Tan v. COMELEC

Tan v. COMELEC

Facts:

On 10 May 1992, Antonio Tan, as incumbent city Prosecutor of Davao City, was designated by the Commission on Elections as Vice-Chairman of the City Board of Canvassers of Davao City for the 11th May 1992 synchronized national and local elections conformably with the provisions of Section 20(a) of Republic Act No. 6646 and Section 221(b) of the Omnibus Election Code
On the basis of the votes canvassed by the Board of Canvassers, Manuel Garcia was proclaimed the winning candidate for a congressional seat to represent the 2nd District of Davao City in the House of Representatives.
Senforiano Alterado, another candidate for the position, filed a number of cases questioning the validity of the proclamation of Manuel Garcia and accusing the members of the City Board of Canvassers of "unlawful, erroneous, incomplete and irregular canvass." Meanwhile, the electoral protest of Alterado was dismissed by the HRET. The criminal complaint for "Falsification of Public Documents and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" before the Office of the Ombudsman was likewise dismissed on the ground of lack of criminal intent on the part of therein respondents. An administrative charge was instituted in the COMELEC against the City Board of Canvassers, including Antonio Tan, for "Misconduct, Neglect of Duty, Gross Incompetence and Acts Inimical to the Service."
Tan moved to dismiss the administrative complaint against him for alleged lack of jurisdiction of the COMELEC, he being under the Executive Department of the government and that COMELEC’s power to deputize public officers belonging to the executive department is for the purpose of insuring free, orderly and honest elections. It does not include and comprehend administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over officials belonging to the executive branch of government. That jurisdiction over deputized executive officers cannot be deemed to include such powers as would allow encroachment into the domain of the executive branch under guise of administering laws relative to elections. . Motion to dismiss was denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss

Held:

No. The COMELEC's authority under Section 2(6-8), Article IX, of the Constitution is virtually all-encompassing when it comes to election matters. The administrative case against Tan, taken cognizance of by, and still pending with, the COMELEC, is in relation to the performance of his duties as an election canvasser and not as a city prosecutor. The COMELEC's mandate includes its authority to exercise direct and immediate supervision and control over national and local officials or employees, including members of any national or local law enforcement agency and instrumentality of the government, required by law to perform duties relative to the conduct of elections. In order to help ensure that such duly deputized officials and employees of government carry out their respective assigned tasks, the law has also provided than upon the COMELEC's recommendation, the corresponding proper authority (the Secretary of the Department of Justice in the case at bar) shall take appropriate action, either to suspend or remove from office the officer or employee who may, after due process, be found guilty of violation of election laws or failure to comply with instructions, orders, decision or rulings of the COMELEC. However, the COMELEC, prior to making its recommendation, must first satisfy itself that there indeed has been an infraction of the law, or of its directives issued conformably therewith, by the person administratively charged. It also stands to reason that it is the COMELEC, being in the best position to assess how its deputized officials and employees perform or have performed in their duties that should conduct the administrative inquiry. To say that the COMELEC is without jurisdiction to look into charges of election offenses committed by officials and employees of government outside the regular employ of the COMELEC would be to unduly deny to it the proper and sound exercise of such recommendatory power and, perhaps more than that, even a possible denial of due process to the official or employee concerned.
The COMELEC merely may issue a recommendation for disciplinary action but that it is the executive department to which the charged official or employee belongs which has the ultimate authority to impose the disciplinary penalty. The law then does not detract from, but is congruent with, the general administrative authority of the department of government concerned over its own personnel.