, by 1st indorsement, referred the cases to the Commission on Election, Manila, Law Department, on the ground that he was inhibiting himself due to his prior action of refusing to receive the petitioner's affidavit of withdrawal tendered simultaneously with the filing of the certificate of candidacy for governor on 28 February 2001.
In the meantime, the Law Department, COMELEC, under Director Jose P. Balbuena, made a study of the cases without affording petitioner an opportunity to be heard or to submit responsive pleadings. On 05 April 2001, they submitted a report and recommendation to the COMELEC en banc.
"Petitioners' ground to deny due course and/or to cancel the said certificate of candidacy is anchored on Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code
"Moreover, petitioners contended that CATALINA LOPEZ LORETO-Go is ineligible to run either Mayor of Baybay, Leyte or Governor of Leyte Province.
"Based on the certified list of candidate for the provincial candidates of Leyte on March 7, 2001, the certificate of candidacy of Catalina Lopez Loreto-Go for the position of Governor of Leyte was filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor on February 28, 2001 at 11:47 p.m., the last day for filing certificates of candidacy.
"In support of the petitions of Atty. Montejo and Atty. Antoni, is a certified machine copy of the affidavit of withdrawal of Catalina L. Loreto-Go, which was filed on march 01, 2001 at the Office of the Election Officer of Baybay, Leyte, which she filed on February 28, 2001.
"The affidavit of withdrawal of Catalina Loreto-Go, a portion of which reads:
"1. That last February 27, 2001 I filed my certificate of candidacy for mayor for the MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, LEYTE;
"2. That due to political exigency and influence form my political leaders urging me to run for mayor of the Municipality of baybay, leyte, I have no other recourse but to follow desire of my political constituents;
"3. That therefore, I am formally withdrawing my certificate of candidacy for Mayor of the Municipality of Baybay, leyte and in it stead I am formally filing my certificate for Governor of Leyte.
"A careful scrutiny and examination of Catalina Loreto-Go certificate of candidacy for Governor of Leyte Province although filed on the last day of February 28, 2001, her affidavit of withdrawal for Mayor of Baybay, Leyte, was filed only on March 1, 2001 or one (1) day after the February 28, 2001 deadline. In other word, there are two (2) certificates of candidacy filed by Catalina Loreto-Go, one for governor of Leyte and the other for Mayor of Baybay, Leyte.
"Clearly, on March 1, 2001 when she filed her affidavit of withdrawal for Mayor of baybay, Leyte, both her certificates of candidacy for Mayor of Baybay, leyte and Governor of Leyte were still subsisting and effective making her liable for filing two certificates of candidacy on different elective positions, thus, rendering her ineligible for both positions, in accordance with Section (1) (b) of Comelec Resolution No. 3253-A.
On 23 April 2001, the COMELEC en banc approved the recommendation of the Director, Law Department and adopted the resolution in question as set out in the opening paragraph of this decision.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
I. Is petitioner disqualified to be candidate for governor of Leyte and mayor of Baybay, Leyte because she filed certificates of candidacy for both positions?
II. Was there a valid withdrawal of the certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Baybay, Leyte?
(a) Must the affidavit of withdrawal be filed with the election officer of the place where the certificate of candidacy was filed?
(b) May the affidavit of withdrawal be validly filed by fax?
III. Was there denial to petitioner of procedural due process of law?
HELD:
We grant the petition. We annul the COMELEC resolution declaring petitioner disqualified for both positions of governor of Leyte and mayor of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte. The filing of the affidavit of withdrawal with the election officer of Baybay, Leyte, at 12:28 a.m., 1 March 2001 was a substantial compliance with the requirement of the law.14 We hold that petitioner's withdrawal of her certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baybay, Leyte was effective for all legal purposes, and left in full force her certificate of candidacy for governor.
Section 73, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, provides that:
"SEC. 73. Certificate of candidacy. - No person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.
"A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior to the election, withdraw the same by submitting to the office concerned a written declaration under oath.
"No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same election, and if he files his certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for any of them. However, before the expiration of the period for the filing of certificates of candidacy, the person who has file more than one certificate of candidacy may declare under oath the office for which he desires to be eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices."
There is nothing in this Section which mandates that the affidavit of withdrawal must be filed with the same office where the certificate of candidacy to be withdrawn was filed. Thus, it can be filed directly with the main office of the COMELEC, the office of the regional election director concerned, the office of the provincial election supervisor of the province to which the municipality involved belongs, or the office of the municipal election officer of the said municipality.
While it may be true that Section 12 of COMELEC Resolution No. 3253-A, adopted on 20 November 2000, requires that the withdrawal be filed before the election officer of the place where the certificate of candidacy was filed, such requirement is merely directory, and is intended for convenience. It is not mandatory or jurisdictional. An administrative resolution can not contradict, much less amend or repeal a law, or supply a deficiency in the law. Hence, the filing of petitioner's affidavit of withdrawal of candidacy for mayor of Baybay with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte sufficed to effectively withdraw such candidacy. the COMELEC thus acted with grave abuse of discretion when it declare petitioner ineligible for both positions for which she filed certificates of candidacy.
There is another important moiety that affects the validity of the COMELEC resolution canceling petitioner's certificates of candidacy. It is that petitioner was deprived of procedural due process of law. The petition to cancel her certificate of candidacy or to deny due course to both were filed before the provincial election supervisor of Leyte who inhibited himself and referred the cases to the Law Department, COMELEC, Manila. On 11 April 2001, the COMELEC, First Division, acting on the first indorsement of Atty. Villegas approved his inhibition and required the provincial election supervisor of Leyte to immediately forward his copy of the records of these cases to the Regional Election Director, Region 08, at Tacloban, Leyte, for hearing. On 18 April 2001, Regional Election Director, Region 08, Atty. Adolfo A. Ibañez issued summons/subpoena to petitioner Go to submit her consolidated answer to the petitions and counter-affidavits including position paper within three (3) days form notice. On 23 April 2001, petitioner submitted her consolidated position paper. On 25 April 2001, at 9:00 a.m., Director Ibañez set the cases for hearing for reception of evidence of the parties
In the meantime, however, the Law Department, COMELEC conducted an ex-parte study of the cases. It did not give petitioner an opportunity to be heard. Petitioner was not required to submit a comment or opposition to the petitions for cancellation of her certificates of candidacy and/or for disqualification. It did not set the cases for hearing. It was not even aware of the proceedings before Director Ibañez in Tacloban. After an ex-parte study of the cases, on 05 April 2001, the Law Department submitted its report and recommendation, approved by Director Balbuena, to the COMELEC en banc.
During the oral argument on 07 May 2001, Director Balbuena candidly admitted that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure requires that notice be given to the respondent . Indeed, Section 3, Rule 23 of said Rules on petition to deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy explicitly provides:
"Rule 23 - Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificates of Candidacy
"xxxx
"Sec. 3. Summary Proceeding. - The petition shall be heard summarily after due notice.
fr. atty pinon ^^
Buac v. COMELEC
Buac v. COMELEC
FACTS:
On April 25, 1998, the COMELEC conducted a plebiscite in Taguig, Metro Manila on the conversion of this municipality into a highly urbanized city as mandated by Republic Act No. 8487. The residents of Taguig were asked this question: “Do you approve the conversion of the Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Taguig, as provided for in Republic Act No. 8487? ”
On April 26, 1998, the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers (PBOC), without completing the canvass of sixty-four (64) other election returns, declared that the “No” votes won, indicating that the people rejected the conversion of Taguig into a city.
However, upon order of the COMELEC en banc, the PBOC reconvened and completed the canvass of the plebiscite returns, eventually proclaiming that the negative votes still prevailed.
Alleging that fraud and irregularities attended the casting and counting of votes, private respondents, filed with the COMELEC a petition seeking the annulment of the announced results of the plebiscite with a prayer for revision and recount of the ballots. The COMELEC treated the petition as an election protest, docketed as EPC No. 98-102. It was raffled to the Second Division.
Petitioner intervened in the case. He then filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over an action involving the conduct of a plebiscite. He alleged that a plebiscite cannot be the subject of an election protest.
The COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution granting petitioner’s motion and dismissing the petition to annul the results of the Taguig plebiscite for lack of jurisdiction. The COMELEC en banc affirmed this Resolution.
Accordingly, on April 19, 2004, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Order in EPC No. 98-102 constituting the committees for the revision/recount of the plebiscite ballots.
On April 28, 2004, the revision/recount proceedings commenced and upon its termination, the Committees on Revision submitted their complete and final reports.
Thereafter, the COMELEC Second Division set the case for hearing. As no witnesses were presented by petitioner, the parties were directed to submit their respective memoranda, which they did.
Petitioner contends that “the revision of the plebiscite ballots cannot be relied upon for the determination of the will of the electorate” because “the revision is incomplete. He claims that:
“Based on the Final Report of the Committee on Revision for each of the eight (8) Revision Committees, the revision of ballots yielded a total of 15,802 votes for ‘Yes’ and a total of 12,602 votes for ‘No.’ The revision committee thus canvassed only a total of 28,404 ballots.
As shown by the records, the COMELEC considered not only the total number of votes reflected in the Final Canvassing Report of the Taguig PBOC, but also the voting results based on (1) the physical count of the ballots; (2) the returns of the uncontested precincts; and (3) the appreciation of the contested ballots, all summed up and tallied as follows:
Affirmative Negative
Total Number of Votes Per PBOC Canvassing Report 19,413 21,890
Minus: Number of Invalid Votes 253 419
Minus: Number of Votes Deducted from the
Plebiscite Returns After Physical Count (Table D) 0 2,024
Plus: Number of Votes Added After Physical Count 1,936 0
(Table D)
Plus: Credited Claimed Ballots 9 13
Total 21,105 19,460
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion.
HELD:
Petitions dismissed for lack of merit.
The above factual findings of the COMELEC supported by evidence, are accorded, not only respect, but finality. This is so because “the conduct of plebiscite and determination of its result have always been the business of the COMELEC and not the regular courts. Such a case involves the appreciation of ballots which is best left to the COMELEC. As an independent constitutional body exclusively charged with the power of enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall, the COMELEC has the indisputable expertise in the field of election and related laws.” Its acts, therefore, enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties.
In fine, we hold that in issuing the challenged Resolution and Order in these twin petitions, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion.
fr. atty pinon ^^
FACTS:
On April 25, 1998, the COMELEC conducted a plebiscite in Taguig, Metro Manila on the conversion of this municipality into a highly urbanized city as mandated by Republic Act No. 8487. The residents of Taguig were asked this question: “Do you approve the conversion of the Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Taguig, as provided for in Republic Act No. 8487? ”
On April 26, 1998, the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers (PBOC), without completing the canvass of sixty-four (64) other election returns, declared that the “No” votes won, indicating that the people rejected the conversion of Taguig into a city.
However, upon order of the COMELEC en banc, the PBOC reconvened and completed the canvass of the plebiscite returns, eventually proclaiming that the negative votes still prevailed.
Alleging that fraud and irregularities attended the casting and counting of votes, private respondents, filed with the COMELEC a petition seeking the annulment of the announced results of the plebiscite with a prayer for revision and recount of the ballots. The COMELEC treated the petition as an election protest, docketed as EPC No. 98-102. It was raffled to the Second Division.
Petitioner intervened in the case. He then filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over an action involving the conduct of a plebiscite. He alleged that a plebiscite cannot be the subject of an election protest.
The COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution granting petitioner’s motion and dismissing the petition to annul the results of the Taguig plebiscite for lack of jurisdiction. The COMELEC en banc affirmed this Resolution.
Accordingly, on April 19, 2004, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Order in EPC No. 98-102 constituting the committees for the revision/recount of the plebiscite ballots.
On April 28, 2004, the revision/recount proceedings commenced and upon its termination, the Committees on Revision submitted their complete and final reports.
Thereafter, the COMELEC Second Division set the case for hearing. As no witnesses were presented by petitioner, the parties were directed to submit their respective memoranda, which they did.
Petitioner contends that “the revision of the plebiscite ballots cannot be relied upon for the determination of the will of the electorate” because “the revision is incomplete. He claims that:
“Based on the Final Report of the Committee on Revision for each of the eight (8) Revision Committees, the revision of ballots yielded a total of 15,802 votes for ‘Yes’ and a total of 12,602 votes for ‘No.’ The revision committee thus canvassed only a total of 28,404 ballots.
As shown by the records, the COMELEC considered not only the total number of votes reflected in the Final Canvassing Report of the Taguig PBOC, but also the voting results based on (1) the physical count of the ballots; (2) the returns of the uncontested precincts; and (3) the appreciation of the contested ballots, all summed up and tallied as follows:
Affirmative Negative
Total Number of Votes Per PBOC Canvassing Report 19,413 21,890
Minus: Number of Invalid Votes 253 419
Minus: Number of Votes Deducted from the
Plebiscite Returns After Physical Count (Table D) 0 2,024
Plus: Number of Votes Added After Physical Count 1,936 0
(Table D)
Plus: Credited Claimed Ballots 9 13
Total 21,105 19,460
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion.
HELD:
Petitions dismissed for lack of merit.
The above factual findings of the COMELEC supported by evidence, are accorded, not only respect, but finality. This is so because “the conduct of plebiscite and determination of its result have always been the business of the COMELEC and not the regular courts. Such a case involves the appreciation of ballots which is best left to the COMELEC. As an independent constitutional body exclusively charged with the power of enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall, the COMELEC has the indisputable expertise in the field of election and related laws.” Its acts, therefore, enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties.
In fine, we hold that in issuing the challenged Resolution and Order in these twin petitions, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion.
fr. atty pinon ^^
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